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ABSTRACT
This study inquires into the reasons for the onset of three 
arms control negotiations; the Hague Conference of 1899 and 1907 
(considered one continuing conference), the Washington Naval Conference 
of 1921-1922 and SALT I. Of special interest is the role of qualita­
tive changes in weaponry. Attention is focused on the periods 
immediately preceding each conference in order to identify qualitative 
changes in weaponry which appeared to be of concern to major partici­
pants.- Next, each conference itself is examined to determine if such 
weapon innovations were important in the context of the conference. 
Finally, the conferences are compared to determine similarities and 
differences in the reasons for the onset of each conference.
The results suggest that whereas no single factor or group of 
factors can be said to always be present to provide the impetus for 
arms control negotiations, it can be stated that three factors, 
economics, security, and technological innovations in weaponry, provide 
the prime determinants for most.
v
WEAPONS INNOVATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL 
Three Case Studies
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Certain subjects seem quite clear as long as 
we leave them alone. The answers look obvious 
until we ask questions, the concepts appear to 
be well understood until we wish to define them, 
causes and effects are easily recognized until 
we seek to explain them, and all the rules pass 
for valid until we try to prove them.-1-
Such is true with arms control and disarmament. The subject has been
bandied about over many decades so that a large amount of "conventional
wisdom" has emerged to enshroud the topic and thus confuse certain
issues, among them the reasons for arms control conferences.
This study will inquire into reasons for the onset of three sets 
of arms control negotiations: the Hague Conference of 1899 and 1907 >
the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, and SALT I (the phase of the 
strategic arms limitation talks of 1969-1972). Of special interest 
will be the role of qualitative changes in weaponry. Attention will 
be focused on the periods immediately preceding each conference in 
order to identify qualitative changes in weaponry which appear to be of 
concern to major participants. Next, each conference itself will be 
examined to determine if such weapon innovations were important in the 
context of the conference. Finally, the conferences will be compared 
to determine similarities and differences in the reasons for the onset 
of each conference.
1 fFred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper &
Row, 19614.), p. 1.
2A frequent assumption throughout history was that armaments 
cause wars; therefore, to halt wars, armaments must, by definition, 
be abolished, or controlled to a significant degree. Qualitative 
changes, or improvements in weaponry, appeared to widen the effect of 
these armaments so as to multiply their destructiveness. A brief look 
at the evolution of weaponry will show this as true. As the weapons 
of war changed from the feudal horse soldiers to bows and arrows, the 
crossbow, the various stages of muskets and rifles— flintlocks, repeaters, 
machine guns, automatic handguns— to tanks, ships, artillery, airplanes—  
and finally to nuclear weapons— war became more of a deadly affair, 
affecting more people. As Charles A. Barker aptly states; "War-has 
always been limited by the capacity of a nation to organize its 
military and apply it with political effect. The limitations of
2
weaponry . . . entered the calculations of the prosecutors of war."
As the destructiveness of weaponry through its qualitative changes 
increased, however, men appear to have more earnestly sought means by 
which to limit this weaponry or its deployment.
The first really successful negotiation of this type culminated 
in the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817. The negotiation was between the 
United States and Great Britain, and concerned the question of arma­
ments, especially naval armaments, along the common border of America 
and British North America. Agreements were reached which limited both 
sides to one armed vessel each on Lakes Champlain and Ontario, and two 
each on Lakes Erie, Huron, Michigan and Superior. Each armed ship was 
limited to one 18 pound gun.
2Charles A. Barker, "Disarmament; a Problem of Time," in 
Problems of World Disarmament, coordinated by Charles A. Barker (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co.71963)> P• 9*
3Little else concerning arms control and disarmament was attempted, 
however, until the advent of the Hague Conferences of 1899 190?;
hut these negotiations failed to halt armament production or improvement 
in any hut very minor ways. After World War I, however, certain 
maritime nations appeared to experience a revulsion against large-scale 
armament production, especially in the area of naval weaponry, and came 
together at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 in order to limit 
this type of weaponry. This conference culminated in 1922 with an 
agreement which established ceilings on production of certain kinds of 
naval warships, in the form of ratios for the United States, Great 
Britain, Japan, Prance and Italy. Following this, other attempts were 
made to halt armaments.
In 1930 the London Naval Conference managed several minor limits
on battle cruisers and submarines. Following this, in the World
Disarmament Conference of 1932, President Hoover proposed that all
armaments which could be used for offense be forbidden, but this
request failed. Hoover then suggested that a 30 percent reduction in
armaments across the board be made by all nations attending the
conference, but this was rejected by France. Following this, in 1933>
Germany withdrew from the conference, thus in effect ending any chance
to reach any agreement at all. Next, in December 193i+j Japan decided
to withdraw from the Washington Treaty, and submitted its formal notice
of termination. As Barker says, ’’the disarmament effort following
3World War I withered and died under the heat of these events.”
By the end of World War II, the scope of weapon innovations in 
the form of atomic weapons had further enlarged the destructive
3Ibid.
capability of armaments. From 1 3 k S i half-hearted attempts by the 
camps of the East and West toward disarmament were undertaken, but 
ideological differences and repeated qualitative jumps in weaponry made 
the nuclear nations very skeptical and suspicious of each other. It 
was not until the early 1960's that disarmament began to be sought 
earnestly by the nuclear nations, especially the United States and 
the Soviet Union, and peripheral agreements to the main topic of arms 
control began to proliferate. Finally in 19&9 the United States and 
Russia began the so-called SALT negotiations. Phase I ended in 1972 
with an agreement on limitation of certain defensive missiles,, and a 
temporary ceiling on certain types of offensive weaponry.
Thus, the twentieth century saw an increase in the efforts of 
nations, mostly as the improvement in quality of weaponry began to 
insure more destructiveness in war, to reach some sort of agreement on 
arms control. The majority of writings on arms control, however, show 
very little, if any, concern about the reasons for the onset of these 
arms control negotiations. Practically nowhere are valid generalizations 
made. The only attempts made to explain the ’’why11 have come in the 
manner of "conventional wisdom" assertions; for example, assumptions 
attributing them to the effects of economics, morality, good will or 
public opinion. While these may be valid explanations, no steps have 
been taken to determine their effects.
Moreover, the fact of the matter appears to be that the great 
concern with arms control is in reality a post-World War II phenomenon, 
and studies on the subject have appeared to evolve around the technical 
considerations of nuclear armaments and ways to conduct mutual 
inspections. Historical studies of the factors influencing the onset of
arms control negotiations are few, and studies attempting to generalize 
are nonexistent. This paper, then, is to tread on relatively unbroken 
ground. For that reason, this inquiry is done cautiously, with broad- 
based descriptions of the conferences and the preceding periods in an 
attempt to examine, briefly, all the reasons for arms control which 
appear especially applicable. This inquiry will necessarily observe 
other factors than solely weapon innovations, even if no more than just 
to acknowledge their existence and their possible effect. The advances 
in weaponry, on the other hand, will be examined in more detail. In 
the final analysis, however, it is doubtful thati at this stage, any 
positive, concrete relationships of weapon innovations and arms control 
can be ascertained. However, if this inquiry serves to focus on certain 
reasons for the onset of negotiations and is able to generate hypotheses 
concerning weaponry which may be explored at a later time, then the 
thesis has served its purpose.
These three conferences were specifically chosen because they 
are generally recognized as representative of the efforts at arms 
control in this century. The Hague Conferences, for example, took 
place at the head of a cycle of arms control negotiations. Before 
these, very little had been done to gain arms control, because it was 
not seen as a viable possibility. We can even ask if the Hague 
Conferences were, in reality, disarmament conferences; but it is 
generally recognized that the 1899 conference was at least conceived 
of as such, and nations gathered together knowing they would speak of 
armaments. The Washington Conference is generally seen as the only 
successful pre-World War II arms control conference, involving fewer 
nations than Hague but more than SALT. It was the first such
conference in the interwar period, and it laid the groundwork for those 
which were to follow. SALT, on the other hand, is an entirely new 
concept. It directly involved only two nations, but literally involved 
the world. It came at a time when technological innovation was at 
its highest peak. It is currently the subject of intense debate, and 
arms control "experts” constantly attempt to generalize from this 
conference.
Before beginning the studies, however, it is necessary to 
clarify the terminology which will be used. The singular term 
"disarmament" has been used intermittently to represent any of three 
basic ideas: the total abolition of armaments, the absence of increases
in armaments in general or in particular, or the reduction of armaments 
in general or in particular. Likewise, "arms control" has. been used 
to cover several ideas. For example, Bernard Brodie says that arms 
control "includes disarmament, arms limitation, and specific guidance 
of future development."^ Thomas Larson suggests that disarmament be 
"used to refer to measures envisaging the reduction or elimination of 
armaments or armed forces"; and that arms control or arms limitation be 
used interchangeably to represent "measures envisaging other kinds 
of limitations." Others take arms control out of its historical 
context and use it to represent a certain idea, such as "steps aimed at 
reducing the risk of accidental, inadvertent, or miscalculated war, or
^Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan Co. ,
1973), p. 32i|*
^Thomas B. Larson, Disarmament and Soviet Policy, 1961+--1968 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J,: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. I*.
6at reducing the frightfulness of nuclear wee if it should break out.” 
John W. Spanier says that "disarmament refers to the complete abolition
7or partial reduction of the human and material resources of war. . .
These definitions combine to confuse, rather than to amplify.
IMs study will use, as a point of clarification, the definitions 
presented by Merze Tate in The Disarmament Illusion. Disarmament, then, 
is 11 the reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with 
domestic safety— which implies sufficient arms not only for internal 
policing but for the protection of territory against invasion.” In 
sum, this is not to "lay down your arms,” but rather the "limitation 
and reduction of armaments,” and thus is a political problem. Limita­
tion is the "abstention from increase of armaments,” and reduction is
8"the general and simultaneous decrease or curtailment of armaments.”
Any other nuances will be defined where they appear. "Arms control," 
then, means any and all of the above: disarmament, arms limitation,
and arms reduction.
Weaponry refers to the actual armaments, land, sea, or air, 
which can be used in combat, either for defense of one’s own possessions, 
or offensively against another nation in order to gain influence or 
possessions. Most will have a dual purpose: offense and defense.
Qualitative innovations in weaponry are those improvements made in
6Lincoln P. Bloomfield et al., Khmshchev and the Arms Race: 
Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disamament, 195L-196U (Cambridge, 
Mass.: m ] I. T. Press, 1966) , p. 1, Fn. 1.
7John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Nogee, The Politics of Disarma­
ment; A,.Study in Soviet-American Gamesmanship ("New York: Praeger, 1962) ,
:p* 5.
8Merze Tate, The Disarmament Illusion: The Movement for a
Limitation of Armaments to 19Q7(New York: Russell & Russell, 1971, 
cT9^2y7ppTi^"x7^
8weapons of such a nature so as to alter in some major way the then 
established manner of making war. In a word, these are changes which
9increase the "destructive potential of existing and follow-on systems" 
so as to create concern in a nation not having this innovation.
The terms arms control "conference" and "negotiation" will be 
used interchangeably to mean "a process in which explicit proposals 
are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an 
exchange or on the realization of a common interest. . . . "  These 
proposals are not part of "tacit bargaining," but rather deal with such 
items as the agenda, rules, and technical and legal issues. Negotiations, 
in this sense* are needed anytime "explicit agreement is essential.
^John Newhouse, Cold Dawn; The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston, 1973)> P* 3«
10Ikle, pp. 3-1+.
CHAPTER II
THE HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907
The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 were the result of a 
series of events, fears, and perceptions which had taken place in the 
last decades of the nineteenth century. The direct "antecedent act" 
was the Rescript of Czar Nicholas II which called for the nations 
of the world to meet at a conference in order to discuss ways which 
would hopefully lead to a lessening of the "arms race" then in effect.
This original intent of the Rescipt was subsequently broadened to 
include other concerns, specifically international arbitration, and the 
first conference at the Hague began on May 18, 1899 • These conferences 
did show that some topics could be discussed amenably with hope of agree­
ment, but also that certain topics were not negotiable. If these 
latter topics were broached, a chorus quickly arose to render any 
discussion unproductive. As a result of the intransigence of several 
of the nations represented at the Hague, very little in the way of 
agreement on disarmament was reached. In the second conference the 
subject was even rejected as part of the formal program, and only 
peripheral agreements concerning the use of armaments were reached.
In the period preceding the conferences, the philosophy of most 
European nations appeared to be "if you wish for peace, you must prepare 
for war."'*" Bismark, for one, took this statement so seriously that he
^William I. Hull, The Two Hague Conferences and Their Contributions 
to International Law (boston: Ginn & Co., 1908; reprint ed., New York:
Kraus Reprint Co., 1970)5 P* 52.
10
converted Prussia and Germany into what has been described as a "modem 
Sparta." Other nations followed his lead to such an extent that, as 
William I. Hull, a noted expert on the conferences, stated, the "armed 
peace" became more of a burden than actual war had been before. This 
armed peace manifested itself in intense suspicion between nations.
What may have been defensive moves by one nation, appeared as highly 
offensive to others. For example, on December 6, 1898, the Kaiser 
announced a request to the Reichstag for an increase in the army of 
26,576 men. This was necessitated, he said, because of the unfortunate 
geographical position of Germany. Since Germany’s neighbors were 
increasing armaments and military expenditures at a very rapid rate, 
the vulnerability of her two exposed fronts caused much concern. This 
-increase in German troops, on the other hand, appeared to provide the 
"Austrian militarists" with a reason to clamor for increases in their 
armaments, which they did. In sum, as tensions became more intense 
toward the end of the century, alliances formed and military men 
prepared for war.^
As a response to this, peace societies became louder in their 
condemnation of war preparations. Also, many nations began to feel 
the economic pinch created by channeling large amounts of their national 
economic wealth into arms production. Because governments saw great 
utility in a militaristic posture, however, the onus was on those who 
proposed disarmament to show how it would benefit all. Since the peace 
movement after 1850 (the Universal Peace Congress, the churches, the 
Arbitration Alliance), could not convince governments to take action
Sferze Tate, The Disarmament Illusion: The Movement for a
Limitation of Armaments t o 1907 (Hew^oikl Russell & Russell, 1971»
pp. 252-56.
11
against armaments, another force had to provide the impetus to get the
3
nations to a disarmament conference.
This is not to imply, however, that the peace movement had no 
effect on the creation of the conferences at the Hague. The fact of 
the matter is, according to Merze Tate, an expert on disarmament 
conferences, that these peace societies did play some part in the 
eventual conferences, hut it was not an overt role. Rather, it was a 
covert process which served to educate the publics of the various 
nations to a sense of their responsibilities. The peace groups were 
faced, however, with a massive effort on the part of government to 
maintain adequate defense capabilities. They attempted to convince 
their publics that it was impossible for them to limit armaments while 
neighboring states were increasing theirs. This ploy by the govern­
ments was successful, and the publics in most nations began to see 
disarmament as a "utopian dream.
"In short," Tate argues, "in 1898 there existed in England, the 
United States, and to a lesser extent in France and Germany, an inchoate 
opinion in favor of a limitation of armaments, but this opinion did 
not exert a great influence upon governments. At the close of the 
century it was beginning to affect statesmen only in what they said, 
not in what they did." The impetus for the top decision makers of the 
various nations, the kings, diplomats, emperors, presidents, etc., to 
finally begin to seriously consider a limitation in armaments resulted
3Ibid., p. 160.
^Ibid., pp. I6O-63.
%bid., p. 163.
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not from public opinion, but primarily from budgets which became
unmanageable in peacetime. They also became fearful of other things:
the terror and hazards of war, internal revolution and "economic and
political convulsions" in the social order— anything which might cause
their downfall. Nevertheless, there was no movement towards a
disarmament conference. They seemed content to live with their fears
because of the thought, perhaps unconscious in some cases, that to
6reduce armaments might dangerously increase their vulnerability.
Ironically, a proposal for a conference to discuss disarmament 
came from what Tate describes as, "a country where even pacifist opinion 
on the subject was only in a nascent form and still inarticulate, where
all peace propaganda was carefully censored and where no Peace Society
7 8existed." This was the Rescript from Czar Nicholas II of Russia.
The reason for the Rescript, says Hull, was that the Czar and
his advisors recognized the immense costs involved in keeping their
army and navy at a quality and quantity equal to, or better than, the
other major nations of the world, especially in Europe. The actual
idea for the Rescript, according to Hull, came from an attempt by the
Minister of War, General Alexie N. Kuropatkin, Finance Minister Count
Witte, and Foreign Minister Count Muraviev, "to avoid the necessity of
9replacing an antiquated kind of artillery by a new and expensive one."
£
Calvin Davis, The United States and the First Hague Peace 
Conference (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 16-30.
7Tate, p. I63. According to Hull, p. 2, Russia at this time 
was considered the "world’s largest military power."
8A Rescript, as defined in Webster, is "an official or authorita­
tive order, decree, or formal announcement." Webster’s Third New Interna­
tional Dictionary of the English Language 3<i Ed. (l969)> s. v. "Rescript."
^Hull, p. 2.
13
Calvin Davis, the author of The United States and the First 
Hague Peace Conference, agrees that Kuropatkin instigated the Rescript.
It appears that Kuropatkin was very concerned over a relatively new 
qualitative advance in weaponry: a rapid-fire field gun which was
reported to be capable of firing six rounds per minute, as compared to 
the one round per minute field guns then in existence. His concern 
heightened when he learned that the Austro-Hungarian Army was to 
acquire a number of these new weapons, which Both Prance and Germany 
already had. The problem faced by Kuropatkin was that if Russia was 
to join the armaments competition concerning these guns, it would cost 
approximately fifty million dollars, which the Russian treasury did not 
have. He also felt that loans would be impossible to obtain.^
Miss Tate’s story, taken from the diary of E. J. Dillon,^ 
differs only slightly from the above. It appears that the minister of 
the Marine, Admiral Grigorsvitch, requested a loan from the Czar for 
the reconstruction of the naval fleet; primarily because Germany was 
exceeding Russia in terms of naval strength. The Czar initially 
declined, but later partially gave in and authorized an amount of money 
for this purpose. Eight days later General Kuropatkin requested that 
the Czar authorize a national loan for the purchase of new firearms, and 
for the refurbishment of the Russian army along the same lines as then 
existed in France. The Czar declined this request, but Kuropatkin 
argued that intelligence reports indicated that Germany was becoming
■^Davis, p. 1+3.
■^ Dr. E. J. Dillon enjoyed an intimate friendship with Count Witte. 
He had lived in Russia under three Czars, had graduated from two Russian 
Universities, wrote for two Russian newspapers, and was Professor of 
Comparative Philosophy at the University of Kharkov.
I k
too powerful and should be feared. He also pointed out that under a
military convention which she had signed with France, Russia was
obligated to retain a common system of weaponry with her ally. The
Czar replied that he would consult with Count Muraviev to see what
12could be done to avoid this kind of expenditure.
It was at this point that the influence of Nicholas1 advisors
come into the picture, for it was they who actually wrote the Rescript.
Their motives appear different from the Czar's, however. They saw
that "Russia needed peace for consolidating her new territorial
acquisitions, for improving her economic and financial system, for the
completion of her strategic railways and canals and for carrying out
13her new naval program." Any respite in the competition for armaments 
would be an advantage to Russia.
The ministers to the Czar, in particular Count Witte, were 
certain that weakness and disunity of Russia would mean that any conflict 
with Germany would probably result in disintegration of Russia. In this 
regard, all wars must be avoided and peace sought. Peace would have 
the effect, and be a prerequisite for, the stabilization and regenera­
tion of a solid financial base for Russia.^
What appeared as the final push for Russian initiation of the
1E>Rescript, according to Tate and Dillon, was Kuropatkin relating to 
Muraviev that Austria-Hungary was on the verge of increasing and
12Tate, p. 179. 13Ibid., p. 182.
1 TEbicL , pp. I8J4.-87.
The following is largely from Merze Tate and E. J. Dillon,
The Eclipse of Russia (London: Curtus Brown, 1918). Davis echoes it to
some extent, but rests his argument more on the military effects of the 
field gun.
15
replacing her artillery -weapons. If she did so, thought Kuropatkin, 
Russia would have to do likewise. Kuropatkin's idea was that Russia 
propose to Austria that some form of compromise he reached between the 
two for the elimination of the excessive burden of refitting for 
artillery. This proposal was to be for a temporary period of ten years.
Count Witte, when informed of this plan by Muraviev, was in 
disagreement. He believed this arrangement would only serve to inform 
Austria and Germany that Russia was in financial straits, which would 
definitely not be in Russia's best interest. What Witte proposed was a 
"ruse" to be used to convince Austria that disarmament should be 
discussed. He envisioned the development of a group of pacific nations 
in competition with each other over trade, science, and industry. To 
make this a reality, thought Witte, the nations should begin to think 
in these terms. What should be proposed, he suggested, was a plan to
16bring all of the major nations in the world together at a conference.
If the above explanation for the origination of the Rescript 
is accepted, says Tate, then the conclusion which has to be reached is 
that the Rescript was not brought about through "idealistic motives," 
but that it was conceived by Witte and Muraviev. as an attempt to help
17
Russia out of her extreme financial difficulties. As E. J. Dillon 
states:
There would in all probability have been no 
Hague conference if General Kuropatkin had 
asked in the ordinary way for the necessary 
credit to enable him to follow the example of 
his German colleague and supply the Russian
Dillon, pp. 270-79.
17Tate, p. 195.
army with a new gun. It is equally probable 
that if Witte had simply accepted or rejected 
the War minister’s suggestion of a ’deal* with 
Austria, the peace conference would not have 
been convoked or thought of. . . . However 
high we may rate the contributory causes of the 
peace movement inaugurated by Nicholas II, 
history will retain the decisive fact that the 
motive of its prime author [Witte] was to 
hoodwink the Austrian Government and to enable 
the Tsar’s War Minister to steal a march on 
his country’s future enemies.
Davis also sums it in this light. He says that "the truth was that the
peace rescript had been conceived in fear, brought forth in deceit, and
19swaddled in humanitarian ideals.”
The Rescript, which acquired the name the Czar’s Rescript, was
formally issued on August 27, 1898. It said that:
The maintenance of universal peace and a 
possible reduction of the excessive armaments . 
which weigh upon all nations represent, in 
the present conditions of affairs all over the 
world, the ideal towards which the efforts of 
all governments should be directed.20
It further stated that the time was ripe for a discussion of this
problem on an international scale. It also made reference to the
movements and opinions directed towards peace in the preceding decades,
and alluded to efforts of governments toward entering into alliances,
and strengthening their military forces for peace. It finally pointed
out that these efforts had not brought peace.
Next, the Rescript spoke of the financial burden undergone by
the various nations of the world because of the development of their
Dillon, p. 278.
19^Davis, p. 1+3•
20I use the Rescript as quoted in Tate, pp. 167-69*
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military forces and the role of technology in improving their weapons.
It said:
Hundreds of millions are spent in acquiring 
terrible engines of destruction which are 
regarded to-day as the latest inventions of 
science, hut are destined to-morrow to he 
rendered obsolete by some new discovery.
National cultural, economical progress, and 
the production of wealth are either paralysed 
or developed in a wrong direction. . . . The 
constant danger involved in this accumulation
of war material renders the armed peace of
to-day a crushing burden more and more diffi­
cult for the nations to b e a r . 1^
The Rescript went on and said that if this burden increased, then
disaster could be the only result. Thus,the Rescript called for a
limitation on the increase of armaments through the convocation of a
conference to take up this question. It was signed by Count Muraviev.
Copies of the Rescript were given to all foreign ambassadors
. then in Russia. Muraviev expressed the Czar? s reason for such a
conference as a desire to open hearings on halting all increases of
armaments. In clarification he said that armaments in existence would
be allowed to remain, and no political questions would be discussed.
Because of Russia's vast military forces the Rescript surprised the
diplomats,.conservatively speaking, and the reactions evoked were
22generally of a suspicious nature.
In the United States the Rescript elicited a divided opinion.
One group believed that the Czar feared "rapprochement of England and 
America and [the] appearance of the United States in the Far East."^ 
Another group believed that the Czar was not concerned with the armaments
21 22Ibid. Davis, p. 39.
23Ibid., p. 38.
of the United Utates at all, and, therefore, the cry for a limitation 
on armaments was of no concern to them. In any regard, since at the
t .»
time the United States was in a war with Spain and rapidly increasing 
armaments, it consequently saw that a conference concerning armaments 
was essentially impractical. The United States decided to attend the 
proposed conference, but let it be known beforehand that it would not 
limit arms.^
Russia was surprisingly skeptical herself. She quickly let it 
be known that decisions made at the conference would not be binding; 
but the Czar, at a minimum, hoped to establish some commission which 
would insure that discussion of armaments would continue. He and his 
advisors were especially concerned because Russia had no industry to 
speak of: especially an armaments industry. Thus Russia was forced to
purchase all powders and armaments abroad, thereby contributing to the 
drain on her financial resources.
Germany appeared to be outwardly agreeable, but privately 
skeptical. The Kaiser was the first to react to the Rescript, and did 
so by sending a telegram to the Czar saying, diplomatically, that 
Russian motives were good and "pure,'1 but the idea of a general disarma­
ment was not in itself a simple scheme, but rather very complex and 
difficult. He did not reject the Rescript out of hand, but said that it 
would be studied.
In essence, Germany felt nothing of much value would come from 
the conference since, having to defend two frontiers, any limitation
^Ibid. , p.
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of armaments was seen as placing her at an extreme disadvantage with 
her neighbors. The Kaiser thought that Russia’s financial difficulties 
accounted for the Rescript, and that since Russia could no longer obtain 
money from Prance (the Russian debt to Prance had reached large propor­
tions), she was attempting to obtain loans from England and Germany by 
means of a facade of pacifism. But to reject the Rescript out of
hand, thought the Kaiser, might cause other nations to blame Germany for
26scuttling a chance for peace in the world.
Two letters from the Kaiser reveal the above as probably true.
In one he states:
The whole plan seems to me to be due merely to 
the financial exhaustion of Russia . . . .  Taxes 
: can hardly be increased, and culture is at the 
lowest ebb. Witte had no further [financial] 
sources, since Prance has given Out and Germany 
and England are no longer willing. Whereby it is 
clearly proven that so far Europe has paid for 
the Russian armaments. All this must be counted 
in, along, with the young Tsar’s humanitarian 
nonsense which has led him to this incredible 
step. There’s a bit of deviltry in it too, 
because any one who refuses the invitation will 
be sard to want to break the peace and that at a 
moment when Russia cannot go further, while 
others— especially Germany— -can now begin and 
make up for lost time. 7^
In another letter, speaking of Muraviev and Witte, he said:
The vanity of the former was tickled by the idea 
of presiding over a conference, and thus having 
the opportunity of bringing himself into promi­
nence and getting himself talked about, a consid­
eration which influenced most of his actions, and 
the latter was in a serious want of money, and 
thought that the proclamation of a pacific policy
96
Tate, pp. 250-51.
27Die Grosse Politik, XV, Wo. 1+219, PP* 11+9-50. Prince von Bulow 
to Kaiser William II, August 28, 1898, quoted in Tate, p. 252.
would open for him the money markets of 
London and Berlin, which had now become a 
matter of vital necessity, since he had 
lost all hope of receiving further supplies 
from France. °
The British view of armaments appears best expressed by a 
statement made in the House of Commons in 1899 "by George J, Goschen, the 
first Lord of the Admiralty, when he declared that the British would re­
duce naval constuction if other leading naval powers would do likewise,
29Britain, however, was the only major power to make this gesture. In 
any regard, the British remained skeptical of a conference. Lord 
Salisbury, the Prime Minister, had. been concerned about armament 
increases for some time, but he saw no solution which would lead to a 
halt in these increases, or any reduction. He accepted the Russian 
invitation, but reasoned that until others reduced their armaments, 
England could not.
Tate states that, although he had been concerned over armament
increases, Lord Salisbury
was far from sure that a reduction was 
desirable even if the powers were to agree 
to a scheme.. Although its immediately 
[sic] effect might be to decrease the 
burdens of taxation, it would, at the same 
time, rob war of some of its terrors, and 
thus add a new peril to those threatening 
the general peace. He was of opinion [sic] 
that no peace is possible in Europe without 
an armed force behind it, . . . He believed 
that the perfection of the instruments of 
warfare, their extreme costliness, and the 
horrible carnage and destruction which would 
accompany their employment on a large scale
28G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, British Documents on the 
Origin of the War, l898-1911+> vol. I. (London, 1927) > pT~222~9 
Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Salisbury, Berlin, December 22, 1898, 
quoted in Tate, p. 25>2.
^Lavis, p. 81+.
acted as a serious deterrent from war; 
armaments were so adjusted as to render a 
successful war not worth striving for.30
France was initially cold hut polite toward the Rescript. Due
to its previous close contacts with Russia, France was initially offended
by not being consulted by the Czar before he issued the Rescript.
France was convinced of the infeasibility of arms limitation for itself,
but went along because it did not want to be accused as being the one
31responsible for obstructing the conference. France^ real feelings 
appear to be recorded in a letter to Count Munster of Germany from
S ' 4  /
foreign Minister Theophile Delcasse of France. Delcasse said:
In this conference we have entirely the same 
interest as you. You will not limit your 
forces at this moment nor agree to proposals 
of disarmament, we are in the same position.
On both sides we wish to spare the Tsar and 
to find a formula to circumvent this question; 
but we will not let ourselves in for anything
which might weaken our forces on either side.
But to avoid a complete fiasco we may possibly 
be able to make a few concessions about arbi­
tration. But these must not in any case limit 
the full independence of the g r e a t  S t a t e s . 32
Italy, on the other hand, was very interested in reduction of 
budgets, while Turkey was not interested in disarmament at all. Japan 
acknowledged that due to heavy expenditures for both its army and navy, 
it was anxious for the conference.
The reaction of the mass media to the Rescript was at first 
cautious but, by and large, sympathetic to the humanitarian interests 
shown by the Czar. From this, however, the media soon turned to ridicule
^Tate, p. 2^ 9- *^Davis, p. 89.
~^ Die Grosse Politik, XV~, Ho. 1+253, p. 186, Count Munster to 
Prince von Hohenloke, Paris, April 21, 1899> quoted in Tate, p. 256.
and skepticism. It saw that Russia was in a financial "bind, and was 
therefore promoting a conference on limiting arms primarily hecau.se the 
Czar lacked the money for purchase of armaments. The media further 
questioned the viability of the Czar’s proposal for a disarmament 
conference at the same time he was refurbishing his armed forces.
Due to the tremendous amount of skepticism resulting from the 
original Rescript, Czar Nicholas II and his ministers made an effort to 
ameliorate what seemed to be the artificially altruistic motives of the 
Rescript by issuing a second notice, or circular, which considerably 
broadened the scope.of the original. The question of disarmament was 
ma<le subordinate to other problems and proposals, for example, arbitra­
tion; and this modification was better received.
33This second proposal contained the following:
1. An understanding stipulating the non increase, 
for a definite period, of the present effective 
military and naval forces, and also of the 
military budgets pertaining to them; and a
_ preliminary investigation of the means by which 
even a reduction in these forces and budgets 
may be secured in the future.
2. A prohibition of the introduction, in armies 
and navies, of any new kinds of firearms whatso­
ever, as well as of new explosives or any 
powders more powerful than those now in use, 
either for muskets or for cannon.
3. A restriction of the use, in military 
campaigns, of the formidable explosives already 
existing; and a prohibition of the hurling of 
projectiles or explosives of any kind from 
balloons or by analogous means.
1|. A prohibition of the use, in naval warfare, 
of submarine torpedo boats or plungers, or of
33James Brown Scott, The Work of the Second Hague Conference 
(New York: American Assn. for International Conciliation, 1908), 
pp. i|5-U6. A slightly different translation can be found in Davis, 
pp. Ill, 112, 115, 120, and in Tate, pp. 267-69.
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other similar engines of destruction; and 
an agreement not to construct in the future 
war vessels with rams.
5. The application to naval warfare of the 
stipulation of the Geneva Convention of l86i|., 
on the basis of the additional articles of 
1868.
6. The neutralization of ships or boats 
employed in saving those overboard during or 
after naval battles.
7. A revision of the Declaration concerning 
the laws and customs of war, elaborated in 
I87I4. by the Conference of Brussels and 
remaining unratified to the present day.
8. The acceptance, in principle, of the 
employment of good offices, of mediation and of 
facultative arbitration, in cases adaptable
to them, with the object of preventing armed 
conflicts between nations; and understanding as 
to the method of their application, and the 
establishment of a uniform practice in their 
employment.
All invited countries accepted this program as it stood.
Most of the delegates appointed to the conference carried with 
them the skepticism of their governments. Some even appeared 
embarrassed to be attending a conference in which they would be 
expounding goals which they felt to be rather ludicrous. On the 
American side, Andrew D. White, the highly-regarded Ambassador to 
Germany, was chosen to head the delegation. The instructions to the 
American delegation by Secretary of State Hay were that the conference 
should not stand in the way of continued development of the United States 
military forces. In sum, says Davis, "These instructions made certain
O)
Other members of TJ. S. delegation were Frederick W. Holls, 
private citizen (speciality inti1law); Capt. W. R. Crozier (ordinance 
officer); Capt. Alfred T. Mahan (naval expert); Stanford Newel (Ambassador 
to the Netherlands); and Seth Low (President of Columbia University).
z h
that the United States would not participate in any moves concerning 
the major intent of the peace rescript, namely, control of armaments, 
hut they did indicate desire by the State Department to regain for the 
United States its reputation as a champion of arbitration,"
Germany appointed as one of its delegates the Baron Karl
von Stengel, a professor at the University of Munich, He had published
a pamphlet, Per Ewige Friede, in which war’was glorified and the
impending conference was characterized as a "daydream". This went along
36with the essential distrust the Germans held for the conference.
37The Conference opened on May 18, 1899, in closed session,
M. de Staal of Russia was elected as President of the Conference, with 
the offices of official secretary going to the representatives from 
Belgium, Prance, Germany, the Netherlands, and Russia* Three commissions 
were formed to consider the points presented in Count Muraviev's 
second circular. The First Commission was concerned with questions of 
armaments: points one, two, three, and four of the circular. The
Second Commission considered points five, six, and seven, dealing with 
rules of war; and the Third Commission dealt with point eight, 
concerning arbitration. Each country was allowed to have representation 
on all three commissions, with one vote per commission. The only 
exception was Russia, for Montinegro had no representative at the
3^ Davis, p. 80.
36
They saw the conference as a game of strategy.
37Hull, p. 22, states that the meetings were to be secret with 
no stenographer to record the proceedings, but pressure was brought to 
bear on the delegates by the press, resulting in information briefings 
being given to the journalists. The information given, however, was, 
according to Hull, "meager, half-true, or wholly false."
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conference, and commissioned Russia to act on her "behalf. On the First 
Commission, Auguste Beemaert of Belgium was selected as president, 
with Munster of Germany and White of the United States as honorary 
presidents.
The emphasis of the conference, "beginning with the remarks at 
the opening session, was on arbitration and not armaments; but some work 
was done in the First Commission to attempt to salvage something on 
this question. At the opening session of the First Commission, de Staal 
stated that there was a need for ’’alleviating the burdens of peace, not 
by disarmament, but by a limitation, a halt, in the ascending course 
of armaments and expenditures.”
Colonel Gilinsky of Russia, after speaking of the need to curb
increased armaments, presented the specific Russian proposals for land
39warfare to the First Commission. These, in summary form, were as 
follows: 1. A proposal for prohibiting an increase in the number of
troops maintained in peacetime in each country (this prohibition was 
to last for a period of five years); 2. A means to determine the 
present level of troops; and 3* A prohibition against increasing 
military budgets over what was then in force.
The German reply, delivered by Colonel von Schwarzhoff, was that:
The German people are not crushed beneath the 
weight of expenditure and taxes; they are not 
hanging on the edge of a precipice; they are 
not hastening towards exhaustion and ruin.
Quite the contrary: public and private wealth
is increasing; the general welfare and standard
■^Quoted in Hull, p. 55*
on
The following points (Hull, pp. 56-57) and most of the following 
arguments reference the First Commission are summarized from Hull.
of life are rising from year to year.
He continued by stating his belief in the impos s.lbil ity of the tasks 
presented in each of the proposals. He expressed his "confidence" in 
the rulers of nations, meaning that an excess of armaments alone would 
not cause war. He went on to say that the technical difficulties 
implicit in the proposals were in fact "insurmountable obstacles."
He also objected to the advisability of considering the question of 
troops by itself. The number of troops, he said, was connected to too 
many other conditions, like length of service and public training of 
citizens, to be a separate entity with any specific meaning. The 
defense of a nation, he pointed out, was not simply a question of the 
number of troops. One should also consider a nation’s "character, 
its history, and its traditions, taking into account its economic 
resources, its geographical situation, and the duties which devolve 
upon it."^* To determine the effect of any single one of these items 
would be impossible. He concluded by saying that although Germany was 
receptive to the notion of a limitation of armaments, the problems in 
the way of such an agreement made the notion impossible to obtain in 
actuality.
Gilinsky’s reply was that it was first necessary that an agree­
ment be made, then the states could arrange for its enforcement.
Von Schwazhoff’s answer was to note that a nation’s strength can be 
increased by means such as railroads, and this without raising the 
levels of troops.
^Quoted in Hull, p. 58.
^Tbid. , p. 59*
Mr. van Kamebeck of the Netherlands attempted to "bring the two 
views closer together. He said that even if monies spent on military 
needs were not a heavy burden to a .nation, as appeared the case in 
Germany, it should at least be recognized that better uses . could be 
found for the money. The question must be looked at, not from a 
parochial view, but from a more universal one. It may be, he went on 
to say, that these expenditures were not really necessary for national 
defense, but rather were "the result of international competition."
The Russian proposal, he pointed out, was that the cost could be reduced 
to those who could not afford it by eliminating or reducing international 
competition. However, if this was not a suitable argument, he went on 
to say, there was another way of looking at this problem. If those at 
home favoring reduced military spending were not satisfied, then the 
"enomous military expenditures which burden nations may furnish
j p
dangerous weapons against the established social order." This type 
of argument changed no-one’s minds.
I *5
A military committee was formed to consider the above dis­
cussion. No minutes were kept, but its report to the commission was as 
follows:
The members of the committee charged with the 
examination of the propositions of Colonel 
Gilinsky, relating to the first topic of 
Count Mouravieff's circular, have met twice.
With the exception of Colonel Gilinsky, they 
have decided unanimously: first, that it
would be very difficult to fix, even for a 
term of five years, the number of troops, 
without regulating at the same time other 
elements of the national defense; second, that
^Ibid. , p. 61.
I
The members, all military, were from Austria, France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Italy, Romania, Russia, and the United States.
it would be no less difficult to regulate 
by an international agreement the elements 
of this defense, organized in. each country 
upon very different principles. Hence, the 
committee regrets its inability to accept 
the proposition made in the name of the 
Russian government. The majority of its 
members believe that a more thorough study 
of the question by the governments them­
selves would be desirable.
This was accepted by the commission.
When the specific questions which concerned armaments were 
finally discussed at the Conference, they revolved around three subject
I Sareas: air warfare, warfare on the high seas, and warfare on land.
With regard to air warfare, the main topic discussed was the 
throwing or dropping of explosives or projectiles from balloons. In 
commenting on this, and this appeared to reflect many of the thoughts 
of the delegates on this particular subject, General Poortugael of the 
Netherlands said the following: ’’Since such attacks can not be guarded
against, they resemble treachery; and’all that resembles treachery 
should be scrupulously eliminated. Let us be chivalrous even in the 
manner of making war!”^  Gilinsky echoed this, saying that what each 
nation then had for war was adequate. Mounier of France expressed his 
concern for the safety of non-combatants.
The subcommittee agreed to prohibit this use of balloons, but 
Captain Crozier of the United States made a proposal that this prohibi­
tion be limited to a period of .fuve years. His argument was that the 
use of balloons at some time in the future might be humanitarian by
^Qnoted in Hull, pp. 62-63.
For the best discussion of this see Davis.
^Quoted in Hull, p. 77*
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"localizing11 destruction at specific critical points, thus turning the 
tide of battle there -without involving persons at other locations on 
the battlefield. The proposal with this amendment was adopted by 
unanimous vote.
In the discussions of warfare at sea, the subcommittee handling
the problem quickly became tied down in a discussion of the second topic
of the circular, specifically the definition of what "new kinds of
/
firearms" meant. Captain Scheine of Russia said that "the term should
be understood in the sense of an entirely new type, and should not
) 7
include transformations and improvements."•■■.This definition was in 
turn opposed by Japan, Prance, and Great Britain. Admiral Fisher of 
Great Britain said that a country would have the best arms it could
IO
afford, because they "tend to shorten and to prevent wars." If 
restrictions were placed on new types of weaponry, he went on to say, 
then the "civilized" nations come to be at a disadvantage vis-a-vis 
"savage" nations.
In response, Scheine cited proposals to illustrate what he had 
meant by new types. First, reference marine cannon, he proposed that a 
temporary agreement be made to limit the caliber and initial velocity 
of these weapons. Captain Mahan objected saying that if these were to 
be limited, then the type and size of armor should also be limited.
Admiral Pephan of France then suggested that an agreement should be 
reached whereby all nations would pledge not to introduce, for a 
temporary period, "a radical transformation in existing types, such as
^7Ibid., p. 83.
^8Ibid., p. Bk-
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Ii9that from a muzzle-loading to a breech-loading cannon.1 He also 
suggested that the caliber of weapons remain as they presently were.
The vote was seven for, and seven against, with the affirmative votes 
being given by small powers, and the negative votes coming from the 
large powers. The result was a vote on a proposal to have this subject 
sent to the governments for serious study. This passed ten to three, 
with the three negative votes from Germany, Italy, and the United 
States.
/
Scheine’s next proposal was a prohibition on ’’new explosives,
or any powders more powerful than those now in use." The delegate from
Siam opposed this because "the employment of explosives, particularly
for the small powers, constitutes a special means of defense." Great
✓
Britain and France also objected. Scheine changed his proposal to read 
a prohibition of the use of "projectiles charged with explosives which 
diffuse asphyxiating or deleterious gases . . . . [these] include only 
those projectiles whose object is to diffuse asphyxiating gases, and 
not to those whose explosion produces incidentally such gases."
This new proposal was supported by Austria-Hungary, Denmark,
France, Great Britain, Portugal, and Russia. Their argument was that 
the purpose of the conference was to reduce what the various countries 
had in the world for destruction. Their primary goal, then, was to 
attempt to prevent the occurrence of new means of destruction. The 
phantasm of death from asphyxiation,, to them, was more cruel and ghastly 
than by other means then in existence. This prohibition passed with
Ibid.» p. 86.
Ibid., p. 87.
only one dissenting vote, that of the United States* Its argument was 
that these new weapons had not been adequately tested as yet; therefore, 
they might, in the end, be more humane than others which were then in 
use. The proposal for the provision was passed at a meeting of the 
entire conference with only Great Britain and the United States 
dissenting.^
The next subject discussed by the naval subcommittee was the ques
tion of torpedo boats and rams. Torpedo boats (including submarines)
had not seen much use prior to 1899> and their future was questionable.
With this in mind, no specific proposals were advanced by Russia for
their prohibition. Through general conversation, Denmark, Germany,
Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Russia all agreed to prohibit their
use, but only if unanimity was attained. The United States reserved the
right for the unrestricted use of the boats, however, and Austria-
Hungary, France, and several other smaller nations saw that they were a
good defensive weapon for their ports. The subject was dropped, and
the subcommittee concentrated on rams. No agreement was reached on 
92these, either.
In the area of warfare on land, Gilinsky proposed that the use 
of explosives in any conflict be confined to that which was presently 
in existence, and that a moratorium be placed on manufacturing of new 
explosives. Crozier of the United States opposed this with the standard 
answer that new explosives may be better and cheaper than the old ones; 
therefore, money could be saved. A vote was taken, and the subject was
<1
Great Britain voted no because unanimity had not been attained.
92Davis, p. 120.
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referred to the will of each state.
The subject of field guns was then discussed. The Russians 
proposed that the cannon then in use in several nations, the new rapid- 
fire field gun, should be the limit of innovation, and that these cannon 
should not be modified further. Gilinsky further stated that armies 
should be permitted to acquire these new guns if they did not already 
have them. However, the reaction was entirely negative. No nation 
except Russia wished to limit innovations. The proposal was voted on, 
with no affirmative votes, and Bulgaria and Russia abstaining. The 
subject was dropped.
Next the subject of muskets was discussed. Gilinsky suggested 
that since the majority of the muskets in use by the armies of the 
world were approximately of the same caliber and quality, a period of 
time should be established during which a moratorium would be placed 
on changes in the types of muskets presently in use. He made this into 
a proposal and also added that no one could improve the quality of their 
muskets, even if the weapon was of inferior quality than those held by 
some nations. In other words, he went on, existing types of muskets 
could be improved, but a transformation of the weapon itself could not 
be made; e. g. , to make them automatic.
This proposal evoked much response. General Zuccari of Italy 
saw that in reality the differences in quality and caliber of muskets 
in the armies of the world was very great. Colonel Kuepach of Austria- 
Hungary said that it would be hard to define the effects of innovations, 
because even small improvements could essentially transform the 
character of the weapon.
In light of these responses, Russia made a counter-proposal
33
covering a minimum weight and caliber for muskets, a minimum weight for 
bullets, a maximum muzzle velocity, and a maximum rate of fire of twenty- 
five rounds per minute. Colonel von Schwarzhoff of Germany responded 
that this would not work because it would make the weapon too heavy for 
the soldier. In addition, he said, muzzle velocity depended on the type 
of powder used, and since no provision was made on development of new 
powders, the proposition was faulty. The proposal was rejected.
General Poortugael of the Netherlands then proposed that a five 
year moratorium on improving muskets and on_producing new ones be 
instituted, and that all nations be allowed to adopt the best muskets 
then in use. The vote was ten yes, and ten no. Colonel von 
Schwarzhoff reflected the views of the major powers when he said: MWe
"should not tie our hands in advance so that we should have to ignore 
more humane methods which may be invented in the future."
Next, the subject of bullets, specifically "dumdum" bullets, 
was discussed. The argument against the dumdum was that they made 
"incurable wounds" because of their tendency to flatten out upon entering 
the body. Gilinsky formulated a resolution stating; "The contracting 
Powers prohibit the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in 
the human body, such as bullets with hard jackets, whose jacket does not 
entirely cover the core or has incisions in it." Since these bullets 
were used in large part by the British army, the provision appeared to 
be directed at them. The vote was nineteen for the resolution, and one
Negative votes were cast by Austria, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Switzerland, Turkey, and the U.S.
^Quoted in Hull, p. 181.
^Ibid., p. 182.
against (Great Britain, later joined by the United States).^
The efforts of the First Commission resulted in only three 
declarations being brought before the Conference for vote. First, the 
prohibition against throwing projectiles from balloons was passed 
unanimously. Second, the prohibition against use of dumdum bullets was 
passed with negative votes coming from Great Britain and the United 
States. Third, the prohibition on projectiles containing asphyxiating 
gas was passed with negative votes coming from Great Britain and the 
United States.
The only major reservation at the conference apparently came
from the American delegation. It was read into the conference permanent
record and said:
Nothing contained in this Convention shall be so 
construed as to require the United States of 
America to depart from its traditional policy of 
not intruding upon, interfering with, or 
entangling itself in the political questions or 
policy or internal administration of any foreign 
state; nor shall anything contained in the said 
Convention be construed to imply a relinquishment 
by the United States of America of its traditional 
attitude toward purely American questions.57
With respect to armaments, the Hague conference of 1899 was a
failure. A reason appears to be that, as Davis concludes,
No great power— and few secondary powers—  
really desired limitation of armaments.
Cherishing national and imperial ambitions, 
fearful of their enemies, and distrustful of 
their friends, nations sent representatives 
to the Hague not to promote peace but to 
prevent success for the principal Russian
56The above discussion of the workings of the conference is 
taken from Hull, Scott, and Davis. They agree on all important points.
57James Brown Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace 
Conferences: The Conference of 1899 (New York, 1920), pp. 81+, 87,
quoted in Davis, p. 179-
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proposals—-proposals in which the Russians 
themselves had no faith.58
It also appears that the conference attempted much more than the 
delegates were willing to he party to. The issues were decidedly 
complex, and when one country suggested a way to control armaments, 
others were quick to point out the infeasibility of the proposal; e.g., 
the rifle problem. The complexity of the problems helped stymie any 
movement towards armament control. In the end, the main objective of 
the original Rescript— the limitation of armaments— had been rejected, 
with only peripheral and, by and large, meaningless restrictions on 
armaments passed. The major accomplishments came from the works of the 
other two commissions:, neither having to do with armaments.
In the period between the two Hague conferences, two major wars
were fought: the Anglo-Boer war, and the Russo-Japanese war. Moreover,
a combined European and American army 
avenged the outrages of the Boxers by 
sacking Peking. England fought in the 
Transvaal, five thousand miles from her 
base of supplies; the United States had 
just conquered and now held under military 
rule possessions at even greater distance 
from home water. All these wars demon­
strated the new significance of sea power 
in history and intensified the naval 
armament competition.59
Nevertheless, the subject of armaments control was becoming 
more prominent in these years between the two conferences at the Hague.
This was due to the tremendous ams competition which ensued after the 
Conference of 1899, and to the determination by some of the major 
powers that the subject should be spoken of at the next conference.^
There was also a rising consensus that the discussions
58 59 60
Davis, p. 212. ^Tate, p. 29U. Ibid.
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of armaments at the Conference of 1899 had been taken up, as Hull says,
"at the wrong end"; that it had devoted itself 
chiefly to the "balancing of ship against ship 
and tonnage against tonnage, and had conse­
quently fallen into a hopeless technical tangle 
and mathematical snarl; that what was needed was 
a thorough study of the economic and political 
aspects of the question. But this study, 
recommended by the conference itself, was not 
entered upon by the governments; and statesmen- 
continued to suggest mathematical solutions of 
the problem, such as the reduction of the size 
of battle ships, or the restriction of military 
budgets for a term of five years to the amounts 
expended during the preceding five years.61
Moreover, the various peace societies around the globe continued 
to show their concern over the cost and quantity of new naval weapons. 
Many resolutions made and passed at‘the various peace congresses from 
190l| to 1907 called for a limitation on armaments. One such congress, 
-the Inter-Parliamentary Union, played a vital role in the onset of the 
1907 Conference. It held its I9OI4. conference at St. Louis, Missouri, 
where a resolution was adopted calling for an international conference, 
made up of governmental delegates of the various countries of the world, 
to discuss those questions left for future consideration by the Confer­
ence of 1899• The Union requested that the President of the United 
States call on other governments to establish this new conference. On 
October 21, 190i|, President Roosevelt sent a circular proposing a second 
Hague Conference to the various governments of the world, but Russia
and.Japan in particular (both then engaged in war), felt that the time
62was not right and the matter was postponed.
After the Russo-Japanese war, the cry for a conference was again
6lHull, p. 69. 
^Tate, pp. 319-20.
heard, hut the tone had changed. Russia, for one, no longer wanted to 
limit armaments, hut rather to increase them. Great Britain, on the 
other hand, felt that the conference should include talk of disarmament. 
Roosevelt also wanted the conference to include talk of limitation of 
armaments, and advocated the limiting of the size of battleships to 
l£,000 tons. France, Great Britain, Spain, and the United States all 
indicated their willingness to discuss the topic of arms limitation at 
the conference; hut Austria, Germany, Japan, and Russia indicated that 
they would not discuss the question, even if it was introduced.
Hull feels that Russia did not want to bring up the subject for 
two reasons: first, the opposition the Russian government had faced
during the first conference, and second, the Russian1 s suspicion that 
if they included a discussion of limitation of armaments in the program, 
it would create discord and a lack of co-operation among the delegates 
at the conference. Tate, on the other hand, feels that the desire 
to increase arms was due to Russia1 s poor conduct in the Russo-Japanese 
war.
advantage to limit armaments either. They saw themselves as becoming 
a great power, and were in the process of increasing the size of their 
already large merchant marine. To become a great power, a large, 
strong navy was a necessity. In sum, in the intervening years between 
the two conferences, especially during the period between the proposal 
for the Second Conference and its actual acceptance by the major powers;
The Germans apparently felt that it would not be to their
61See Tate, pp. 321^ -29, for further discussion of Great Britain1 s
views.
is for this was a speech made during the Second 
Conference by the Russian delegate, M. Uelidow.
the question of disarmament, the feasibility of such a topic being
discussed, was a subject of much debate among the major nations of the
world. In order to show her desires and good will, Great Britain did
announce in 1906 the scrapping of one battleship which was to be built,
and likewise reduced the number of submarines and destroyers it did
66have; however, this was of no help.
The President of the United States then sent a circular to the
various governments of the world proposing a new conference. The
response was favorable, but out of deference to the Czar, Roosevelt
yielded the making of the program and the actual protocols to Nicholas II.
The conference was called for 1$ June, 19071 but when the Russian
proposal was sent to the various nations, it excluded any discussion of
the limitation of armaments.
Russia proposed a program but specifically excluded those
questions "which concern the restriction of military or naval 
66forces. ..." The program consisted of improving the rules of land
and maritime warfare, and of improving the arbitration procedures agreed
on at the Hague Conference of 1899•
Not all governments agreed to the above conditions, however,
and several reservations were noted. The United States, Great Britain,
and Spain, reserved the right to submit questions on the reduction or
67limitation of armaments. On the other hand, Austria, Bolivia, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, Japan, the Netherlands, and Russia, all reserved the
6%ite, pp. 350-52.
^Quoted in Hull) p. i|.8.
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The change in U.S. views from 1899 represented Roosevelt's 
conceptions.
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right to abstain from discussion of any topic which would appear to be 
leading to no useful result.
It was almost two months into the conference in 1907 when Sir 
Edward Fry of Great Britain finally brought up the subject of disarma­
ment. He pointed out that since the 1899 conference the actual expenses 
for military forces had increased in large amounts. These expenditures, 
he went on to say, could be put to better use. He acknowledged that
the idea embodied in the limit on armaments was "noble," but the
68important question was, "Is this wish attainable?" Great Britain, he
said, was willing to work towards this goal. He saw, however, that it
was the duty of any and all states to provide for a defense capable of
protecting the inhabitants from any danger from outside forces; and that
only these states could decide best how to fulfill this duty. In this,
then, lay the fact that any armament limitation must come through the
"good will" of each nation. He concluded by proposing to establish the
"means" for securing this good will. His declaration was as follows:
The Government of Great Britain will be ready 
to communicate each year to the powers that 
will do the same, its plan of constructing 
new war ships and the expenditures which this 
plan will require. Such an exchange of 
information will facilitate an exchange of 
views between the governments on the reduc­
tion which by common agreement may be effected.
The Britannic Government believes that in this 
way an understanding may be reached on the 
expenditures which the states that agree to 
pursue this course will be justified in 
entering upon their budgets. 9^
He then proposed a resolution which stated;
68Quoted in Hull, p. 72. 
Ibid., p. 73.
ho
(The Second Conference of Peace re-affirms the 
resolution adopted by the Conference of 1899 
regarding the limitations of military charges, 
and considers that these military burdens have 
considerably increased in almost all the coun­
tries since the last date. The Conference 
declares that it is especially to be desired 
that the governments should undertake again 
the serious study of this question.70
Following this, M. Nelidow of Russia, the President of the Second
Conference, stated that if the discussion of disarmament "was not ripe
in 1899 > it is not more so in 1907- Nothing has been done in the
matter, and the conference is quite as little prepared to deal with it
71to-day as it was then." Any discussion of the topic at this confer­
ence, he went on to say, would be "fruitless" and a probable cause of 
enormous disagreement, thus jeopardizing the aims set forth in the 
proposal. The best course of action, he suggested, was that the British 
resolution be affirmed to demonstrate that there was "unity" in the 
general intent to limit armaments, and a consensus that the problem may 
"some day" be solved. The resolution was then adopted by acclamation.
This was the extent of discussion on this question during the Second 
72Conference.
In conclusion, an excellent case can be made for the proposition 
that as disarmament conferences, both of the Hague Conferences were 
colossal failures. Proving this, however, was not the intent of this 
chapter. It was, rather, to define the role of technological weapon 
innovations in bringing the conferences about.
70Quoted in Scott, Work of the Second Conference, p. 2lj..
^Quoted in Hull, pp. 7i+“7!?-
72Ibid. The best account of the fourteen conventions of the 
1907 conference is to be found in Scott, Work of the Second Conference, 
pp. lU-23.
It has been shown that the majority, if not all, of the major 
nations of the day did not feel that limitations of armaments, or even 
arms budgets, could be discussed with any hope of a successful conclu­
sion. They were concerned about armament expenditures, to be sure, 
but up to the time of the Czar's Rescript, no other nation had come 
forward to seriously propose that a conference be initiated to limit 
these arms.
Thus, when the question of the impetus for the Hague Conference 
of 1899 is examined, it must be noted that if it were not for the 
concern of Russia over a new rapid-fire field gun, the conference might 
never have been called. It is quite easy to reason, however, that if 
arms expenditures were growing to the concern of all, then the impetus 
would have come from this fact; and if not for this field gun, other 
actual "causes" would have come about eventually.
To reason this way, however, is to neglect the fact that 
qualitatively speaking, the existence of this new weapon changed, to a 
large extent, the then prevalent concept of war. War became a more 
bloody venture where the firepower of this new gun would increase by 
six times the amount of artillery explosives which could be brought to 
bear on an enemy. Tactics would have to be changed. Also, Russia 
found herself, not as the strongest armed nation in the world, but as 
one which qualitatively had been relegated to an inferior position in 
firepower vis-a-vis other nations. This evidently caused great concern 
to the Russians. Other nations in Europe which always had inferior 
forces, and which did not see themselves as major powers,. were not 
concerned. Moreover, Great Britain and the United States, separated 
from the threat of ground combat in Europe, were also unconcerned. Thus
the only major Mhave-notfT nation was Russia.
When Russia went to her treasury to finance these desired guns, 
however, it found itself in financial straits. It could barely afford 
these weapons, and what of the next technological innovation in weaponry? 
In the financial sense, Russia had reached the limit of its ability 
to purchase innovative changes. In this light, the arguments of Tate 
and Dillon of the Russian financial straits, brought on by what 
Kuropatkin and Muraviev saw as a necessary purchase of a field gun, appear 
most logical. The question that needs to be resolved., then, is was it 
the new advance in weaponry or a financial problem which provided the 
impetus for the Rescript? This is an unanswerable question (any answer 
is probably related to the timing of both occurrences).
In addition, one may ask if the above point is moot in the light 
of the Russian proposal at the conference for a limitation on innovations 
beyond these field guns. To this I would say no, because logic appears 
to suggest that Prance, Germany, and even Austria-Hungary, would not 
give up their advantage in these weapons. The only alternative for 
Russia was to propose that they establish this as a limit, and allow 
other nations (Russia) to attain this same level. If they could do so, 
and this level remained the ceiling of qualitative advances in field 
artillery weaponry, then Russia would once again have the superior force 
on the Continent. .
By the time of the 1907 conference, however, Russia found herself 
in a position of having lost face to the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese 
war of 1905. To admit under these circumstances, especially after the 
negative reaction at the 1899 conference, that it desired a limitation 
of armaments, would only show insecurity and weakness. It is entirely
b3
possible that Russia expected the subject-to be brought up by others 
at a third conference (a third conference was proposed at the 1907 
conference)*
It remains, then, to point out that the other nations entered 
into these conferences not out of a real desire to limit armaments, 
but out of an obscure desire not to be the government which could be 
singled out as having scuttled a conference with such high ideals. Also, 
as the emphasis on limitations of armaments was reduced as a result of 
the Czar's second circular, more possibilities were opened for discussion 
which were of interest to the other nations; e.g., arbitration, care 
for sick, wounded, and prisoners of war, etc.
CHAPTER III
THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE FOR THE LIMITATION OF 
ARMAMENT, 1921-1922
The Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armament of 
1921-1922 undertook to solve two fairly distinct problems; limitation 
of armaments, and Pacific and Far Eastern questions. Because both were 
discussed at a single conference, there is a tendency among scholars 
to attribute to the latter the primary motive for the onset of the 
conference. This is not necessarily so. The impetus derives from both 
a desire for limitation of armaments, and a desire to solve certain 
problems other than armaments. These desires interacted so as to 
obscure any single reason for the onset.
Hector C. Bywater states that "in the winter of 1920-21 the 
situation in the Far East was so ominous that well-informed observers 
believed war between the United States and Japan to be only a question 
of time. . • c"1 Perceptions were very important to each nation, Japan 
saw her moves as necessarily defensive and vital for her national 
interest. Then, as now, she was largely dependent on imports to provide 
her with sufficient raw materials to feed and clothe her population, as 
well as to provide for the creation of industries for her economic 
growth. She saw the Far East and Pacific region as a vital domain which 
must remain secure. Any actions by any other nation to intrude into the
■^ Hector C. Bywater, Sea Power in the Pacific; A Study of the 
American-Japanese Naval ProbIem72d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. , 
193U> ° 192177 p. ix.
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area and halt this lifeline flow of materials would hurt Japan immensely.
Hie fact that the United States was in the best position to oppose
Japanese ambitions in the area, especially in China, served to create
2strong feelings of tensions between the two.
On the other hand, especially after the Russo-Japanese War in
1905, the United States began to perceive Japan as an imperialistic
power and a definite threat to American interests in the Pacific. This
war had ended with Japan the surprising victor, and her "victor spoils”;
the establishment of a "virtual protectorate" over Manchuria, the
annexation of Korea in 1910, her issuance of the "Twenty-one Demands"
to China in 1915 > and her actions in Siberia in 1918-1921, only served
3
to sharpen the United States1 suspicion of Japan.
China had the potential for causing the largest problems. 
Antagonisms rose as Japan was able to gain control over portions of 
previously-held German possessions in China and the Pacific after the 
war. Japan needed China, said Raymond Buell, because without her,
Japan could not accomplish her goal of "Pan-Asiaism . . • the union of 
all yellow peoples under Japanese leadership. . . To gain China1 s
loyalty, Japan sought to convince the Chinese that if they did not 
align with Japan, they would become "an anglo-American sphere of
5influence. . . ."
2Jonathan Mitchell, Goose Steps to Peace (Boston: Little, Brown & 
Co., 193l) 9 P* 22.
^Ibid., pp. 39-Ub»
^Raymond Leslie Buell, The Washington Conference (New York:
D. Appleton & Co., 1922), p. i+8.
5 •M. Sato, speech entitled "If Japan and America Fight," 1921, 
quoted in ibid. , p. I4.9.
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It appears , according to Buell, that World War I allowed 
Japan to use the-West's "preoccupation” with Europe to "consolidate” 
her position in Asia. As she took control of portions of China, annexed 
various German islands north of the Equator, and moved into Siberia, 
however, she came to be seen by the United States as a highly imperialist 
nation with the ultimate goal of "establishing complete political and 
economic control" of East Asia.^
In many ways, Buell states, Japan was protected and could 
continue to pursue her ambitions because of the existence of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This alliance had "for twenty years not only 
protected the aggressions of the Japanese military machine from the
rj
interference of outside powers, but . . . [had] encouraged them."
This alliance had been formulated in 1902 as an insurance against
continued Russian imperialism in East Asia. Great Britain not only had
to be concerned with the German threat in the European theater, but
with Russian incursions into British "spheres of influence," in South
Asia and the Pacific as well. British strength was such that alone
she could protect either her homeland in the North Sea, or her possessions
in the Pacific, but not both. With this alliance, however, she could
remove most of her Pacific fleet into the North Sea. In essence, this
alliance provided each nation with more security as well as freedom of
8movement in the area than it would have had alone.
To Japan, the alliance was just as advantageous. She likewise 
c
Buell, p. 10.
7Ibid., p. 103.
8Ibid., p. 107.
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wished to halt Russian imperialism, hut by declaring war on Russia.
She "dared not do so single handed," however, "because of the probability
9
of the intervention of Prance, if not Germany, in behalf of Russia."
An alliance with Great Britain could effectively preclude this occur­
rence. In addition, an alliance with an established and sophisticated 
power such as Great Britain would do much to enhance JapanTs diplomatic 
position in the world. This would "serve admirably as a billet d’entree 
into the international community. ^
The alliance, however, was due to expire on July 13, 1921, and 
many officials in Great Britain wished to abrogate it altogether. The 
Japanese, it was thought, had bent the agreement numerous times and in 
the process had managed to ruffle too many British feathers. A member 
of Britain’s Par Eastern Department voiced a popular view when he 
stated that the policies of the Japanese were now "almost diametrically 
opposed to the best interests of not only Great Britain and the United 
States but of China. . . . [it had] for its ultimate aim a complete 
Japanese hegemony over China, politically, economically and probably 
militarily. Others saw that the alliance had simply outgrown its 
original usefulness. Most critics saw a possibility of a war between 
the United States and Japan, and were afraid that if this did happen,
12Great Britain, under the alliance, would be obligated to support Japan.
9 10Ibid. Ibid.
"^Rohan 0. Butler et al, eds., Documents on British Foreign 
Policy, 1919-1939 (London, 1966), Memorandum by Victor Wellesley,
June 1, 1920, P. 0. F2l59/l99/23, quoted in Thomas H. Buckley, The 
United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922 (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1970), p. 29.
12Lloyd George denied that the British would oppose the United 
States. Pressures for ending the alliance also came from Canada and 
Australia.
Some members of the British government wished to retain the 
alliance in its current format for economic reasons; i.e., to relieve 
Britain of her need to keep a fleet in the Pacific, which was to 
protect her importation of raw materials and foodstuffs from that 
region. To most, however, the dilemma was that, if the alliance was 
renewed, the United States would look unfavorably on the matter. If it 
was not, the Japanese could become the 11 enemy" and wreck havoc on 
British interests in the area. It appears to have been a case of 
"damned if you do, and damned if you don*t.11 Many, then, appeared to 
opt for a condition resembling the alliance, but without the obligations 
then inherent in it.
The Japanese, on the other hand, were positive in their desire
to preserve the' alliance. They saw the alliance as useful as it had
been initially. It had helped shield Japan from adverse reactions to
her various moves, especially in China; and it had, above all, enabled
Japan to operate a flexible policy in her relations with other powers 
13in the area. The Japanese were so intent on its retention, for 
example, that when the rumor reached Japan in early 1921 that Lloyd 
George wished to abrogate the Alliance, Crown Prince Hirohito was rushed 
to England to appeal to the British government.^
In the midst of these occurrences, an arms race was beginning 
to take place which was of growing concern to these nations. Before
1916, the United States Navy ranked a poor third behind those of Great 
Britain and Germany. In that year, however, Congress passed the Naval
TO
Alfred Dennis, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1923)» pp. 89-91«
14yiitchell, p. ,50* It was quite an unusual move for a member
of the royal family to be sent on such a mission.
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Appropriations Act of August 2 9 , 1 J 1 6 , -which provided funds for, and
authorized construction of, 1$6 vessels for the navy. These included 
1*5 l616 capital ships : 10 battleships and 6 battle-cruisers. The
entire program was to have been completed in three years; but due to
the United States1 entry into World War I, much of it had been
suspended. At the end of the war only one battleship had been.completed,
17with most of the others in various stages of Construction.
At this time, a decision was made to fulfill Woodrow Wilson1 s
1916 statement that the United States should have "incomparably the
18most adequate Wavy in the world." The navy opted to continue the 
1916 program, and construction either continued or began on all capital 
ships authorized by the act. The General Naval Board also called for 
another three year program to build three more battleships with the 
objective, as stated in one official navy report, to create a "navy 
equal to the most powerful maintained by any other nation in the 
world."^^
One of the major reasons for this desire, according to Thomas 
Buckley, was "the old rivalry between the governments of Great Britain
-
Buell defines a capital ship as "a vessel of war, not an air­
craft carrier, whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons . . .standard 
displacement, or which carries a gun with a caliber exceeding 8 inches 
(203 millimeters)."
16The battleships were to have 12-16 "guns apiece, and the 
battle-cruisers 8-16" guns.
17
Thomas H. Buckley, The United States and the Washington 
Conference, 1921-1922 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970), 
p. 29.
^Quoted in Buell, p. 11*1.
^"Report of the General Board of the Navy, September 21*, 1920" 
in Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1920, Appendix A, quoted in 
Buell, p. 11*0.
20and the United States. . . After the end of World War I, this
rivalry became concerned with who would be the superior sea power. The
British were adamant that their "naval supremacy" be retained. In
October, 1918 > says Buckley, Prime Minister David Lloyd George told a
Wilson confidant, Colonel Edward M. House, that "Great Britain would
spend her last guinea to keep a navy superior to that of the United
21States or any other power." Winston S. Churchill, also in 1918,
stated to the House of Commons:
Nothing in the world, nothing that you may 
think of, or dream of, or anyone may tell 
you; no arguments, however specious; no
appeals however seductive, must lead you to
abandon that naval supremacy on which the
life of our country depends.22
As it became obvious to Great Britain that the United States was not to
enter the League of Nations and was to continue its 1916 naval program,
says Buckley, Britain "publicly began to veer toward a naval race with
the United States . . . which threatened to make the Anglo-German
23competition of the early 1900’s look like a lobster quadrille."
The Japanese also viewed the 1916 Naval Appropriations Bill, 
coupled with renewed American interest in the Pacific and Far East,^
20Buckley, pp. 19-20.
^^Mary Klachko, "Anglo-American Naval Competition, 1918-1922," 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1962), p. 77> 
quoted in Buckley, p. 20.
22Speech of November 1918, in Benjamin H. Williams, The United 
States and Disarmament (New York, 1931)> P* 137> quoted in Buckley, 
pp. 2 -^25.
23Buckley, p. 23. I see no physical evidence of this; however, 
I will accept the supposition of the existence of a fervent arms race 
"mentality."
pi
As the war began to close European markets, the U.S. began to 
move more fully into the Pacific region in search of trade and the 
development of new foreign markets. This was very suspicious to Japan.
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with great trepidation. They hegan various armament programs of their
own in response. The Tokyo journal, Yorodzu, indicated in 1920 that the
United States was forcing Japan to arm. It stated, "If America were
not augmenting her naval armaments, Japan would be at liberty to
economize in the same direction. It is, however, because of the
American menace that we are forced to enhance our naval power at the
25cost of heavy taxation, under which the people are groaning.11
During the naval budget debates of 1920, a member of the Diet stated,
"America appears to think she is divinely appointed to rule the world
with a big stick. What is the purpose of her colossal navy if it is
26not to make her power supreme in every part of the world."
The newspaper, Nichi Nichi, stated, in an article carried in
1920, that "all the powers" were of agreement that naval armaments should
be limited, but because of the United States’ increasing naval strength,
"even if other Powers should strictly and faithfully adhere to the
principle of reduction, . . .  the peace of the world will just the same
27be menaced by the naval power of America." The paper went on to say
that the "Double-Eight Program" was not enough for proper defense of
28Japan, and claimed that Japan needed a minimum of 22+ capital ships.
25 26Quoted in ffywater, Sea Power, p. 1$1. Ibid., p. 156.
27Pall Mall Gazette, November 2, 1920 (correspondent writing 
from Tokyo on October 17, 1920), quoted in Archibald Hurd, "Naval 
Supremacy: Great Britain or the United States," Fortnightly Review
CYIII (December 1, 1920): 921.
28The "Double-Eight Program" is called by many different names.
I have chosen the one used in Yamato Ichihashi, The Washington Conference 
and After (Stanford: Stanford University Press, I928). The program 
itself was formulated after the 1905 war as Japanese naval experts saw a 
need for two-squadrons, each consisting of 8 capital ships, to be re­
placed every 8 years. It was finally passed by the Diet in 1920, and 
designed to be completed by March, 1928.
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The chart, as Table 1, shows a reason for Japan*s fears.
The chart tells us that if the currently authorized construction
programs in each country were to be carried to completion, by 1921+
the United States and Great Britain would have been almost equal in
capital ships, but Japan would have been only half as strong. This
conclusion, however, is not complete. It also must be noted that in
1921+ the vast majority of British ships would have been veicy old and
outdated. The United States and Japan, on the other hand, would have
had capital ships with more firepower (notice the disparity in 1st
class vessels), more armor, and a faster speed. "Actually, the
American Navy by 1921+ would have been as strong in capital ship
efficiency as the British and Japanese Navies combined, if no further
29Building programs had been adopted by any of these powers." By 
I92I+, then, the United States would have been supreme on the high seas: 
a position that Great Britain had held in most, if not all, of the 
nineteenth century.
The three countries involved in this "race," however, soon 
began to realize the folly of pursuing their present paths. Japan's 
buildup was beginning to cost her dearly by 1921. Her naval expendi­
tures alone rose from $85 million in 1915 to $21+5 million in..1921.
The 1921 figure represented approximately one-third of her entire budget 
30for that year. But even by spending at this high level, Japan could 
only hope that if both nations built all that was authorized, then the 
ratio of Japan to United States in capital ships would be 1:2. In
29Buell, p. lljl*.
3°Ibid., pp. 139-1+2.
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TABLE 1
CAPITAL SHIPS, ON HAND AM) AUTHORIZED31
1921 1921+ (estimated)
United States:
Ships*. . . . . . . .
Displacement, tons. . 
Guns. • . . .......
Great Britain:
Ships . .. • • . 
Displacement, tons. 
Guns. . . . . .  . .
Japan:
Ships • . . . . .  . .
Displacement, tons. . 
Guns. . . . . . . . .
17
1+67>25>0 tons 
188
32
808,200 tons 
281+
11
319 >11+0 tons 
108
35 (27-lst class/l8-2d class) 
l,l£0,6£0 tons 
3hO
36 (l8-lst class/l8-2d 
883>290 tons
17 (ll+-lst class/3-2d class) 
51+3>lU0 tons 
161+
*Por 1924, figures are divided into 1st class (those ships with 
11+ inch or larger guns) and 2nd class (those ships with guns under 
11+ inches).
31From figures in "Leading Navies Compared," Scientific American 
(February 12, 1921) , and Archibald Hurd (fn. 27). The figures for 1921+- 
differ slightly in both of these articles, but the larger figure has 
been used here whenever differences occurred.
other words, even spending as much as they were, Japan could hope to
come no closer than one-half the size of the United States1 capital 
32ship fleet.
Baron Kato, then Japan's Minister of the Marine, let it be
known that enough was enough. In an interview with the Associated Press
in March, 1921, he stated that Japan would be willing to give up her
Double-Eight Program if the other major naval, powers would agree to
halt their naval construction. Japan recognized, as Yarnato Ichihashi
states, that the expense of naval aimaments was "almost ruinous to
33Japan's general interests." Mitchell, writing in 1931? stated that 
Japan's financial crisis of 1921 was the worst of any in its entire 
history.
Great Britain also recognized the dangers inherent in any arms 
race; and, in fact, had begun a small-scale limitation program a few
35years earlier. In 1921, Great Britain's navy was a total of 
1,753>539 tons; the United States had 1,302,141+1 tons; and Japan had a 
total of 61+1,852 tons. Britain had not begun construction on many 
vessels since 1916, however, and in 1921 was constructing only 182,950 
tons of all types of navy ships. Of these, four capital ships were 
under construction, totaling 172,000 tons. The United States, on the
32Bywater, Sea Power, pp. 155-56.
33Ichihashi, (fn. 28), p. 19. Yamato Ichihashi was the Secretary 
to Baron Kato, Senior Delegate of Japan to the Washington Conference in 
1921-1922.
^^Mitchell, p. 50.
35In 1918, expenses caused two-thirds of British battleships to 
be placed in reserve. The remaining one-third was seen as still too 
expensive to operate, however, and several of these were also placed in 
reserve. Bywater, Sea Power, p. 28.
other hand, had 15 capital ships (618,000 tons) under construction, as
did Japan (599j700 tons). Publicly, Britain spoke for continued
supremacy of her navy. Privately, however, this was not so. Lloyd
George, in a meeting of the Standing Defence Subcommittee of the Cabinet
on December 1)., 1920, "pointed out that a naval race could ruin Britain,
for the country might have to repay its war debt to the Americans before
starting construction, and the country was already having serious
37financial problems." Even though Lloyd George wanted a large navy, he 
was enough of a realist to recognize that any naval race could bankrupt 
Britain.
The United States also began to face up to the reality of arms 
expenditures. In 1915-1916, her naval expenditures had been only 
$155>029,000. In 1917-1918, however, this figure had risen to 
Si,268,000,000. After the war, the expenses rose even higher as America
OD
began a program "designated to make its navy second to none." The 
1916 act, however, had called for the manufacture of 16 capital ships, 
but with a stipulation that each vessel not cost more than a certain 
amount. Capital ships, by this time, were approaching $1+0 million 
apiece to build, and projections estimated that they would become obso­
lete within two decades. Replacement costs at that time, considering
39inflation, would be astonomical. By 1919 > it was estimated that it 
would take $850,000,000 just to complete the capital ship portion of the
36 •
Buckley, p. 23. Figures are from "Limitation of Armaments:
Part II," General Board Report 1088a, (September 17, 1921).
■^Buckley, p. 25*
OO
Ichihashi, p. 1+.
■^Buell, pp. 11+1+-1+6.
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1916 program, not tor mention future maintenance costs.^ The United 
States was spending 12 percent of her national budget on naval expendi­
tures.^" In other words, in the United States and Great Britain, budget 
considerations began to override considerations of supreme naval power.
In addition to predicted financial problems, each nation was 
confronted with changes in the technology of weaponry which was beginning 
to change the concept of war, at least on the high seas. Prior to 
World War I, the use of the capital ship by the navies of the world had 
indicated that an absolute top priority was given this weapon by all.
To have a strong, viable naval force meant to have a fleet of capital 
ships. By 1921, however, these nations were willing to give up produc­
tion of capital ships, and even scrap some of the older ones. This can 
be described by explanation of the growth of the popularity of two more 
or less novel innovations in weaponry: the submarine and the airplane.
Before World War I, the potential of the submarine had been seen 
by Admiral Sir Percy Scott. He stated, in 1912, that the "battleship 
had outlived her usefulness, and ought to be scrapped forthwith as an 
extravagant anachronism."^ His prediction and argument was that the
submarine would rule the high seas in the future because of its stealth
) ^
and killing power. It had been in existence for several decades, but 
the initial stages of World War I had not seen its extensive use. As the 
German navy began to receive a considerable beating at the hands of 
Great Britain’s fleet, however, it found itself, as Arthur Pollen states,
^Hector C. Bywater, "The Limitation of Naval Armaments," Atlantic 
Monthly (February 1922): 260-61, hereafter referred to as Bywater, L. N. A.
^Buckley, p. 60. ^Quoted in Bywater, L. N. A., p. 261.
^Bywater, L. N. A., p. 261.
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"condemned to utter sea helplessness— unless a new navy conld be called 
into existence and a new sea war fought."^
As this weapon system "began to he completed and placed into 
service, the death totals attributable to its use began to take on 
quite impressive proportions. In February, March and April, 1916* 
submarines sank 1j50>000, 500,000 and 900,000 tons of shipping, respec­
tively. At February and March rates over 25 percent of the world1 s 
shipping would have been sunk in one year. At April’s rate, over I4.O 
percent would have been. With these facts, Pollen says, "For the first
time since August, 1911|.» the complete failure, if not the defeat, of
2*5
the Allies was in sight. Allied tactics were changed to meet the
threat of the submarine and, by and large, they were successful. In
total, Germany sank over 11 million tons of shipping, but it failed
when up against capital vessels.
This failure, however, was not to discredit the submarine’s,
potential value to a nation. This was recognized, and after the war,
capital ships came under verbal fire again. Admiral Sims, for example,
stated that "battleships are not worth the powder to blow them to hell;
the future of the battleship is that it is just going to fade out of
existence.”^  Sir Percy Scott again reiterated his view that "the
introduction of the vessels that swim under water has , in my opinion,
enitrely done away with the utility of the ships that swim on the top of
the water. . . .  Uo man-of-war will dare to come even within sight of a
J 7
coast that is adequately-protected by submarines. In addition,
^Arthur H. Pollen, "The Submarine," Foreign Affairs Y 
(July 1927): 557.
^Ibid., p. 558. ^Quoted in Buell, p. 235- Ibid.
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German Admiral Von Scheer stated that "an adequate submarine navy would
I o
enable a comparatively weak nation to pursue an overseas policy."
This latter comment coincides with Bywater's assessment in Sea Power in 
the Pacific that the torpedo, by whatever means launched (mostly sub­
marines), would become "a favourite weapon with those countries which
ho
have to maintain a naval establishment on limited funds."
The Japanese, for one, were rapidly expanding their submarine 
fleet. By 1921, estimates placed the Japanese submarine’force at 107; 
all but l£ ocean-going. It was rumored at that time that Admiral Kato 
wanted to increase the number to 15>0 by 1925>. Bywater also states that 
"several writers in the Japanese Press" began to urge the Japanese govern­
ment to change its naval policy by decreasing reliance on capital ships 
and increasing the use and size of the submarine fleet. He does add, 
however, that at the time of the publication of . his book (1921) , Japanese 
as well as American and British naval experts were still considering the 
capital ship as "the first and most important element of sea-power."
Admiral Kato appears to have summed the official naval philosophy of all 
concerned when, in the Diet in 1919 j he said, "The more we study the
lessons of the war, the stronger does our conviction grow that the last
91word in naval warfare rests with the big ship and the big gun."
Bywater sums the above best in The Limitation of Naval Armaments.
He states that the submarine started slowly in World War I, but soon it 
began to become the dominate naval weapon system. The question of its
^8Ibid., p. 236.
^Bywater, Sea Power, p. 216. Also, keep this in mind when 
observing France*s objections to abolishing submarines at the conference.*
^Bywater, Sea Power, p. 236. ^Ibid.
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worth relative to a capital ship was never answered, however, because 
the Germans never confronted an allied capital ship in a head-to-head 
battle. They were confined, instead, to attacks on merchant vessels. 
’’Broadly speaking,” Bywater states, ”it may be said that the submarine 
has not proved its claim to have superseded the battleship; and the fear 
of the submarine alone would not have justified the suspension of 
battleship construction. At the same time, it has compelled naval
52architects to pay increased attention to the safety of large warships.”
This proved to be very expensive because of the large increases in 
armor thickness necessary below the water-line.
Another novel weapon innovation which caused similar comments 
was the airplane. Bywater concludes that the use of the airplane in 
World War I by the United States ”may prove to have been the death-
53blow" to the capital ship. The United States conducted post-war
tests on the effect of aerial bombs on captured Geiman ships. These
tests were veiy impressive. The following is a portion of the report
on the testing.
Aircraft carrying high-capacity high-explosive 
bombs of sufficient size have adequate offensive 
power to sink or seriously damage any naval 
vessel at present constructed, provided such 
projectiles can be placed in the water close 
alongside the vessel. Furthermore, it will be 
difficult, if not impossible, to build any type 
of vessel of sufficient strength to withstand the 
destructive force that can be obtained with the 
largest bombs that aeroplanes may be able to 
carry from shore bases or sheltered harbors. . . .
It is probable, however, that future develop­
ment will make such operations practicable. . . .5U
52 53Bywater, L. U. A., p. 262. Ibid.
^Report of the Joint Board (j. B. No. lj.39? Serial No. 159) to 
the Secretaiy of the Navy, August 18, 1921, quoted in Bywater, L. N. A., 
p. 263. Also in Buell, pp. 236-37*
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This, to Bywater, was "the most serious indictment of the capital ship 
which has yet been framed.”
When cost comparisons were made of these novel weapon innovations 
against capital ships, the differences were very impressive. Bywater 
states that in 1921, 1*00 of the largest airplanes or lf> of the most 
sophisticated submarines could be built for the cost of 1 battleship.
Also important to consider, he said, was that the airplane and the 
submarine both were just beginning their evolutionary process; while 
innovative development of the capital ships had all but halted. All of 
this meant that capital ships were becoming obsolete. As these newer 
innovations were devised and perfected, the capital ship would need more 
armor, bigger and longer range guns, more speed. As these were added, 
however, the price would climb. The British Hood, just finished in 
1920, was cited as an example. This ship cost $3^,000,000 to complete, 
and in 1920 it was seen as the best ever made; however, as Bywater shows, 
it was outdated by 1921. At that time, Sir George Thurston estimated 
that the ideal battleship would need to be at least 57>000 tons, with 
8-18 inch guns (the Hood was almost 20,000 tons and several guns short). 
This ’'ideal" would cost $60,000,000.
This discussion indicates the situation as it existed prior to 
the onset of the Washington Conference. As each nation grew more 
concerned with its special interests, financial burdens and conceptions 
of existing and new weaponry, it began diplomatic moves designed to 
bring about some sort of conference to help settle the existing problems. 
On July 11, 1921, for example, Lloyd George, in a speech, made the point
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Bywater, L. H. A., p. 263.
^Ibid., pp. 262-61;.
6l
that Japan was an "old and proud Ally," and that the United States was
the nation "closest to our aims and ideals with whom it is for us not
merely a desire and an interest but a deeply rooted instinct to consult 
57and co-operate." What George said was that Great Britain had a great 
interest in both nations, and would dislike to see war between the two.
It also appears that George was warning Japan that she could not expect 
Great Britain to join her in a fight against the United States.
This brings to light the possibility that Great Britain, there­
fore, desired to act as arbiter to reduce the confrontation between 
the United States and Japan, as well as to change the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance. The excuse of arms limitation, then, may have been "only a 
door; through which the British might enter into negotiations with both
58the United States and Japan." As Buell conceives it, Great Britain
wished to terminate the Alliance, but "as long as the question of naval
competition remained unsolved, the termination of the . . . Alliance was 
59impossible." ^
To Japan, the request for a conference may have been a sincere
desire to limit armaments. She wished to perpetuate the alliance, for
she was afraid of the United States' naval buildup. In I9I8-I92O,
because of an inability to achieve equality with the United States,
60Japan resolved to maintain at least a 10:7 ratio in order to achieve
6lwhat she conceived of as adequate security. This desire, however, was
57London Times, 12 July 1921, quoted in Ichihashi, p. 20.
^Buckley , p. 3U* ^Buell, p. 121;.
^All ratios are given with the base figure of 10 assigned to the 
United States* naval strength.
Buckley, pp. 78-80.
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halted by budget constraints.
Also involved, but to a smaller degree, in the desire to convoke
a conference was the rationalization that armaments had been a root
cause of World War I. Arthur Pollen is convinced that after the war .
the powers in the world realized that it was the "military autocracies"
of Central Europe which had caused the war. They did this by, in
essence, following "policies abroad that only material force could
sustain. ..." These policies had bred the need for amaments, and
62"armaments had bred war. . . ." Whether true or not, the important
factor, as would be indicated in the opening remarks at the conference,
was that various governments perceived that they were at least a cause
of war. Buell states that prior to World War I, many nations* leaders
saw armaments as a preserver of peace in the world, especially in
Europe. It came to be recognized after the war, however, that a large
quantity of arms does not necessarily mean an absence of war. As Buell
says, it was seen that "armaments serve merely to disturb peace. . . .
[and] if nations feverishly construct great battleships and conscript
6great armies, it is certain that some time they will be used." It 
was, after all, he suggests, the presence of large numbers of naval 
armaments that "made war between Japan and the United States a probabil-
The election of Warren G. Harding as President of the United 
States appears to have "tipped the scales" and brought about a U.S. 
desire to convoke a conference. As pointed out in Buckley, Harding
6
Buell, p. II4.6. (emphasis his)
desired a conference because it would provide the means by -which "just,
thoughtful, righteous peoples, who are not seeking to seize something
which does not belong to them, can live peaceably together, and elimi-
66nate causes of conflict." Even though Harding oversimplified, says
Buckley, he did reflect a common idea of rationality of the day: if .
rational men were to gather about a conference table, disputes could be 
66settled. In his inaugural speech, Harding appeared to set the stage 
for the conference. He intimated that although the United States would 
not enter into the League of Nations, it would be amenable to meeting 
with other nations in order "to recommend a way to approximate disarma­
ment and relieve the crushing burdens of military and naval establish­
ments."0^
68Great Britain was also moving in this direction. At the
Imperial Conference in London on June 20, 1921, Lloyd George stated that
sea power was the basis of British existence; therefore, he said, "We
have . . . to look to measures which our security requires. We aim at
69nothing more. We cannot be content with less." ■ With this, he called 
for a conference to discuss the potential explosive issues over the 
Pacific and Par East.
On July 8, 1921, the United States’ Secretary of State, Charles
66Transcript of Presidential Press Conference of December 23, 
1921, Harding Papers, quoted in Buckley, p. l£.
^Buckley, pp. 16-16.
6*7Congressional Record, March 2|, 1921, pp. J4.-6, quoted in 
Buckley, p. 1)4.
^Buckley, p. 30.
69Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of United 
Kingdom, the Dominions,■and India: Held in June, July, and August, 1921
Summaiy of Proceedings and Documents (London, 1921), p. 13, quoted in 
Buckley, p. 31 •
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Evans Hughes, sent a wire to his ambassadors in Great Britain, Prance,
Italy and Japan, directing them to determine whether or not the above
countries would meet "in a conference on limitation of armament . . •
70to be held in Washington at a mutually convenient time." At the same
time, the United States also suggested that, since the question of
limitation of armaments was so closely intertwined with certain Pacific
and Par Eastern problems, perhaps questions of this nature should be
included in the conference. All indicated their tentative agreement to
the formal proposal by July 11, 1921. Formal invitations were mailed
to Prance, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and China on August 11., 1921.
On October 1+, 1921, invitations were extended to Belgium, the Netherlands, 
71and Portugal.
It is difficult to tell whether the British or the Americans
were the instigators of the Washington Conference, but several messages
translated by Herbert 0. Yardley in The American Black Chamber do
indicate that there is reason to suspect that it was Great Britain who
72convoked the conference through the United States. In a telegram of 
July 5, 1921, from the Japanese Ambassador in London to the Japanese 
government, it was stated that the ambassador and-Lord Curzon had spoken 
of the Anglo--Japanese Alliance in connection with the possibility of 
opening a Pacific conference. In this discussion, Lord Curzon indicated
70Telegram from Charles Evans Hughes to United States Ambassador 
to Great Britain George Harvey, July 8, 1921, quoted in Buckley, p. 32.
^Ichihashi, pp. 10-11.
72Herbert 0. Yardley was the creator and director of the Crypto­
graphic Bureau (colloq. , The Black Chamber) of the United States which 
was in operation during the time of the Washington Conference. Yardley 
and his group were involved with code breaking; especially with regard to 
Japanese codes. Many of the telegrams quoted have been destroyed and 
can be found only in his book, The American Black Chamber.
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that he wanted Japan* s views before communicating with the/United
States* Ambassador.' A telegram from the same'source on July 8, 1921,
indicated that both Japan and Lord Curzon wanted the invitation for
such a conference to "appear to proceed, from the American Government
73and not to have it appear as the plan of the British government."
The Japanese were reluctant to come to a conference on Pacific
and Par East problems, however, and a cable dated July 13, 1921 from
Tokyo set forth Japan’s guidelines. It stated:
The Japanese Government wishes the subject
of discussion to be limited to the limitation
of armament questions, but in case it is
necessary to discuss also Far Eastern and 
Pacific problems, this discussion should be 
limited to questions of general principles . . . 
concerning merely China. (h
The next cable directed the Japanese Ambassador to go directly to
Hughes and agree to a conference on the limitation of arms, but to
indicate that an inclusion of Pacific and Par Eastern problems would
complicate the conference too much. The cable went on to state that if
Hughes would not agree to drop these subjects, then the Japanese
Ambassador should revert to the guidelines shown in the preceding cable
(footnote Ik) •
In a cable dated July l£, 1921, the Japanese revealed that they 
were afraid that Great Britain had proposed the conference to quash the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance by destroying its value; and they were convinced 
that Great Britain’s first concern was not arms limitation as was the 
United States’, but rather Pacific and Par East problems. Because of
73Herbert 0, Yardley, The American Black Chamber (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. , 1931) , P- 28i+.
^Telegram No. 286, July 13, 1921, Tokio to Washington, quoted 
in Yardley, p. 287.
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their fear, a cable dated July 23 from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador
in London stated that they thought
that it would be an opportune policy to 
inform Great Britain of the substance of our 
answer to America, and to work to secure a 
complete understanding between Great Britain 
and Japan before the conference.75
Additional cables alluded to this same desire for Anglo-Japanese collab­
oration prior to the conference.
The formal invitation mailed to the various nations indicated that 
arms limitation was to be the top priority at the conference, primarily 
because of cost considerations. In part the invitation stated:
The President is deeply gratified at the 
cordial response to his. suggestion that there 
should be a conference on the subject of Limita­
tion of Armament, in connection with which 
Pacific and Par Eastern questions should be 
discussed. . . .  The enormous disbursements 
in the rivalries of armaments manifestly consti- •
tute the greater part of the encumbrance upon 
enterprise and national prosperity; . 
expense of this nature is not only without 
economic justification but is a constant menace 
to the peace of the world rather than an 
assurance of its preservation.76
It went on to say that while the consideration of naval armaments would
have priority, questions of all types of arms limits would be considered.
All invited nations entered the conference willingly except for 
Japan. She was interested in the limitation of armaments, but, as
Telegram No. 882+, July 23, 1921, Tokio to Washington, quoted 
in Yardley, p. 296.
Y6
Conference on the Limitation of Armament; Washington, Novem­
ber 12, 1921-February 6, 1922 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1922), pp. i+~5, hereafter referred to as C. L. A. C. L. A. is 
an official publication of the United States government, supposedly 
containing all of the committee as well as subcommittee proceedings in 
its 1,757 pages. It also contains all official documents (which can 
also be found in International Conciliation, Nos. 169-182, December 1921- 
January 1923)•
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shown above, she was very skeptical of joining a conference designed "to
deal with Pacific and Par East problems. She was entrenched in Siberia,
Korea, parts of China, in several islands in the Pacific, and in
Manchuria. As Buell states, "Japan had never been closer to realizing
the dream of . . . hegemony over Asia [than] in 1921."77 Much of the
Japanese media's response was to lament the fact that Japan had to enter
into such a western "plot" designed to give the United States control of
China. Buell says that a large portion of the Japanese government
also felt somewhat the same way. If the above is so, then why did Japan
agree to participate? Buell states that Japan could not refuse. If
it did, he states, then Japan would have been admitting imperialist
ambitions to all. To do so would place her as an "outcast" (in her view)
79in international society.
Japan's reply on July ll* to the invitation indicated her 
skepticism. After agreeing to enter into the limitation of arms portion 
of the conference to "seek to secure an enduring peace of the world and 
to promote advancement of human welfare," Japan asked for time to consider
77Buell, pp. 11+8-1*9.
7 H^. W. Kinney, "Puzzled Japan," The Outlook August 21*, 1921, 
p. 61*2. Kinney speculated that the Japanese might have seen the confer­
ence as "a gigantic international conspiracy of white nations."
Ichihashi says that this was a "childish" way to think.
79Buell, pp. 11*9-50. Ichihashi also indicates this skepticism 
on the part of Japan; not about arms limitation which it desired, but 
about Pacific and Ear East problems. The Japanese writers began to call 
the conference the "Pacific Conference," and stated that arms limitation 
was evidently not so important. The reason for the Japanese lack of 
enthusiasm, said Ichihashi, was because of inclusion of complicated 
Pacific and Par Eastern questions into a simple idea of arms limitation. 
As Ichihashi says, to the Japanese, "armament limitation required no 
argument, the only requisite being an international understanding fixing 
a simultaneous action on the part of the interested powers." Ichihashi,
p. 13.
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the other purpose of the conference. Its request said: "hut in
regard to a conference on the Pacific and Par Eastern quest ions the
Government, before it would express its views, would desire to know the
nature and scope of the American proposal in order to ensure the success
80of such a conference." The Japanese government notified the United 
States on July 27 that they would accept the invitation for both "sub­
conferences."
Ichihashi says that to understand Japan1 s initial reluctance to
enter into the conference, one must realize that Japan had expected,
initially, to be invited to an arms limitation conference involving
only three powers. These powers, to Japan, were the only nations which
had the expertise, finances, and the desire to engage in massive naval
building programs. Because of this, they were also bound to realize the
8linherent dangers in "competitive construction." This was what Japan 
was interested in; not war, or in letting other powers seize gains in
the Pacific region which it had achieved over many decades.
The other powers invited appear to have been favorably disposed 
to the notion of a disarmament conference.. Some initially questioned 
the motives of the United States, and entertained questions as to the
worth of such a conference; but, by and large, they looked forward to
its opening. In accepting the invitation to the conference, however, 
Premier Briand of Prance stated in his message to parliament on July 12, 
1921, that he appreciated having been invited to a conference which 
would assure the continuity and the stability of peace in the region of
80Ji.ji (Tokyo), l£ July 1921, quoted in Ichihashi, p. 16.
8l -
Ichihashi, pp. 18-19.
the Pacific.” Nowhere did he mention-the question of, or his willing­
ness to discuss 5 arms limitation.
The proposed agenda for the conference was announced by the 
Department of State on September 10, 1921. It was divided into two 
major headings; the "limitation of Armament," and "Pacific and Par 
Eastern Questions." Under the former were three subheadings; "Limita­
tion of Naval Armament"; "Pules for control of new agencies of warfare"; 
and "Limitation of land armament." Under the latter heading were 
"Questions relating to China," to Siberia, and, to the mandated Islands
O *3
of the Pacific. As the agenda was being circulated, Prance and Great 
Britain requested explication of "new agencies of warfare" and were told 
that these were gas, submarines, and airplanes. Japan accepted the 
agenda on October 17 and stipulated that it retained the right to raise
O I
questions not covered in the agenda at the conference.
89In preparing for the conference, the American delegation 
decided to make its top priority the limitation of naval armaments and
not questions concerning the Pacific and Par East. The reasons for
this, states Buckley, was that this topic was more concrete and had a 
direct effect on the taxpayer1 s wallets. Par Eastern problems, in turn,
82La Matin (France), 13 July 1921, quoted in Ichihashi, p. If?.
The Agenda can be found in C. L. A., p. 10, or in Buell,
pp. 150-51, Fn. 23.
 ^^Buckley, p. I4I.
89
The American delegation was headed by Charles Evans Hughes, 
with Elihu Root, Senator H. C. Lodge, and Senator Underwood as members. 
Great Britain1s delegation was headed by Lord Arthur Balfour, with Lord
B. Lee as an important member. Japan’s delegation was headed, in actual­
ity, by Baron Kato Tomashaburo, not to be confused with Admiral Kato, 
the. Minister of the Marine. The French delegation was headed by Premier 
Briand, later Rene Viviani. For a complete listing of all participants 
and staffs, see C. h. A. , pp. I2-J4I.
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were "mysterious." The United States1 plan took a great deal of prepara­
tion to formulate. The delegation was suspicious of the Japanese, and 
decided initially to call for a capital ship advantage of 2:1 over 
Japan, and equality with Great Britain. The Navy’ s input was to say that 
it needed either to have the Anglo-Japanese Alliance quashed, or a 
navy as large as that of Great Britain and Japan combined. Hughes 
finally devised a proposal which would scrap construction programs of
the major naval powers and insure a ratio of 10:10:6 for Great Britain,
86the United States and Japan.
The Washington Conference officially opened on November 12, 1921,
with Charles Evans Hughes as permanent chairman. At the opening session
Hughes welcomed the delegates and quickly stated that to the United
States, naval disarmament was the top priority of the conference. He
reiterated the principles articulating the need to disarm as stated in
the Czar’s Rescript of 1899> the United States’ desire for a limit of
armaments in 1907, and read the resolution for disarmament which had been
passed by the 1907 Hague Conference. He went on to say:
What was convenient or highly desirable before 
.is now a matter of vital necessity. If there 
is to be economic rehabilitation, if the longings 
for reasonable progress are not to be denied, if 
we are to be spared the uprisings of peoples made 
desperate in the desire to shake off burdens no 
longer endurable, competition in armament must 
stop.87
He continued by stating that in order for arms limitation to work, "all" 
must sacrifice in reality. With this introduction, he then surprised 
the entire conference with several broad and innovative proposals on how 
these sacrifices should be accomplished.
^Buckley, pp. Ij.9-56. ^C. L. A. , p. 56-
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He "began "by proposing a 10 year "holiday1' on the construction 
of capital ships. He further stated that since it was fairly accepted 
that capital ship tonnage was the "measure" of the "relative strength 
of navies," the proposal would rest primarily on capital ships. His
four principles to guide the conference were:
CD That all capital ship "building 
programs, either actual or projected, should 
be abandoned;
(2) That further reduction would be made 
through the scrapping of certain of the older 
ships;
(3) That, in general , regard should be had
to the existing naval strength of the Powers
concerned;
(ij.) That the capital ship tonnage should 
be used as the measurement of strength for 
navies and a proportionate allowance of 
auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.89
Hughes then proposed specific limitation programs for each of the major
naval powers.
He proposed that the United States scrap all of her capital
ships which were still under construction at the time of the conference,
no matter how far complete. This amounted to, he stated, l£ capital
ships; including 6 battle-cruisers and 7 battleships under construction,
as well as two battleships already launched but not yet regarded as
complete. This would amount to scrapping 6l8,000 tons of capital ships
90which were under construction. He also proposed that the United States 
scrap all of her older battleships up to a certain date of manufacture. 
This amounted to 15 battleships of 227,7^0 tons. The total number of
Defined as a period in which there should be no further construc­
tion of capital ships.
^C. L. A. , p. 60.
90$332 million had already been spent on these 15> ships.
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capital ships proposed for destruction was 30, equal to an aggregate 
81+5,71+0 tons.
Hughes then proposed that Great Britain halt further construction
91on four new battleships currently in the planning stages, and the
scrapping of 19 older capital ships. The latter would total 1+11,375
tons, giving the British a total tonnage reduction of 583,375 tons.
Hughes then proposed that Japan abandon her Double-Eight Program,
and agree to scrap 3 battleships and 1+ battle-cruisers "not yet laid
down but for which certain material has been assembled." This would
amount to scrapping 7 new capital ships with a total tonnage of 289,100
tons. Next he proposed that Japan scrap 10 older capital ships with a
total tonnage of 159,828 tons. This would make a grand total of 1+1+8,928
tons to be scrapped.
Of Prance and Italy he said:
In view of certain extraordinary conditions 
due to the World War affecting the existing 
strengths of the navies of Prance and Italy, 
the United States does not consider necessary 
the discussion at this stage of the proceedings 
of the tonnage allowance of these nations, but 
proposes it be reserved for the later consid­
eration of the Conference.92
For all three major naval powers, then, the above would entail scrapping
66 capital ships with total tonnage of 1,878,01+3 tons. When enacted,
the United States would be left with 18 capital ships of 500,650 tons;
93Great Britain with 22 capital ships of 60l+,i+50 tons; and Japan with 
91This Involved "a reduction of 1+ new capital ships not yet laid 
down, but upon which money had been spent, with a total tonnage when 
completed of 172,000 tons." C. L. A., p. 80.
92C. L. A., p. 80.
93A special allowance of i+ capital ships was given to Great 
Britain due to the age of her on-hand vessels.
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10 capital ships of 299>700 tons. The replacement tonnage was stipulated 
as 5*00,000 tons each for Great Britain and the United States, and
300,000 tons for Japan. Each country would be allowed to replace their 
fleets after the 10 year holiday; but they could only replace a capital 
ship after it was at least 20 years old. For submarines, Hughes proposed 
a limit for the United States and Great Britain of 90>000 tons, and 
5>l+>000 tons for Japan. In aircraft carriers, a limit of 80,000 tons 
was proposed for Great Britain and the United States and i+8,000 tons 
for Japan. ^
To Ichihashi, Hughes’ proposal "electrified the calm session;
some [delegates] were shocked, some were even alarmed, but others were 
g <
pleased." To Buell, the reason for this shock, as well as the pleasure,
was that Hughes had "presented an actual workable plan" to the confer- 
9 6ence.
At the Second Plenary Session on 15> November, all powers agreed 
"in principle" to Hughes’ proposal, but at various subcommittee meetings, 
debate over the ratios ensued. Admiral Kato requested that changes in 
the proposal be made "with regard to the tonnage basis for replacement
Q],
C. L. A. , p. 66. Replacement tonnage was the total tonnage 
allowed once all ships in existence in 1921 had "worn out."
q C
Ichihashi, p. 35*
9 6Hughes presented the following account of his reasons for 
presenting the proposals as he did. "It was evident that each country 
would have its own conception of its needs; that general considerations 
of needs and aspirations could be brought forward by each power in 
justification of some hypothetical relation of naval strength and the 
result would be an endless discussion; getting us nowhere. Looking at 
the question from every angle, I found no hope of success unless the 
three great naval powers, United States, Great Britain, and Japan, were 
willing to end their competition by a determination to stop now. See 
David J. Danelski and Joseph S. Tulchen, eds., Autobiographical Notes of 
Charles Evans Hughes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 243.
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97of the various classes of vessels." He requested that because of her
geographical proximity, Japan should receive a better ratio than the
10:10:6 proposed by Hughes. This request went to a technical subcommittee
headed by Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy. Kato’s arguments were "national security" on the one hand, and a
charge that Hughes’ figures on completed capital ships was wrong on the
other. Kato concluded by saying that Japan "considers it impossible
to provide for her security and defense with any force modified so that
98the relative strength of the three navies will be 10-10-7."
Certain Japanese cables of Japanese intentions at the conference 
are most revealing in the matter of the capital ship ratio. A cable 
sent on November 28 from Tokyo instructed the Japanese delegation to
give in on the 10:7 ratio deadlock. It stated that "it is necessary to
avoid any clash with Great Britain and America, particularly America, 
in regard to the armament limitation question." The cable further 
stated that if the Americans did not agree to a 10:7 ratio, the delega­
tion was to attempt a 10:6.5 ratio. As an absolute minimum, the cable 
went on to say, the delegation was to accept a 10:6 ratio, but then only
with "a guarantee to reduce or at least to maintain the status quo of
99Pacific defenses. . . ."
Yamato Ichihashi attests to the above as true, and gives the
reason for the Japanese capitulation. He quotes Baron Kato as saying:
The costs of armament have now become so 
heavy that they are a burden hampering productive
9 1C. L. A., p. 106.
98Quoted in Ichihashi, p. I4.8.
99Cable No. 13> November 28, 1921, Tokio to Washington, quoted 
in Yardley, p. 313.
activity throughout^the world. . . .  The 
limit of reduction to which Japan will go 
is marked only hy the necessities of her 
security. . . .  Up to the present Japan 
has had fears which have caused her to 
continue building [her fleet]. . . • [She] 
had hoped that the conclusion of the Great 
War would bring a cessation of construction, 
but as the United States, with her unassail­
able position, deemed it necessary to 
continue her naval development, no alternative 
was permitted to Japan.100
Kato went on to say that it never had been Japan’s intention to ’’rival”
the United States and Great Britain in naval strength, because Japan's
naval program had ’’always been defensive” and would continue to be.
What he was looking for at the conference, he stated, was a "complete
understanding that will terminate distrust and suspicion.
The final agreement reached, then, was that the ratio of 
10:10:6 was acceptable to all parties. Second, all agreed to maintain 
the status quo on fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific. Third, 
Japan was allowed to keep the brand-new ship, the Mutsu, and would, in 
turn, scrap the Settsu (an older battleship). The number of ships which 
Japan would retain was 10; the number in Hughes' original proposal.
The retention of the Mutsu made a total difference in tonnage of 13,600 
tons; thus, giving Japan total tonnage of 313>300 tons. Fourth, in 
order to preserve the equality in "efficiency," the United States was 
allowed to complete the Colorado and Washington, and scrap the Delaware 
and North Dakota (older ships). This would leave the United States with 
18 ships, but would increase her total tonnage to 525,8£0 tons. Fifth, 
Great Britain would be allowed to build two new ships, but they would
^^Quoted in Ichihashi, p. 2+0.
Ibid.
have to scrap 1* older ones. This would leave Great Britain with 20
■ . - - ' ? 
capital ships of 582,050 tons. Sixth, maximum tonnage for each replace­
ment vessel would be placed at 37,000 tons, and the replacement ratios
were now raised to 525,000 tons for the United States and 315>000 for
102Japan. Lastly, the 10 year naval holiday was declared.
The above results were then presented to France and Italy with a
103proposal that they retain a ratio of 1.75* or 175*000 tons each.
Admiral de Bon of France, however, delivered a speech in which he stated 
that because of her vast colonial network and her dependence for raw; 
materials on these colonies, a large French navy was a necessity. He 
further stated that France’s "desire" was to replace her current capital 
ships with 10 new ones of 35*000 tons each. In view of this, she needed 
to have a replacement tonnage of 350,000 tons minimum. Hughes, there­
fore, sent a wire to Briand (who had returned to Paris by this time) , 
in which he stated that Great Britain, Japan, and the United States had 
agreed to scrap 68 "capital fighting ships" totaling 1,861,000 tons.
He also pointed out that Italy had agreed to a small tonnage requirement, 
and then suggested that "the attitude of France will determine the 
success or failure of these efforts to reduce the heavy burden of naval 
a r m a m e n t s . H e  went on to point out that if France's portion was in 
the same ratio as the United States’ reduction, then by all rights France 
should be allowed only 102,000 tons. The 175*000 tons, in actuality, was
i n?
C. L. A., pp. 1+1*6-52.
103Italy had already expressed her desire to have naval numerical 
equality with France. To the end she had agreed to limit her navy to 
175*000 tons of capital ship as long as France did likewise.
lOl+Teiegram from C. E. Hughes to P. Briand, December 16, 1921, in 
C. L. A., pp. l+5!*-58.
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an allowance for France to increase her present tonnage (she had only 
161).,000 tons 'then .available). Briand’s answer was to agree on the 1.75 
ratio on capital ships hut to stipulate no further limitation on other 
ships. He stated that "As regards naval armament, it is not the offen­
sive, hut solely the defensive, point of view with which France is 
preoccupied.” He therefore agreed to the 1.75> or 175,000 ton limit, 
for France on capital ships, hut went on to say:
But so far as defensive ships are concerned 
[light cruisers, torpedo hoats and submarines], 
it would be impossible for the French Govern­
ment . . . to accept reductions. . . . The 
dominating idea of the Washinton Conference is 
the restriction of offensive and costly naval 
armaments. But I do not believe it to be any 
part of its program to restrict a nation which, 
like France, has a large extent of coasts and 
numerous distant colonies, in the means toC
essential to its communications and security.
The French attitude began what Buell calls ”the submarine contro­
versy.” Hughes’ original proposal had proposed tonnage limitations of
90,000 tons for the United States and Great Britain, 5^ 4,000 tons for 
Japan, and it had not mentioned France and Italy. All of the then
existing tonnages of the major powers, however, were below these figures
106at the start of the conference. Lord Lee, Britain’s First Lord of 
the Admiralty, stated that it appeared "strange” that the proposed 
"limit" on submarine tonnage would allow nations to build more to reach 
the stated level. In addition, he stated that the allowance was particu­
larly odd in view of the moral objections to the uses of the submarine
10 T^elegram from P. Briand to C. E. Hughes, December 18, 1921, 
in C. L. A. , pp. ij.98-60.
106The figures of existing total tonnages of submarines differed 
in British and U.S. calculations. American figures were considered more 
correct. They were; United States— 95,000 tons, Great Britain— 82,iu6JL|., 
tons, France— 142,850 tons, Italy— 20,228 tons, and Japan— 31^00 tons.
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in World War I. In the war, he went on, Geman submarines had sunk at 
least 12,000,000 tons of merchant shipping, worth over $1,100,000,000 
not including the cargoes. He further stated that 20,000 noncombatants 
had been killed by drowning. He then called for total abolition of all 
submarine fleets in existence, starting with England's own 100 vessels.
The French delegate then stated France1s position.
France believes that the submarine is 
the only weapon which at present permits a 
nation scantily supplied with capital ships 
to defend itself at sea. For France, there­
fore, the submarine is an essential means of 
preserving her independence which she can not 
give up, especially in view of the sacrifices 
to which she has been asked to consent in the 
matter of capital ships.^7
At the next meeting, Admiral de Bon presented a lengthy speech stating
- that France would not abolish the submarine under any circumstances, as
it was an especially effective defensive weapon for those nations without
a large navy. Its low cost, he went on to say, made it much the more
valuable, especially when compared to capital ship construction. After
further lengthy explanation, he concluded that "90>000 tons is the
absolute minimum for all the navies who may want to have a submarine
force."108
Great Britain's reply was to point out that France had stated 
that she could not disam her land forces because of her fear of Germany 
(to be discussed below). However, the British spokesman went on to 
suggest that submarines could not protect France from Germany; therefore, 
Britain's only conclusion was that the submarines were to be used against
to p. 518.
1Q7C. L. A., p. J+86.
108Ibid. , p. 5l8. De Bon's address on submarines is from p. 501}.
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Great Britain.
The representative from the United States urged that abolition 
be dropped, and a consideration of tonnages and numbers ensued. Great 
Britain, however, remained concerned with French submarines attacking 
her ’’lifeline” of merchant ships. In an attempt to ameliorate the 
impass, Elihu Root introduced several resolutions to attempt to state 
in simple terms the moral standards to be used by submarine commanders 
in order to ease the trepidation of Great Britain. One such resolution 
stated:
The Signatory Powers recognize the practical 
impossibility of using submarines as commerce 
destroyers without violating the requirements 
universally accepted by. civilized nations for 
the protection of the lives of neutrals and 
noncombatants, and to the end that the prohibi­
tion of such use shall be universally accepted 
as a part of the law of nations, they declare 
their assent to such prohibition and invite all 
other nations to adhere thereto. 1-09
Italy, Japan, and France referred the matter to their governments for
instruction.
On 30 December, Lord Lee, while awaiting the governments1 return 
on the above, read into a speech he was delivering an article written 
by Capitaine de Fregate Castex in the Revue Maritime of January, 1920."^^
At the time of these articles, Lee stated, Castex was chief of an impor­
tant bureau in the French Naval Staff. He was now Chief of Staff to the 
Admiral of the Second Division in the Mediterranean, and was to be the 
principal lecturer at the next year’s French Navy’s Senior Officers 
Course. At first, Lee said, Castex defended Germany’s use of the
109C. L. A., p. 596.
^^Revue Maritime was an official publication of the French Naval 
General Staff.
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submarine in World War I. At the end of the article, Lee quoted Castex 
as having stated, "After many centuries of effort, thanks to the 
ingenuity of man, the instrument, the system, the martingale [the sub­
marine] is at hand which will overthrow for good and all the naval 
power of England."'*''^  Lee now called on the French government to dis­
claim these remarks, and to do so by agreeing to accept the Root 
Resolutions. France did apologize and, as a face-saving device, reluc­
tantly accepted the resolutions in their entirety. This was a victory 
for Great Britain, for the submarine was prohibited from acting as a 
"commerce destroyer."
The problem of land armaments was also discussed at the confer-
112ence. In 1921, France had the largest land army in the world, but
she was reluctant to reduce her forces at all. The problem, said Buell,
was that a sea power felt very reticent about giving up ships while land
armies were at a high level. In addition, France’s alliances with
Belgium and Poland made her a very potent force on the continent. As
Buell saw it, this was a policy of "Armed Peace," and it was forcing
Europe to continue in "a passive state of war." It appears, as Buell
also suggests, that when Briand came to the conference, he "brought one
mandate with him." That was to tell the world of France1 s particular
113problems in Europe which prohibited her disarming.
In a speech on November 21, 1921 (at the Third Plenary Session), 
Premier Briand set forth France's position. Portraying helplessness,
111■ C. L. A., p. 652. Lord Lee was quoting from Capitaine de
Fregate Castex's article entitled "Synthese de la Gueire Sous-Marine," 
Revue Maritime (January, 1920).
112Buell’s figures show France with 818,000 men, Poland— 1*50*000, 
Japan— -300,000, England— 215,000, U.S.— 175*000, Germany— 100,000.
11^Buell, p. 203.
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he told the audience that he would desire nothing more than being able
to state that "we come prepared to make the greatest sacrifices; our
country is safe; we lay down our arms and, in so doing, we rejoice in
helping to lay the foundations of a permanent peace." But, he went on
to say, "Unhappily we can not do this. . • • We have not the right to do
it." His point was, as he further explained, that
It takes two to make peace: yourself and
your neighbor. To make peace— I speak from 
the standpoint of land armament— it is not 
enough to reduce armies and to decrease the 
munitions of war. That is the material side 
of things. There is another consideration. . . .
A nation must also be surrounded by . . .  an 
atmosphere of peace; disarmament must be 
moral as well as material. • . . In Europe • • *
there are still, alas, grave elements of 
instability, conditions of such a character 
that France is forced to look them in the face 
and to measure their consequences from the 
point of view of her own safety.
Briand went on to say that Prance could not possibly disarm 
until Germany had a change in her philosophy of war and reduced her 
army. Her army of 100,000 as then presently constituted, said Briand, 
was made of non-commissioned and commissioned officers from her old 
regular army. This would, therefore, form a nucleus for a new, great
army whenever Germany decided to have one. For Prance's safety, he
stated, she could not possibly disarm her land forces.
Japan was generally pleased with the stance France took on land 
armaments. A report of Major General Tanaka on Briand*s plea was 
deciphered by Yardley. In this report Tanaka stated, "It is the feeling 
that through Briand’s fight Japan without any effort has achieved a
llj4C. L. A., p. 116.
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large part of its objective.” In public, Great Britain showed 
sympathy for Prance’s predicament, but privately was very hostile. In a 
telegram to Lord Balfour, Lloyd George stated, "Europe, led by Prance, 
was again becoming an armed camp." He also stated that the statistics 
used by Briand (in his speech citing the threat of Germany) were "faked 
and disingenuous.George thought that Prance was in no danger of a 
German invasion. Nevertheless, the subject of land armaments was, for 
all intents and purposes, dropped from consideration at the conference.
The subject of aircraft carriers was also discussed. The 
original Hughes proposal had limited aircraft carriers to 80,000 tons 
for the United States and Great Britain, and lj.8,000 tons for japan. On 
December 30, 1921, it was proposed that Prance and Italy be limited to
28,000 tons. The Italian delegate quickly pointed out that with this 
provision Italy would only be allowed one aircraft carrier of 27,000 
tons. He then stated that if the carrier was either in dry dock or 
sunk, Italy would find herself without a ship of that type. Italy then 
asked that it be allowed a tonnage allowance high enough to grant it 
leeway to have two such vessels (or 5U>000 tons). In addition, Italy 
asked for the right to have parity with the allowance granted to any 
other Mediterranean Power, if this other power was to be allowed over 
51+,000 tons.
France followed the same logic, but also requested a third 
carrier because of her colonial possessions, for a total of 60,000 tons. 
Japan stated that she could construct only one and one-half carriers with
116Report of Major-General Tanaka from Washington to Tokio, 
quoted in Yardley, p. 311*
ll6Butler, Telegram from Lloyd George to Lord Balfour, November 27, 
1921, P. 0. A8763/18/U6 9 quoted in Buckley, pp. 105-6.
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her allowance and this, Admiral Kato concluded, would not he enough.
He stated that Japan also needed three carriers, but unlike France he 
asked for the maximum size of 27,000 tons each, or a total tonnage of
81.000 tons. In view of these requests, Hughes noted that a ratio of
10:10:6 could be established by giving Great Britain and the United
States a 135,000 ton allowance, Japan an 81,000 ton limit, and France
117and Italy a 60,000 ton limit. All powers agreed to this.
118In 1921 France had the largest air force in the world, but
after she had refused to limit her army and had threatened to build
capital ships and submarines, the British concluded that the French
were aiming their air force at the British Isles. In view of this
Great Britain clamored for some peacetime restriction on manufacture of
aircraft. After numerous meetings, however, a committee only managed
to agree that it was "not practicable" to limit commercial or military
aircraft in any way; and that the question of adaptation of rules of
warfare to aircraft should be reserved for another conference to be
119held sometime in the future.
The treaty of the limitation of armaments was signed at the end 
of the conference by Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy, 
and Japan. Article IV set capital ship replacement tonnage at 525,000 
for the United States and Great Britain; 315,000 tons for Japan; and
175.000 tons for Italy and France. Article V established a 35,000 ton 
limit on capital ships, and Article VI established a limit in the caliber
117C. L. A., pp. 670-78.
Il8France had 1,722 military aircraft, Great Britain— l,0l;8,
U.S.— 537, Italy— b S h f Japan— 537* Figures from Buckley, p. 121.
119C. L. A., p. 790.
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of gun on these ships as not greater than 16 inches (I4O6 millimeters).
Article VII established the aircraft carrier limit of 135,000 tons for
the United States and Great Britain; 60,000 tons for France and Italy;
and 81,000 tons for Japan. Articles IX and X established that the
tonnage limits on aircraft carriers was to be 27,000 tons and the gun
size was established as 8 inches (203 millimeters) or less. Article XI
stated that all vessels other than capital ships to be held or constructed
by the agreeing powers must be 10,000 tons or less with a gun size of
8 inches or less. The treaty also listed the ships and their tonnage
which may have been retained by each country. It further stated that a
10 year holiday would be undertaken, and only after 10 years could
capital ships and aircraft carriers, which were at least 20 years old,
be replaced. The treaty was to last until December 31 > 1936, and a two
120year notice had to be given before the treaty could be abrogated.
A treaty concerning the use of submarines and poisonous gases
was also passed. Article I stated that merchant vessels had to be
ordered by the submarine commander to submit to a search. Crews and
passengers had to be set to safety before the merchant ship could be
destroyed. Also, if the merchant ship failed to submit to search, it
could be destroyed. Article III stated that if the above were to be
violated, the submarine commander would be considered a pirate. Article
IV prohibited the use of submarines as commerce destroyers (a ship engaged
in the wanton destruction of merchant vessels). Article V prohibited the
"use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous
liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by the
121general opinion of the civilized world. ..."
ipo i pi
Ibid., pp. 1573-1601;. Ibid. , pp. l60l;-10.
Finally, in the realm of arms limitation, a resolution entitled
"Resolution for a Commission of Jurists to Consider Amendment of Laws
of War" was passed. This resolution proposed that a commission be
established with power to consider: l) If rules of International Law
presently in existence covered all changes in "methods of attack or
defense . . • of new agencies of warfare" since the 1907 Hague Confer-
122ence; and 2) If not, then what rules should be adopted.
In conclusion, it appears that the Washington Conference was 
called because of several reasons; not all dealing with armaments. A 
particular reason for the conference, the "causal factor" if you will, 
does not seem to be present. Many reasons intertwine, reinforce each 
other, even come together; but the impact of each is difficult, if not 
impossible, to measure. The reasons themselves are almost as hard to 
'define.
It does not appear? that there were any specific weapon innova­
tions during the period preceding the conference. The submarine and the 
airplane, the "novel" weapons discussed at the conference, had been in 
existence for quite a few years prior to the conference. World War I, 
however, had shown the immense killing potential of these two weapons 
systems, and both were still at the beginning of their evolutionary 
process. As the costs of the older mainstay of the fleet, the capital 
ship, reached new heights, the burdens of continuing with the programs 
for further construction of these vessels were seen as oppressive.
Perhaps, as several authors suggest, the idea of arms was only a 
facade to cover the real reason for the conference: the British desire
to abrogate the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The reasons for this are not
1 OP
Ibid., p. 161+0.
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the subject of this chapter, but a superficial view would indicate that 
this was entirely likely. Japanese imperialism, as perceived by Great 
Britain, most certainly caused the British government to reconsider 
the reason for the alliance in the first place. By 1921 Germany was 
defeated and Russia was still undergoing the throes of rebellion. The 
latter appeared weak and of no major consequence to British holdings in 
East Asia. The alliance appeared to be a cover for Japan's ambitions, 
however, and a potential threat if Japan and the United States were to 
engage in war. There still were advantages, however, and if Great 
Britain was to abrogate the obligations of the alliance, and yet still 
retain these advantages of security for British interests in Asia and the 
Pacific, then perhaps a conference which could end in a new pact of 
some kind would be advantageous.
Japan, on the other hand, did not appear to want a halt to the 
alliance and, therefore, was reluctant to enter into a conference on 
Pacific and Asian problems. They were, however, in very deep financial 
straits as a result of their fears of the United States, which were 
driving them in an attempt to retain at least a 10:7 ratio with America’s 
1916 naval program. To continue to attempt to gain this ratio, however, 
could have bankrupted Japan. A limitation in armaments, on the other 
hand, could halt the construction of the expensive capital ship, and 
perhaps the slack could be taken up by an investment in the submarine; 
i.e., witness Kato’s desire to increase Japan's submarine force to 15>0 
ocean-going submarines. To Japan, arms expenses appeared to be the 
motivating force.
To the United States, no special reason appeared sufficient to 
drive her to a disarmament conference. Harding initially spoke of a
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conference on disarmament, but had not pushed the subject, and even 
had opposed the first Senate resolution for such a conference* He 
appeared to be about to oppose the second, but capitulated for some 
reason, and allowed the resolution to pass without opposition.
The cadi for negotiations from the United States was initially 
for a conference to discuss naval arms limitation, particularly capital 
-,.. ships. If, Japanese imperialism was a definite cause in American eyes 
.. for a conference, it does not appear to be corroborated anywhere. In 
■ the United States, however, there does appear to have been a moralistic 
and perhaps naive desire to halt armaments. The desire for naval 
- supremacy does not appear especially strong, especially after the war; 
but the concern with domestic priorities does. In any event, the 
United States appeared to be concerned with reduction of the arms costs 
as a primary motivator for the conference. Economically, as well as 
militarily, she was as well off, if not more so, than any other nation. 
She was able to fulfill national security obligations with the capital 
ships she presently had, the submarine, and the airplane; therefore, 
she saw no need for a race with capital ships.
In the final analysis, the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 
was called for various reasons, none of which appear to have been a 
decisive force for all concerned. Costs and security, however, appear 
to be common perceptions of all nations involved.
CHAPTER IV
THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS, PHASE I (SALT I)
PART I 
Introduction
"SALT,’1 says John Newhouse, "is perverse; it enlists our curios­
ity, yet discourages comprehension."^ Its language is in terms of the 
technical, yet, in essence, it is political in the sense of involving 
decisions which affect allocations of resources, for both external and 
internal priorities. These two aspects of SALT, the political and the 
technical, are intertwined in such a way that it is difficult if not 
impossible to explain them separately. Basic to an understanding of 
SALT is the recognition that technology, in the form of weaponry in 
this case, is a political asset to be used by one nation at the expense 
of another. In the case of SALT, weapons technology appears to have 
brought the United States and Soviet Union to the point of wanting some 
type of limitation agreement (witness the peripheral agreements on 
hot-line, test-ban, and non-proliferation) , but the political utility of
weaponry causes both nations to resist' a limitation. If a limitation is
2
agreed upon, as it was in SALT I, each nation utilizes other qualitative
3weapon innovations as "hedges" in order to "steal a march" on its
^John Newhouse, Cold Dawn, the Story of SALT (New York; Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston, 1973)> p. 1.
2
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are commonly called SALT.
3"Hedge" is a term used to denote one nation's attempt to protect 
itself qualitatively in weaponry while entering into agreements on quanti­
tative limits.
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opponent.
By and large, however, there is agreement on the basic, under­
lying rationale for SALT. This is that SALT represents "a mutual need 
to solemnize the parity principle"^: a desire to acknowledge that both
sides accept the fact that each could destroy the other. In essence,
"SALT is a political negotiation concerned with finding an equilibrium 
in which the great powers feel secure.1'
Although basic agreement can be reached on the underlying 
rationale for SALT, it is extremely difficult to find agreement on the 
reasons for the actual onset of SALT. This, I believe, is because there 
is no single factor causing SALT, and therefore it is an interplay of 
what Thomas Wolfe describes as "strategic, military-technical, political, 
psychological, economic, and bureaucratic factors • . . [which] all
6influence . . . interests in the limitation of strategic armament.1
It is difficult to tell which factor is more important. Some may 
overlap others, and even the actors are not completely sure of the 
greatest influence. Even within each factor there are priorities, percep­
tions, and nuances not discernible to the outsider. The best anyone can 
do, therefore, is to identify the possible factors influencing the onset 
of negotiations in hopes of showing their interrelatedness , and perhaps
"^Strategic parity, as used by Walter Slocombe, is an abstract 
term which denotes more than a numerical equality. It is "the link 
between a nation's military (including nuclear) forces— a collection 
of weapons systems with certain certain technical capabilities and 
characteristics— and its political power and influence." Walter Slocombe, 
"The Political Implications of Strategic Parity," Adelphi Papers No. 77 
(May 1971): 2.
£
Newhouse, p. 5*
6Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Interests in SALT," in SALT; Implications 
for Arms Control in the 1970s, eds. William R. Kintner and Robert L. 
Pfaltzgraff, Jr.(Pittsburg;University of Pittsburg Press, 1973)? p. 21.
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to suggest that one "reason" is more probable than another.
PART II
Soviet Attitudes Towards Arms Control, and Factors Influencing 
the Soviet Decision to Enter into SALT
It appears that Soviet policies on arms control and nuclear 
weapons in the post-World War II period have been executed with a parti­
cular goal in mind: the attainment of at least strategic nuclear parity
with the United States. The methods used to attain this goal have been 
a matter of controversy within the Soviet Union. In fact, as Lincoln
Bloomfield argues, "the significant source of Soviet arms control policy
7
is to be found in * trade-offs’ among several key underlying factors" : 
both internal— the bureaucracy and the economy, and external— the inter­
national environment.
Internal Setting
The decision to enter into SALT has reflected the views of the 
foreign affairs intelligentsia, the scientific community, and the mili­
tary. They constitute specific "interest groups" within the Soviet 
bureaucratic es tablishment.
For purposes of analysis, the foreign affairs intelligentsia 
refers to the professionals concerned with foreign, policy. They are 
primarily found in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the intelligence 
services, diplomatic schools, and the Foreign Affairs Department of the 
Central Committee Secretariat. This group had little influence during 
the years of Stalin and Khrushchev, but since that time their power has
7
Lincoln P. Bloomfield et al. , Khrushchev and the Arms Raceg 
Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament 1 9 5 U - 1 9 & U (Cambridge%
M. I. T. Press, 1 9 6 6 ), "p. 3-
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grown and they might be suspected of playing a significant role in the 
decisions leading to Soviet involvement in SALT. This group does not 
have a single view? "but, as Wolfe states, its "general orientation" has 
"been "pro-negotiation" on arms control, with the stipulation that 
"openings" would be exploited as they presented themselves.
The scientific community is an influential group because of the. 
expertise it commands, particularly in the area of nuclear technology.
Its "general orientation," like that of the foreign affairs intelligent­
sia, is pro-arms control. Its political influence, however, is muted
because of the fear some of the Soviet leadership and the military have
8that it may become too powerful.
The military is an organized agency of the bureaucracy, with
specifically defined interests and goals. Its. importance is reflected
in the strategic functions it performs within the Soviet political system.
The Soviet Union craves great power status, and to this end perceives
the need for a large, sophisticated military establishment. This
establishment, says Wolfe, is characterized by professional independence,
9specialized knowledge, and organizational autonomy. Furthermore, it has 
developed its own values, codes of conduct, and specific esprit de corps.
Next to the party organization, the military constitutes the most power­
ful organized group in the Soviet Union. This means that it has consider­
able influence because it can insure that its "advice" is brought to bear
8Wolfe, pp. 30-32.
9An example of this is a story that Newhouse tells of one session 
during the second round of SALT. M. Semenov, the chief Soviet delegate, 
was comparing Minuteman silos with SS-9 silos, but was corrected by the 
U.S. He had to be told by Colonel-General Ogarkov that the SS-9 silos 
were much larger. Later Ogarkov told a United States delegate to please 
not tell U.S. knowledge of Russian military matters to the civilian 
members of the Soviet delegation.
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on the top leadership. The military supports SALT, but is wary lest 
something happen to hurt the Soviet military posture. It did hot "call 
the tune" for SALT, but did provide a conservative force on the eventual 
Soviet position.
The decision to enter into arms control negotiations has been 
difficult to take for the Soviet leaders. Among many factors which 
influenced its outcome, the economic considerations have played an 
important role, albeit not a decisive one.
In the post-World War II period there do not appear to have been 
any real economic pressures of the nature of an "urgent motive" driving 
the Soviet Union to enter into arms control negotiations. Beginning in 
19l*5, the Soviet Union devoted a large amount of its . budget to research 
and development' (R & D) activities in order to develop an atomic capabil­
ity and thereby erase the American monopoly. Even after the U.S.S.R. 
exploded an atomic weapon in 191*9 > her expenditures remained high, 
principally due to the Korean War. After the war, defense expenditures 
dropped somewhat, but increased in 1955* They were lowered again in 
1956 and 1957 (see table 2). They grew rapidly after 1957?.with the 
biggest jump in 1961.'*‘"L By 1962, defense spending was almost 1*0 percent 
higher than in 1957* In 1963 the published outlay for defense was a 
full 10 percent more than in 1962. The fact that agriculture was in 
shambles in 1963 and civilian industry began to stagnate as more and more 
engineers and scientists were pulled into the arms industry, probably 
caused defense expenditures to drop in 1961* and 1965 ? but by 1966 this 
spending was on its way to an all-time high in 1968.
^8Wolfe, pp. 3l+— 36„
^^ "Bloomfield, pp. 105~7«
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TABLE 2
DEFENSE ALLOCATIONS IN U.S.S.R. BUDGET FOR 1955-196812 
(in Billions of Rubles)
195$ 10.7 1962 12.7
1956 9.7 1963 13.9
1957 9.1 1962+ 13.3
1958 9. h 1965 12..8
1959 9-h 1966 13. h
i960 9.3 1967 lit. 5
1961 11.6 1968 16.7
12Reproduced from a table in Thomas B. Larson, Disarmament and 
Soviet Policy, I96I1-I968 (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969) >
p. 82.
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The actual influence of the economy on the decision to enter
into SALT, however, remains in doubt to this day. Two opposite views
are presented by Thomas Wolfe. One view,holds that economics played a
large role in the decision to opt for SALT. This view maintains that
the Soviet Union needed “growth investment1’ for "meeting rising consumer
demands" and that strategic arms purchases took too many resources needed
for consumer industries. Another view holds that "economic constraints
can no longer be regarded as a severe brake upon Soviet capacity and
willingness to compete strategically with the United States, and that
therefore the prime motivations behind Soviet participation in SALT must 
13lie elsewhere."
Wolfe says that the first view was used more extensively in the 
first stages of SALT as the answer to why the Soviets decided to opt 
for it, especially in light of the slowdown in the Soviet economy in 
1967-1968; but if this was the correct view, he suggests, Soviet interest 
in SALT should have declined altogether as the economy resurged in 1970. 
The interest, however, remained high, thus indicating that the Soviet’s 
main reason for SALT may have been other than economic. Furthermore, 
the statistics of the Five-Year Plan of February, 1971 j in which consumer 
industry still retained a low percentage of the total production, even 
with an economic upsurge, may indicate that the second view is more
■j ]
reasonable. As evidence for this, Wolfe cites the debate over invest­
ment priorities which still raged during the SALT negotiations, with the 
military faction carrying the most weight. Thus it appears, as Wolfe
13Wolfe, p. 25.
The I97O plan showed consumer goods as a percentage of total 
production as only 21;%. 'This had been raised to only 30% in 1971*
Heavy industry took the rest.
suggests, that "the Soviet leaders are prepared to devote at least as
large a proportion of the national income to military purposes as was
the case during the strategic buildup of the sixties— provided that they
consider such a level of military preparation necessary to support Soviet 
1^interests," therefore, it appears that the economic factor is not 
decisive.
In sum, as Thomas Larson aptly states: "Soviet leaders as a
group are well-trained to resist acceptance of disarmament measures whose
l6attraction is mainly economic." Thus, the majority of economic 
resource allocations, it is probable, are heavily influenced by the 
strategic considerations which appear to affect Soviet security.
External Setting
Soviet perceptions of the international environment may have been
a most important influence in Russia’s decision to opt for ams control
in general, and SALT in particular.
The period from 19l|5> to 195>U in Soviet strategic policy was
characterized by a drive to acquire atomic weapons, and arms control
was anathema to the leadership at this time. The Soviet desire for
nuclear weapons, however, does not appear to have been motivated as much
by fear of the United States, as from the knowledge that the weapon was
of vital necessity in the Soviet’s drive to become a superpower. As
Adam B. TJlam writes, "Absolutely nothing suggests that Soviet policies
in 19U5 were dominated by the fear of or were a reaction to America’s
17possession of the atom bomb.” As a matter of fact, TJlam continues, it
■^Wolfe, p. 28. "^Larson, p. 81.
17Adam: B. TJlam, The Rivals: America & Russia since World War II
(New York: Viking Press, 1971) > P« 95-
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was during1 this period that the U.S.S.R. solidified its control over 
East Europe, blockaded Berlin, and demobilized her armed forces from 
just over 11 million men in 1 9 b % 9 to 2.8 million men in 1948* A Soviet 
assumption during this period appeared to be that the United States 
would not use the weapon, even for intimidation.
18The 19U6 United States' plan (the Baruch Plan ) to turn over 
atomic weapons to an agency of the United Nations for management was not 
acceptable to Stalin, because of his suspicion that the "superagency" 
created would be detrimental to Soviet interests. He also knew that under 
this plan. Russia would be denied nuclear know-how, but the United States, 
though disarmed, would retain the knowledge. His counterproposal, that 
all atomic weapons be destroyed but with no inspection guaranteed, was 
unacceptable to the United States, as he probably was certain it would 
be. In essence, says Ularn, Stalin was convinced of the absolute desir­
ability of nuclear weapons and, therefore, embarked upon a program to 
insure their development and acquisition. The fact that Russia was
able to explode a nuclear device by 1 9 b 9  9 Ulam claims, is proof enough
19of Soviet devotion to that goal. The Soviet attitude towards the 
West during this period was characterized by hostility. Bloomfield 
concludes that after Stalin's death, uncertainties, such as which side 
would profit more from a strategic arms race, "combined with the as yet 
unresolved questions of inspection and control, the fixing of ratios, and 
Moscow's assessment of Western intentions, probably made comprehensive
*^The Baruch Plan was presented to the United Nations in 19U&.
See Trevor N. Dupuy and Gay M. Hammerman, A Documentary History of Arms 
Control and Bis armament (Dunn Lorins, Va.s. T. N. Dupuy Associates, 1973)? 
pp. 301-8, for a full reproduction of the plan.
19 1See Ulam, chap. 4.
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20disarmament appear infeasible in 1951j--*1956. • • After 1956 > how­
ever, the Soviet Union under Khrushchev appeared to become more agreeable .
to notions of arms control. A softer line appeared, accompanied by a
21shift toward accommodation with the West.
Khrushchev announced in February 1956, that war was no longer
inevitable and that in some cases the movement to Communism could be
accomplished by peaceful means. This was intended to show that Soviet
22Russia did not want military confrontation with the West. Influencing
this accommodation was the fact that by 1951+ and 1955 the Soviet R & 3)
programs began to deliver their "fruits” in the form of new delivery
23capabilities and larger warheads for its strategic arsenal..
In the period 1956 to 1962 several optimistic assumptions 
concerning future Russian strategic power caused the leadership to 
become very confident concerning Soviet nuclear capabilities. This, in 
turn, probably caused the Soviet TJnion to soften its approach to aims 
control, at least until the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962. One 
reason for this optimism was that Russia successfully tested an ICBM in 
1957 (before the United States), after which Khrushchev announced that 
bomber forces, such as those belonging to the United States, were 
becoming obsolete. As the Soviets began to perceive that they were 
reaching a position of relative parity with the United States (their 
assumption combined with cries of "missile gap" in the United States), 
they began to speak more seriously of arms control. At the Pugwash talks
90 91
Bloomfield, p. 10+. Ibid. , p. 17.
22Leo Gruliow, ed. , Current Soviet Policies; A Documentary 
Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and Its Aftermath (NewYork; 
Praeger, 1957)j pp. 36-38.
^Bloomfield, p. 37*
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in Moscow in i960, the Soviet scientists asked the American delegation to 
report to President-elect Kennedy that "the Soviet TJnion is serious 
about disarmament"; and that its position was "not wholly propaganda."2^ 
After the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 exposed the idea 
of Soviet missile superiority as a myth, the Soviets became quite 
concerned about their vulnerability. They reacted by becoming more 
hostile, and their position on arms control hardened. Although some 
negotiations were still conducted on peripheral topics (hot-line agree­
ment) , movement towards a comprehensive negotiation was halted for a
2E>considerable period.
The Soviet strategic buildup after 1962 was not just the result
of the Cuban crisis, says Wolfe, but was the culmination of planning in
the late 195>0’s to increase nuclear forces in order to reach full parity.
When Khrushchev was finally ousted in October II4., 1961+y however, the
Soviet strategic forces were still very weak (consisting of only about
two hundred launchers); but initial steps for the deployment of the third-
26generation SS-9 and SS-11 had been taken.
After Khrushchev was removed, the remaining leadership was 
virtually the same as before, but its style changed, involving a differ­
ent emphasis. The "new" leadership accused Khrushchev of "subjectivism," 
"voluntarism," and impulsiveness. He had been too addicted to "leaping 
before looking" and to "bombast." What the leadership would now empha­
size, it said, would be group decisions, with "sobriety, caution, [and]
o]
Quoted in W. W. Rostow, "Introduction: the Politics of Arms
Control or How to Make Nuclear Weapons Wither Away," in Kintner, Pn. 6, 
p. ix.
^Bloomfield, pp. 176-8£. 26Wolfe, p. 39-
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27careful preparation.n
In I96I4.-I966, the new leadership conducted a review of defense 
policy and for a time new programming was in limbo. At the Twenty-third 
Party Congress in April 1966, however, Kosygin indicated that larger 
defense expenditures were being programmed, with the emphasis on strate­
gic forces. In 1968 the Soviets modernized their submarine force with 
new Y-class submarines.
In addition to perceptions of the West, it is almost certain that 
internal rifts within the Communist camp affected Soviet actions towards 
arms control. As the Peoples1 Republic of China (PRC) in 1956 began to 
diverge from the Soviet model of development and to take an independent
stance on other matters as well, the relationship between the two giants
28became very antagonistic. This hostility became more intense after
1957 9 especially when the Soviet Union refused to continue to provide
the Chinese with nuclear aid. Nevertheless, exactly how this affected
29Soviet arms control policy is debatable.
There is agreement that the dispute did exert some influence on 
Soviet policies; that Soviet arms control policies following the removal 
of Khrushchev probably were "framed” so as to avoid giving unnecessary 
offense to China. This meant that the Soviets were influenced, restrained 
if you will, because all arms control decisions had to take the attitude
27Quoted in Larson, p. 8.
28Robert A. Scalapino, "The American-Soviet-Chinese Triangle: 
Implications for Arms Control," in Kintner, p. li+3*
29For a good discussion as to this debate, see Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 
"The Chinese Factor in Soviet Disarmament Policy," and Morton H. Halperin, 
"Sino-Soviet Nuclear Relations, 1957-1960," in Morton H. Halperin, ed.,
Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1967).
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30and military posture of the PRC into consideration.
In sum, great power status via atomic weapon parity has probably
been a constant goal of the Soviet Union during the post-World War II
period; therefore, Soviet arms control policy is very concerned with the 
military-strategic balance which exists at a given time. This means 
that arms control and disarmament policies are formulated with regard to 
how they affect security and, therefore, they change with changes in the 
military and strategic situation. A prime concern is to avoid a general 
war, but at the same time to pursue security in the form of parity. The 
actual timing of their arms control efforts, therefore, depends upon 
both internal and external factors, plus one other, technology, which 
will be discussed below.
PART III
American Attitudes to Arms Control, and Factors Influencing 
the United States1 Decision to Enter into SALT
The arms control policy of the United States in the post-World
War II period, generally speaking, has been one which allowed arms limita­
tion to be discussed, but the proposals offered, however, have been only 
those which would have insured continued United States superiority, if 
not in actual on-hand forces, at least in technology. Thus, the American 
decision to enter into SALT was a combination of factors, both internal 
and external, coupled with a strategic philosophy which allowed the 
United States to accept strategic parity with.the. Russians.
In the mid-1960fs, for example, the United States' long-range 
strategic strike: force was four or five times as large as that of the 
Soviet Union. In 1966~1967> however, the United States decided to place
^Sonnenfeldt, pp. 103-8.
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a quantitative ceiling on strategic weaponry, which allowed the U.S.S.R. 
to move past U.S. strategic force levels in ICBMs and deliverable mega­
tonnage by 1970 (see table 3). This part will discuss the non-strategic 
factors which possibly brought about that decision.
Internal Setting
The U.S. bureaucracy has been influential to the extent that it 
functions as do bureaucracies in general: by "funneling" inputs in the
form of options into the leadership. From these, decisions are made. 
Concerning arms control, the most influential agencies in the U.S. 
bureaucracy are the State Department and the Department of Defense. Of 
the two, the Department of Defense has been the more conservative force, 
and the State Department, via the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA) , has been more inclined towards arms control. All in all, how­
ever, these two agencies have balanced each other. This has resulted in 
a cautious, but pro-arms control policy. The bureaucracy’s main influ­
ence, as with the Russian apparatus, however, is to help set the para­
meters of decision making and perhaps to affect the timing of negotiations,
31but overall its contribution was not decisive.
Public Opinion and Congress, on the other hand, have generally 
adopted the "guns or butter" conception of defense. Until Vietnam they 
were mainly conservative in their views of military spending; i.e., the 
public and Congress, nurtured on anti-Communism, accepted government 
requests for military and weapons appropriations.
After however, the public began to feel the pinch of
31Harland 33. Moulton, From Superiority to Parity; the United 
States and the Strategic Arms Race, 19&1-1971 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 
Press, 1973)> PP. 270-75.
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TABLE 3
UNITED STATES AND SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL 
STRATEGIC-STRIKE FORCE, 197032
Type U.S. U.S.S.R.
ICBMs
Small (SS-11, Minuteman) (1,000) (940)
Medium (SS~8, Titan II) (54) (220)
Large (SS-9) • • • (280)
Subtotal 1,054 1,440
SLBMs 656 350
Bombers 55o 3.45
Total 2,260 1,935
Number of warheads carried
(approximate) 5,300 2,225
Deliverable megatonnage
(approximate) 5,600 9,700
32Chart in J. J. Coffey, "American Interests in the Limitation 
of Strategic Armaments," in Kintner, p. 58.
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supporting the war in Vietnam, strategic forces and the Great Society 
programs. Defense "budgets, for example, went from $1|.6 "billion in 
i960 to $1j9»9 "billion in 1965> $66 "billion in 1966, $70.6 billion in 
1967, $75 billion in 1968, $81.1* billion in 1969> and to $82.3 billion 
in 1970.^ As large as these expenditures were, they were declining as 
a proportion of G. N. P. The rapidly increasing total budget was 
becoming oppressive.
However, due to the war in Vietnam, the percentage of the defense 
budget devoted to strategic arms declined greatly from 1965 to 1968, as 
compared to the percentage prior to 1965j and this was to decline further 
by 1970- Whereas in 1965> 13*8 percent of the defense budget was ear­
marked for strategic forces and 9*8 percent for R & D, in 1970 the
35percentages were 11.7 and 6.8 percent respectively. ■
The attitude of the bureaucracy and Congress to arms control 
became more positive as the 1960Ts drew to a close. Whereas some agen­
cies and congressmen urged caution in approaching any sort of negotiation
In 1967 a Gallup poll showed that 76% of Americans sampled held 
either a "mildly unfavorable" or "highly unfavorable" attitude toward 
Russia. In George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971 
vol. 3- (New York: Random House, 1972) , March 8 , 1967 Poll. By 1969 ? 
however, Vietnam had caused much of the Congress and the public to be 
skeptical of "experts," and they began to pressure for more funds for 
domestic needs. In an August 11*, 1969 poll? 52% of those surveyed felt 
that the U.S. was spending "too much" on military and defense. Only 8% 
felt that the U.S. was spending "too little." In Gallup, p. 2210. How 
much influence public opinion had on the decision to opt for SALT is 
highly debatable. In national security matters, public opinion has 
mattered little. However, in this case public opinion may have influenced 
Congress, which, because they control appropriations, did exert influence 
on the government to decide on SALT.
■ 3  J
Charles L, Schultze et al., Setting National Priorities: The
1972 Budget (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1971)? P- 12.
35 /The Federal Budget; its Impact on the Economy. (New York:
National Industrial Conference Board, 1969)> p. 12.
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with the Soviet Union, others welcomed the advent of a spirit of detente 
and urged SALT as an immediate step.
External Setting
In 19^1 John Poster Dulles set forth his ideas on the inherent
dangers which he and many others associated with world communism. It
was his contention that the communists1 goal was to hecome locked in a
"death struggle" with capitalism. Communism, then, was a diabolical
scheme designed to subjugate the entire world. The Soviet Union, under
the guidance of a "fanatical Communist Party," was evil and bent on
37"destruction, terror, and madness." Since these views were widely 
shared throughout American society, the conception of negotiating 
seriously with Russia on its terms of total disarmament was conceived to 
.be impractical.
This view began to give way after Stalin’s death in 1953 > 
gradually moving towards detente. In the United States after Khrushchev's 
ouster in I96I4., "an air of cautious optimism about East-West relations" 
appealed to evolve. This was, says J. I. Coffey, "from an apparent 
recognition of the new realities and an adjustment that reflects the 
limits of U.S. power, . . . [and also] from a willingness to use that 
power for negotiation rather than for confrontation." This feeling was 
reciprocated somewhat by the Soviet Union.
36 /Detente is a nebulous term literally meaning a "relaxation of 
tensions." It does not imply an "entente," but includes perceptions of 
improving East-West relations. See Department of State, The Meaning of 
Detente (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Office, June 1974)*
37John Poster Dulles, War or Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1950) 9
pp. 2-10.
^Coffey, p. 6l.
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In essence, the lessening of tension in the international environ­
ment provided a catalyst for the advent of SALT, "but it was not the 
decisive factor. The general statement which can he made is that with­
out a relaxed environment SALT probably could not have taken place, but 
without other factors, such as the economic and strategic-technological 
(yet to be discussed), detente would not alone have caused SALT. What 
is important and, as Walter Slocombe suggests very relevant, is that
the United States would not have embraced strategic parity unless it did,
39in America’s estimation, provide for security. This, then, leads to 
the most important factor urging SALT (on the United States’ side at 
least): the effect of technological innovations.
PART IV
The Technological Incentives for SALT
SALT is a political negotiation, but wrought with technological 
considerations.^ Because nuclear weapons so drastically altered the 
previously-held concepts of warfare, in the nuclear age atomic technology 
becomes a tool which allows one nation to exert influence on another's 
political decisions. Technological innovations have the ability to 
create feelings of insecurity in others, and if these innovations alter 
the strategic power balance between antagonists, the psychology of the 
nuclear age appears to cause the nation with the most powerful strategic 
force to perceive that it is. in a position to exert more influence in the 
world. Ironically, the "lesser” power appears to accept its role of
39See Slocombe, Fn. I4.
^Technological in the sense of weapons developments that affect 
the strategic doctrine. Appendix A contains a brief summation of the 
strategic concept of deterrence.
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having less influence, although its ability to obliterate its opponent is 
unimpaired. Like Hertz and Avis, both nations strive to be "Number One" 
in the strategic aims race, each attempting to halt the race once it 
has reached a superior position. Thus, it was only when both the 
United States and the Soviet Union agreed to accept strategic parity as 
the basis of negotiation that SALT was able to begin. Part IV will 
attempt to trace the evolution of parity, and the strategic, technolog­
ical and military decisions which influenced the decision to begin 
SALT.1*1
Uuring the period of the American nuclear monopoly, 19l+5-19U9> 
the defense planners in the United States appeared convinced of U.S. 
atomic superiority. The Soviet explosion of an atomic device in 19li9> 
followed by the Korean War in 1950» however, caused an urgent drive to 
"regain" superiority in nuclear weaponry. In 1950 > President Truman 
decided to develop the hydrogen bomb (what Harry Moulton considers an 
"exponential"^ jump in the technological sequence of nuclear weapons), 
and this helped the United States to "spurt ahead."
The "H" bomb was a vast improvement over the "A" bomb, and it 
was successfully tested in late 1952. By 1955 the United States was far 
superior to the U.S.S.R. in strategic delivery means (see table 1|). The 
Soviet R & D efforts during this period which would dramatically alter 
the strategic status quo in just a few years were being urgently carried 
forth, however, and they culminated in another "exponential" jump, the
^Strategic-technological-military means simply that in the 
nuclear age, one affects the other, and that it is almost impossible to 
separate them completely.
) ?
This means that a qualitative innovation so vastly changed the 
strategic situation that the "have not" nation frantically attempted to 
negate the feat in some manner.
TABLE k
STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS , 1955^
1000
bull
. J *  H1HUJ
» Bear
TJ.S. SovietU.S. Soviet
Medium-Range Bombers Long-Range Bombers
^Chart in Bloomfield, p. 37• ICBMs were only in R & D stages.
development of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (iCBM). The 
Soviet Union successfully tested this weapon in early 1957? "but the 
United States was not able to duplicate that feat until December of 
that year.^4
The Soviet ICBM test caused great concern within, the U.S. , and 
several agencies and "think-tanks," including the Hand Corporation and 
the Department of Defense, began to stress the vulnerability of the 
United States’ Strategic Air Command (SAC).^ It appeared to defense 
officials "to be the most dire threat to the security of the United 
States in its entire history."^ The reaction of the United States was 
to begin more intensive R & D efforts to "regain" superiority in strate­
gic arms. These efforts culminated successfully when a Titan I was 
placed in operation by 1959 and the Minuteman and Polaris by the early
) 7
1960s. The "Triad" was now in operation, and the United States saw 
itself in a secure, superior strategic position.^
In I96I4. President Johnson began to make moves to reach agreement 
on mutual arms reduction with the Soviet Union. He wrote to Khrushchev 
in 196i+ proposing that both nations destroy some of their older bombers, 
and on March 19, 1961+, Adrian Fisher (the Deputy Director of the ACDA)
proposed that a number of U.S. B-l+7s and Soviet TU~l6s be destroyed at
the rate of twenty per month for two years. In August, 1961+, the United
^Moulton, pp. 252-63.
1+5SAC contained what was then the U.S. main nuclear delivery 
means: the long-range bomber.
^Moulton, p. 263.
I 7
Triad is the term to denote that the balance of the U.S. 
strategic strength lies in ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers.
^Moulton, pp. 21-23.
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States proposed a freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic
offensive and defensive weapons, and a ban against "novel" systems. Both
h9proposals were rejected by Russia.
By the mid-1960ts, spending for TJ.S. strategic forces leveled 
off and a tacit understanding was accepted in the defense circles of 
Washington which allowed 639 as the ceiling figure for B-5?2 bombers. It 
was further stipulated that, they would be phased out as they became worn- 
out (current figures show approximately I4.6O in commission). This under­
standing also called for deployment of a Minuteman force of up to 1,000 
missiles and a maximum of ipL Polaris submarines. With this understanding, 
the United States reached its self-imposed ceiling of 105U ICBM launchers 
in 1967.
During the 1960*s, the Soviet Union earnestly began to increase 
its ICBM force. In I96I4., for example, it only had approximately 200 
ICBMs in soft sites, but as table 5 shows, this number was to greatly 
increase by 19^7*
Strategically speaking, the U.S.S.R. bases its strategic doctrine 
almost exclusively on ballistic missiles, particularly ICBMs (see table 
5). Its largest weapon, the SS-9 Scarp, is an expensive, liquid fueled
weapon, costing almost twice as much as the United States Minuteman.
<0The SS-9 gives the Soviet Union a credible first-strike capability,
^Newhouse, p. 69.
£0A first strike is defined as: "The launching of an initial
nuclear attack before the opponent attacked has used any strategic nuclear 
weapons himself." See Glossary in Kintner, p. 1|25>. A first-strike 
capability involves "the substantial elimination of the attacked nations 
retaliatory second-strike force." A first-strike weapon, then, is simply 
a very sophisticated, accurate, or large-yield weapon which gives one 
nation the ability to destroy its opponents retaliatory, or second-strike 
force. A second strike, then, is "the capability to absorb a surprise 
nuclear attack, and survive with sufficient power to inflict unacceptable
110
TABLE 5
STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS (OCTOBER 1, 1967)^1
United States U.S.S.R.
ICBM Launchers 105U 720
Submarine Ballistic Missile Launchers 656 30
Intercontinental Bombers 697 155
Warheads 1+500 1000
damage on the aggressor*1 In U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of the United States Anti- 
ballistic Missile Program, Hearings before the subcommittee on military 
applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. 90th Cong.,
1st sess., 19687"Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 
before the United Press International editors and publishers, San Prancisco, 
Calif., Sept. 18, 196? > "hereafter referred to as McNamara, "Remarks. . . ."
51Chart from Larson, p. 101+. The discrepancy in warheads is 
due to the large number of U.-S. bombers.
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which would give to it the possibility of destroying much of the United
States’ Minuteman force. When the United States learned in August, 1968
that the U.S.S.R. had begun to test multiple re-entry vehicles (MRV)
<2
for the SS-9j however, it became more concerned. Mow more warheads 
■ could be carried to the Minuteman fields, thus insuring more destruction.
The MRV development meant to many U.S. defense experts that the 
Soviets would soon test a multiple independently, targeted re-entry 
vehicle (MIRV). An SS-9 with MIRV would increase the Soviet threat ten­
fold, at least. As few as three hundred SS-9s with six MIRVs apiece, 
says Newhouse, might be able to destroy the entire Minuteman system on a 
first strike. By 1973 the U.S.S.R. had 288 SS-9s.^3
MIRV
MIRV and MRV have increased the amount of nuclear firepower 
which can be delivered from one nation to another. MRVs are warheads 
which, once released by the launcher over enemy territory, scatter along 
a single path and are not individually targeted. MIRVs, on the other 
hand, are released at different times, at different angles and are 
individually targeted. An excellent analogy is given by Newhouse. He 
states:
MIRV is a wondrous technology. The low-thrust 
final stage of the missile is a bus. The bus, 
pushed along by a single guidance and propulsion 
system, carries all of the re-entry vehicles.
These it releases one at a time by changing 
velocity and direction. Incredibly, these 
adjustments actually define the path of the re­
entry vehicle to its target. The bus follows a 
meandering course, now zigzag, now rolling over
52Ian Smart, "Advanced Strategic Missiles: A Short Guide,"
Adelphi Papers No. 63 (December 1969): 31*
53Newhouse, pp. 20-21.
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and releasing a cloud of chaff, now perhaps 
rolling again to fire another decoy, now 
shifting directions and releasing a real 
warhead.^
It is argued "by some the MIRY is a very destabilizing weapon
becausej in one qualitative jump, a nation's strategic firepower is
vastly improved. The counting of forces no longer becomes practical
because one launcher does not equate another. A MIRVd missile is "worth"
more than one without MIRY.
Others argue the MIRY is not as destabilizing as it would
appear, because even though it implies a first-strike capability against
land based missiles, it cannot threaten either bombers or submarines.
Nevertheless, it remains a major threat and is destabilizing at the very
least "simply because governments think it is." The main problem with _
MIRV is, as Newhouse states, that since governments think in terms of
"worst case," the Soviets axe as afraid of the U.S. MIRV which was already
deployed, as the United States is afraid of the Soviet MIRV (for the SS-9
especially), which was (at the time of SALT) not deployed.
As will be shown, anti-ballistic missiles (AEMs) were easily
discussed at SALT and eventually limited. MIRY, on the other hand,
appeared very ominous to the Russians and they refused to discuss it.
Since the Soviet Union had not developed the MERY technology by SALT,
they were not about to limit its use. Their reason appears as Y. V.
Larionov, a noted Soviet scholar, states, that "What appears 'sufficient'
5>7to one side can look like a desire for superiority to the other side."
^Tbid. , p. 28. ^Ibid.
 ^Ibid., p. 29.
* h .  V. Larionov, S. Sh. A. , No. 3, 1970 Moscow: S. Sh. A.
Ekondmika, Politika-Ideologioa, quoted in Newhouse, p. 31•
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ABM
The political implications of ABM (in the sense of security
c'o
considerations) are very involved and very/basic to SALT. The idea of
an ABM force originated long Before SALT, but the U.S. decision to deploy
was deferred until 1967* It was seen as a necessary system for security,
but it was also seen as a system which would weaken the strands of
deterrence. If one side felt it could shore itself behind a wall of ABM,
it would be able to launch a surprise attack, ride out a retaliatory
attack and win a nuclear war. ABM defense, as Jeremy J. Stone, a noted
expert on strategic doctrine states, is "pernicious, destabilizing, and 
39dangerous." Nevertheless, the decision was made by both nations to 
deploy ABM.
The two air defense systems developed by the Soviet Union were 
Tallinn and Galosh. Tallinn was an air defense system using SA-3 mis­
siles , and was originally designed to cover the bomber routes. of approach
60into Russia. Galosh, on the other hand, was an ABM system established 
around Moscow. The deployment of Galosh, however, caused the United 
States to fear that Tallinn might also be an ABM system. As a result, 
the United States earnestly began to step up its development of ABM and 
MIRV (designed principally to maneuver through an ABM system). U.S. 
defense planners saw Tallinn and Galosh as steps taken to begin fortifi-
38The ABM was not an "exponential"- technological breakthrough> 
although it did utilize much of the technology learned over the years, 
but rather it represented a dire threat to the deterrence theory.
39Jeremy J. Stone, Containing the Arms Race; Some Specific
Proposals (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1966) , p. 21.
30ABM is defined as: "A defensive missile fired to intercept an
offensive ballistic missile." A ballistic missile is one which reaches
an altitude outside the earth's atmosphere, and falls back by force of
gravity. See glossary, in Kintner, p. 1*23.
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61cation of Russian urban centers.
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara did not desire to deploy 
ABM, however, and his concern developed into finding ways to block the 
Soviet Union from its further deployment. His views were presented in a 
statement given before the House Armed Services Committee in 1966. He 
said:
It is a virtual certainty that the Soviets 
will act to maintain their deterrent which 
casts such grave doubts on the advisability 
of our deploying . . . [our ABM] system for 
the protection of our cities against the kind 
of heavy, sophisticated missile attack they 
could launch in the 1970's* In all probability,
all we would accomplish would be to increase 
greatly both their defense expenditures and 
ours without any gain in real security to 
either side.°2
President Johnson, however, wanted the United States to have an 
ABM system in some form. A reason for this appears to be, as Newhouse 
states, that "Johnson was . . . looking ahead to the 1968 elections. 
Having helped mightily, to foster the notion of a missile gap in the late 
1950s— an issue used to advantage against Nixon in the i960 elections—
/To
he obviously wished to avoid facing a Republican charge of an ABM gap."
At a meeting in the Texas White House on December 6, 19&6, 
relates Newhouse, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) urged that the Presi­
dent support an anti-Russian ABM defense of American cities. McNamara
had already cut the requested funds for the initial ABM procurement from
^Many U.S. intelligence agencies were predicting a large expan­
sion of Galosh 'in I96I4.-I966.
62u.s. Department of State, Statement of Secretary of Defense 
Robert S. McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee.on the 
Fy 1967~1971 Defense Program and 1967 Defense Budget, February 1966,
P* 53*
Newhouse, p. 8J+.
the next year’s budget; but at this meeting it was decided to restore 
these funds in the amount of $375 million. McNamara then urged a 
compromise: "A suggestion that the Administration hold off spending
the money, or making a firm decision on what type of ABM system to 
deploy until the State Department had explored with Moscow the idea of 
talks on limiting strategic arms, especially ABM's."^
McNamara next authorized Llewellyn E. Thompson, then leaving to 
become Ambassador to Russia, to contact the Russians in order to suggest 
negotiations limiting strategic arms. As Newhouse says, "the days and
65weeks that followed marked the precise beginning of SALT.” Thompson 
then contacted Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and emphasized talks on the 
ABM. Dobrynin, in turn, placed equal stress on some form of accord on 
both offensive and defensive systems. As a result of these .contacts, 
President Johnson said on January 2lj., 19&7* in kis budget message to 
Congress, that he would continue to develop ABM, but would "take no action 
now" with respect to its deployment.
On January 25 > 1967> in testimony before a Senate subcommittee on 
appropriations, McNamara stated the U.S. position on ABM. He said:
We propose: (l) To pursue with undi­
minished vigor the development, test and 
evaluation of the . . . [ABM] system . 
but to take no action now to deploy the 
system. (2) To initiate negotiations with 
the Soviet Union designed, through formal or 
informal agreement, to limit the deployment of 
antiballistic missile systems. (3) To recon­
sider the deployment decision in the event ^  
these discussions prove unsuccessful. . . .
^Ibid. , p. 86. ^Ibid. , pp. 86-87.
66U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Statement of 
Robert S. McNamara, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Appropriations 
January 26, 1967* 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967? P« 239*
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When the Russians announced in February that they were deploying 
an ABM system around Moscow, Secretary of State Bean Rusk replied that 
ABM development by both nations would result in increases in offensive 
missiles. This, he said, could lead to "new plateaus of expendi-
67tures . . . with no great change in the . . . strategic situation."
On February 18, Thompson told Kosygin that the United States was
willing to discuss limiting offensive systems also, and suggested that
the talks be held in Moscow. On March 2, President Johnson announced that
Kosygin, in answer to a letter of 27 January, had agreed to meet with
the United States in bilateral talks on "means of limiting the arms race
68in offensive and defensive nuclear missiles."
In 1967 at a meeting held at Glassboro, New Jersey, Kosygin took
69a very hard attitude towards arms control. Bean Rusk, years later, 
recalls that at Glassboro, President Johnson said in effect to Kosygin, 
"'Just set a date and I'll have McNamara there in Moscow. Rusk further 
states that:
Kosygin' s problem was that he didn' t have, a 
negotiating position. He clearly had no 
authority to discuss limiting arms, least of 
all ABM's. He replied, in effect: 'How can
you expect me to tell the Russian people they 
can't defend themselves against your rockets?'
Nevertheless, as Rusk recalls, Kosygin did appear to be interested in
notions of stable deterrence, an interest which the Russians had not
shown before. To Rusk, therefore, Glassboro "may have been the start of
^Quoted in Newhouse, p. 90* ^Ibid. , p. 91*
6q
On 17 June, 19^75 the PRC detonated its first thermonuclear 
explosion, of at least 3 megatons. See Jonathan Pollack, "Chinese 
Attitudes Towards Nuclear Weapons, 196)4.-9," China Quarterly, vol. 5>0. 
(April-June, 1972) : 2l|7*
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70SALT for the Russians.” At this time, however, Johnson perceived that 
a decision on whether or not to deploy ABM had to be made. It was 
McNamara who stated the Administration’s final position on ABM in an 
address at San Francisco on September 18, 19.6?
In his address McNamara at first acknowledged that
The cornerstone of our strategic policy 
continues to be to deter deliberate nuclear 
attack on the United States, or its allies, by 
maintaining a highly reliable ability to inflict 
an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single 
aggressor, or combination of aggressors, at any 
time during the course of strategic nuclear 
exchange even after our absorbing a surprise 
first strike.'x
This was, he said, America’s "assured destruction capability," and this
capability, he went on to say, was vital for it was the "very essence"
72of deterrence.
The problem was, he said, that even though the United States had 
nuclear superiority at that time, the Soviet Union could still destroy 
the United States, even after a U.S. first strike. Furthermore, "either 
side relating to the build-up of nuclear forces, be they either offen­
sive or defensive weapons, necessarily trigger[s] reactions on the other 
side, . . . [and it] is precisely this action-reaction phenomenon that 
fuels an arms race." In any regard, he went on to say, the United States 
did not want a nuclear arms race with Russia, but "if the only way to 
prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining first-strike capability over us
70Quoted in Newhouse, p. 95*
^McNamara, "Remarks. . . ."p. 105>, (see Fn. fi>0).
72To deter by promised retaliation is to have an "assured destruc­
tion" capability. To do so one needs a credible second-strike force. 
Assured destruction is defined as "the infliction of an unacceptable 
degree of damage upon an aggressor, even after absorbing a surprise 
attack." Smart, p.
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is to engage in such a race," then the United States has the capability
and will to do so. What was preferable, however, was "to come to a
realistic and reasonably riskless agreement with the Soviet Union" on
both offensive and defensive missiles in order to prevent this arms race.
All each side needed to insure, he said, was that both sides, after such
73an agreement, retain an assured destruction capability.
The main point, then, was that the Soviet Union was deploying an
ABM system. The question this brought up was whether or not the United
States should deploy it too. He then argued for ABM, but as a "thin"
7 J
rather than "heavy" system. His rationale against any heavy system 
was that it could "rather obviously be defeated by an enemy simply 
sending more offensive warheads, or dummy warheads, than there are defen­
sive missiles capable of disposing of them." Thus a "heavy" system is 
unnecessary. A heavy system, besides being expensive and unnecessary, 
would only serve to cause the Soviets to increase their offensive 
capability. As he stated: "It is futile for each of us [U.S. and
U.S.S.R. J to spend $]+ billion, $[{.0 billion, of $1+00 billion— and at the 
end of all the spending, and at the end of all the effort, to be x’ela-
tively at the same point of balance on the security scale that we are 
7£>■now."
McNamara did not really believe in any ABM system, but capitu­
lated to its proponents and agreed to back a "thin" anti-Chinese system.
A thin system could also be used as a bargaining counter, since the
 ^^McNamara, "Remarks. . . ."p. 109•
V J
A "thin" system would provide minimal protection, primarily used 
as protection against accidental launches and nuclear fire from the PRC.
McNamara, "Remarks. . . ." p. 110.
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Russians already had it. But, in essence, "the United States launched
its ABM program because Washington felt pressed to do something,
sensible or not." It appears the Johnson Administration felt that
ballistic-missile defense, especially defending 
ICBM sites, was an option well worth exploring.
It was not, however, explored systematically and 
dispassionately in 1966 and 1967- Washington 
instead found-itself caught up in a wave of ABM 
hysteria, and the decision, like so many others, 
was not measured. It was driven by essentially 
tangential concerns, among them: the failure to
start immediate talks with the Russians; the 
pressure to appease members of Congress who 
insisted on emulating the Russian example; the 
understandable White House fear of ABM becoming 
a solid Republican issue in 1968.76
When on 20 May 1968 First Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov, 
in a speech at the United Nations, announced that his government was 
"ready to reach an agreement on practical steps for the limitation and 
consequent reduction of the strategic means for delivering nuclear 
weaponry," Johnson was ready. Talks appeared to be absolutely confirmed 
on 27 June when Foreign Minister Gromyko announced to the Supreme Soviet 
that the Russian leaders were then prepared to enter into talks concern­
ing the "mutual limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic means of
delivery of nuclear weapons, both offensive and defensive, including
77anti-ballistic missiles."
When Czechoslovakia was invaded by Soviet forces on August 20, 
1968, however, the preparations for SALT stopped. Dean Rusk describes 
the U.S. feelings as he said:
The Russians, so far as we knew, were still 
prepared to go ahead. We felt we could not.
Public Opinion in the United States and in the
^Newhouse, pp. 100-101 
77Quoted in Newhouse, p. 103.
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West would not have comprehended a summit 
meeting and the start of talks right after 
the invasion. . . ."78
He went on to say that the idea of SALT was discussed again in November
at U.S. initiative, and the Soviets were agreeable. President Johnson
wanted the negotiations to begin before leaving office; a notion that
was firmly rejected by President-Elect Nixon and Dr. Henry Kissinger.
In denying Johnson's request, they indicated that they wanted strategic
options to remain open and free from any residual policy of the Johnson
Administration.
At this time the Soviet Union appeared even more eager to begin 
SALT. It announced on inaugural day, January 20, 19^9> that the U.S.S.R. 
was ready to "start a serious exchange of views" on a "mutual limitation 
and subsequent reduction of strategic nuclear vehicles, including defen­
sive systems." The spokesman also stated that "when the Nixon Administra­
tion is ready to sit down at the negotiating table, we are ready to do 
so, too."^
Nixon's reply of January 27 indicated that he favored strategic 
talks with the Soviet Union, but he tied the talks to the solution of 
"outstanding political problems," like the Mideast. He was attempting, 
says Newhouse, to show that arms control was one of several issues, all 
interrelated. On February 13, Dobrynin told Secretary of State Rogers 
that the Soviet Union was ready to go ahead with SALT as part of an 
"era of negotiation" in which other areas, such as the Mideast, could be 
discussed.
President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger perceived that with MIRV the
78'ibid., p. 130.
79IUd., p. 11+1.
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United States had greatly increased its counterforce capability, but
with this advantage also came the fear that when the Soviets deployed
MIRV, the size of their SS-9 would make the United States extremely
vulnerable* This* then, caused the Nixon Administration to see itself
as having very few alternatives. Without SALT the options were to
expand the United States1 strategic strike forces, or to strengthen ARM
80in an attempt to attain superiority. The latter option would "be 
difficult if not impossible" to achieve, however, because of the re­
sources; technology, industry, political system, and economy, available 
to the U.S.S.R. This would, as McNamara stated in 1967> "increase
greatly both their expenditures and ours without any gain in real secur-
8lity to either side."
President Nixon did not foresee great dividends from expanding
the stike forces either. On February 18, 1970) he stated his views as:
"Sharp increases in U.S. strategic nuclear forces might not have any
significant political or military benefit. Many believe that Soviet
political positions would harden, tensions would increase and the prospect
for reaching agreements to limit strategic arms might be irreparably 
82damaged." The only viable option appeared to be SALT.
As the summer of 1969 began, Nixon announced his readiness to 
begin SALT. On July 10, Foreign Minister Gromyko delivered an address to
80Newhouse, pp. lljl-1+3.
Coffey, pp. 57-59* McNamara's quote from Statement of Secre­
tary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before a Joint Session of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee and the Senate Sub-Committee on Department of 
Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1968-72 Defense Program and
Defense Budget, mimeographed "(January 23, 1967)? p. 53) quoted in 
Coffey, p. 59*
82'"Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace,"
New York Times Magazine February 19, 1970) P* 21+.
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the Supreme Soviet in which her stated that the arms race between the two 
great powers was foolish, and that the U.S.S.R. regarded SALT as a 
matter of "paramount importance." On October 25, a joint announcement
proclaimed that SALT was to begin at Helsinki on November 17,1969*
The Talks
Since SALT opened in Helsinki, information about the talks has 
been shrouded in secrecy. This has made it extremely difficult to deter­
mine the positions of each nation. However, ideas of each nation*s 
positions can be ascertained.
In a message to Gerard Smith, the chief U^S. delegate to the 
negotiations, President Nixon stated the general position for the U.S. 
delegation. He said:
I have stated that for our part we will be 
guided by the concept of maintaining "sufficiency" 
in the forces required to protect ourselves and
our allies. I recognize that the leaders of the
Soviet Union bear similar defense responsibilities.
I believe it possible, however, that we carry out 
our respective responsibilities under a mutually 
acceptable limitation and eventual reduction of 
our strategic arsenals.®3
Secretary of State Rogers further amplified these instructions 
by stating the three main objectives of the United States as:
1) To enhance international security by 
maintaining a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic rela­
tionship through limitations of the deployment 
of strategic armaments.
2) To halt the upward spiral of strategic 
arms and avoid the tensions, uncertainties, and 
costs of an unrestrained continuation of the 
strategic arms race.
3) To reduce the risk of an outbreak of 
nuclear war through a dialogue about issues 
arising from the strategic situation.
83 •U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Na­
tional Security, 2d ed. , Pub. Ij.95 revised Aug. 1973> (Washington: U.S. 
Govt. Print. Off., 1970), p. 7«
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He further stated: "What we hope that we can do is negotiate an arms
limitation agreement which will keep us in the same relative position
Pi)
that we are now— and which can be verified."
This meant, says Robert Bowie, that the United States1 negotia­
ting position involved the need to keep the Triad in effect, including
85land-based missiles, SLBMs, and strategic bombers. Moreover, the
objectives for SALT were to be the prevention of any unilateral advantages
to either side, and to insure that a "stable strategic equilibrium"
86(under assured destruction) be achieved. All in all, said Gerard
Q rj
Smith, the U.S. delegation was "to see what could be ripe for agreement."
SALT evolved through seven rounds, alternating the place of
meeting between Helsinki and Vienna. Round I, which opened at Helsinki
on November 17> 19^9» lasted for thirty-five days. At its conclusion,
/
a communique was issued which stated very little except that "an under­
standing was reached on the general range of questions which will be the
88subject of further U.S.-Soviet eehanges."
The stress in Round I, Newhouse says, was on defining the para­
meters of the main, or central, weapon systems. Moscow appeared to be 
very concerned over ABM, much to the surprise of the United States.
Newhouse quotes "a closely involved American" as recalling that "both 
sides [were] making McNamara-like noises about the destabilizing effects 
of ABM deployment; the Russians were surprisingly explicit on this
8i+Ibid. , p. 8.
85 ,Robert R. Bowie, "The Bargaining Aspects of Arms Control: The
SALT Experience," in Kintner, p. 131 •
86 87Moulton, p. 302. Arms Control. . . ., p. 8.
88Quoted in Newhouse, p. 173*
89point." At this round Moscow supposedly offered three alternative
postures for'ABM: heavy, limited, or no deployment. The U.S. reply was
"vague and noncommittal." Quantity was discussed in great detail, "but
both sides "were much less willing to do so about quality— about MIRV's,
improved support systems, and potential innovations." Furthermore, "the
Russians had clearly been instructed to avoid talking about them at all.
They could discuss numbers of launchers, for example, but not the size
90of launchers, or the accuracies of warheads." The Russians would 
discuss ARM and when the Americans attempted to raise other subjects, the 
Soviets would become greatly concerned over the U.S. Forward-Based 
Systems (FBS)-.91
Round II of SALT began in Vienna on April 16, 1970* The United 
States hoped that by proposing "very limited ABM deployment," they could 
eventually attain a ceiling on Soviet offensive missiles, and especially 
a subceiling on the number of SS-9's. At this round an option was pre-. 
sented by the United States delegation which would have banned MIRV. This 
was quickly refused by the U.S.S.R. as it represented an attempt, said a 
Russian delegate, to "freeze" Moscow in a technologically inferior posi­
tion. The Russians did, however, quickly accept a United States proposal 
for an ABM plan which limited deployment to one site located around each 
nation's capital. This, as the U.S. delegation soon realized, was to 
the Soviet's advantage because of the over three hundred ICBM's around 
Moscow, which would have come under the protective coverage of their ABM.
^Ibid. ^Newhouse, p. 1?3*
91FBS consists of U.S. aircraft located in continental Europe 
and on aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean. These are dual purpose 
aircraft, capable of carrying nuclear or non-nuclear bombs. Russia 
wanted to count these as central weapons systems.
There were no ICBM's located around Washington. The United States, says 
Newhouse, had not expected the Russians to accept this proposal; -there­
fore, it had to retreat and renegotiate its ABM posture. There were no
92other important results and Round II recessed on August 11+.
Round III began November 2 in Helsinki, and was to last only 
forty-six days. Here, both nations appeared very far apart in their * 
positions. Apparently the major portion of time was spent in defining 
what types of weapons should be limited: offensive, defensive, or both.
The United States wanted limitation on both, while the Soviets would 
agree only to limit ABM's. Very little was resolved at this round, but 
a short while after its conclusion a joint statement was released in 
both Washington and Moscow on May 20, 1971 stating:
The governments of the United States and 
the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course 
of their talks on the limitation of strategic 
armaments, have agreed to concentrate this 
year on working out an agreement for the 
limitation of the deployment of antiballistic 
missile systems (ABMs). They have also agreed 
that, together with concluding an agreement to 
limit ABMs , they will agree on certain measures 
with respect to the limitation of offensive 
strategic weapons.93
As the ABM issue was resolved bit by bit during the succeeding 
Rounds, the Soviets agreed to quantitatively limit their ICBM and SLBM 
forces for a temporary period. The main points of the actual negotia­
tions, however, were the interest each nation displayed in ABM, and the 
reluctance of the Soviets to agree to limit MIRV.
Two agreements were finally reached at SALT I; The ABM Treaty,
■^Newhouse, pp. 177-89*
^^Michael Getler, "U.S. Plan would Limit U.S. ABM if U.S.S.R. 
would Freeze SS-9>" The Washington Post, 21 May 1971 > P* A8.
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and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons, 
both signed on May 26, 1972.^
The AIM Treaty provides for the deployment of a limited-scale 
ABM system, although ABM R & I) is permitted. The treaty recognizes that 
"nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind," and
therefore a limit on ABM would be a "substantial factor" in halting, or
limiting a strategic offensive arms race. It is hoped, the treaty
continues, that this agreement will lead to "further negotiations on
limiting strategic arms." Some of the more important provisions of the 
ABM Treaty are as follows.
It prohibits a nationwide deployment of ABM by specifying that 
each nation may only defend its "national capital area" and one ICBM 
area. Each nation is limited to 100 launchers at each ABM.site, and 
radars are also limited. Each launcher is limited to one missile which 
must be designed for intercept, and the actual ABM system deployed cannot 
be made up of any components which are "sea-based, air-based, space- 
based, or mobile land-based." Several articles provide for non-prolifer­
ation of A M  components. Any inspections, the treaty further points out, 
will be by use of the "national technical means of verification" at each 
nation*s disposal. Furthermore, the treaty is established to be of 
"unlimited duration," with either party allowed to withdraw by providing 
the other with a six-months notice "if it decides that extraordinary 
events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its 
supreme interests."
The Interim Agreement provides for a five-year moratorium on the 
deployment of strategic offensive weapons; e.g., it acknowledges that
9Vie text of these are from Bupuy, pp. 603-9
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such a limit would temporarily serve to "contribute to the creation of 
more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic 
arms, as well as to the relaxation of international tension and the 
strengthening of trust between States. . • . "It also halts construction, 
as of July 1, 1972, on additional land-based ICBM launchers, and it 
limits SLBMs to the "numbers operational and under construction" on 
May 26, 1972. The agreement, like the treaty, is to be in force for five 
years, unless superseded. Each party is permitted to withdraw from the 
agreement by providing the other with a six-months notice. The numbers 
specified in the agreement are:
(1) U.S.— no more than 710 SLBMs on no more than 1+2+ submarines.
(2) U.S.S.R.---no more than 950 SLBMs on no more than 62 sub­
marines.
These agreements meant that the U.S.S.R., potentially, could have 
561+ ICEMs more than the U.S.: I,6l8 to l,0f>2+. This numerical advantage
was allowable, said the U.S. government, because the United States1 
ICBM with MIRV was generally regarded as more reliable and accurate. The 
U.S. had 1,000 Minuteman II, but were to MIRV 550 of these (to be called 
Minuteman III) with three MIRVs each. It was expected at the time of 
the ratification of the treaty that even with the numerical discrepancy 
in launchers, the United States would have almost 2+00 more warheads than 
the Soviet Union. In payload the U.S.S.R. would have an advantage, but 
the U.S. planners felt that accuracy was more important. Many felt that 
whenever the U.S.S.R. developed MIRV, the advantages in warheads would be
95quickly erased.
9E>James M. Roherty, Class Lecture, College of William & Mary in 
Virginia, February 21, 1973«
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"Even before the ink was dry," so to speak, both nations were
already executing technological "hedges" against the other. Whereas
the Soviet’s "hedge" appears to be a MIRV for its land-based missiles,
especially the SS-9 > the United States’ "hedge" appears to resttwith
improvements in its SLBMs. The latter improvements are an adoption of
the Trident submarine, and a new SLBM to go with it, the underwater long-
range missile system (ULMS). ULMS’ advantage is that its range is
approximately 1}.,500 nautical miles, as compared to the approximate range
of 2,500 nautical miles for Polaris and Poseidon. The importance of
ULMS, as Newhouse points out, is that it "will increase the operating
96area of the submarine by a factor of ten."
PART V 
Conclusion
The factors contributing to the onset of SALT are numerous and 
very complex. The most important of these could be summarized in the 
following manner.
Bureaucratic Influence
It is apparent that the bureaucracies in both nations function to 
influence the decision-making processes by shaping the inputs being 
funneled into the leadership. Simply because they have this function, 
both bureaucracies did influence the onset of SALT; for example, possibly 
in defining when security in the form of parity had been met, or defining 
what weapon systems should be limited, or by some other means. Never­
theless, even though the bureaucracies were not decisive, they should not 
be disregarded as factors. Even if they did not push for SALT, they did
96Newhouse, p. 23.
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define the parameters in such a way that it was seen as a viable option.
Economy
The economy defines the resources a decision-maker has available 
to execute policy. To that extent it affected both nations in the 
decision to opt for SALT. It is doubtful that it was decisive in Russia, 
however, because, as Thomas Wolfe says, if it was then one would have 
expected the U.S.S.R. to withdraw from SALT as their economy re surged in 
1970• Likewise, if the economy had been particularly influential in the 
U.S. decision to enter SALT, the United States probably would have wel­
comed the opportunity to halt strategic spending after SALT terminated. 
Neither was done.
Perceptions of the International Environment 
The international environment provided the setting in which to 
conduct SALT, and for that reason, at least, it has to be taken into 
consideration. In the final analysis, unless SALT offered an opportunity 
to enhance Russian and U.S. security it would never have begun. SALT 
dealt primarily with security, but even though this is said to be mostly 
a political matter, in the nuclear age it becomes quite technical in 
nature. It appears, therefore, that notions of strategic security are 
intertwined with the interaction of the international environment and the 
strategic-technological-military factor.
Strategic-Technological-Military 
This combination of factors was vitally important to the onset 
of SALT. Strategically, security depended on the prescriptions of the 
strategic doctrines then in voguej i.e., deterrence and defense. Mili­
tarily, a nation’s power, and consequently its influence and security,
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is perceived to depend on its military forces. Technologically, qualita­
tive innovations in weaponry affect both strategic and military factors. 
Militarily, they add to power, and "exponential" jumps such as MIRV are 
looked on with great favor. Strategically, they are placed into the 
schema of the strategic doctrine and are judged as stabilizing or not 
by each nation. If not, then security is harmed and action must be taken.
Qualitatively speaking, the only major "exponential" jumps in 
weaponry since World War II have been the atom and hydrogen bombs, the 
development of the ICBM, and the development of MIRV. None, -until MIRV, 
caused a SALT because the U.S.S.R. had failed to achieve parity and the 
U.S. refused to give up the idea of superiority. MIRV, on the other 
hand, was probably unknown by the Soviet Union until preliminary steps 
had already been taken to begin SALT. The U.S. knew of MIRV, but were 
concerned lest the Soviets perfect it for their SS-9* As the negotiations 
began, however, the U.S.S.R. quickly turned down a limit on MIRV, there­
fore indicating a desire to retain the opportunity to develop it.
97ABM, on the other hand, was the primary interest of SALT.
Ironically, this weapon was not regarded as an "exponential" jump in 
qualitative innovation because it was composed of older ICBM technology, 
and it did not strengthen a nation's offensive power as such. It did, 
however, drastically affect the strategic doctrine of deterrence. It was 
a defensive weapon and there was an excellent possibility that if de­
ployed, it would, as McNamara suggested, have precipitated a major ams 
race. Not only would it have been expensive to build, it would also have 
created the additional expense incurred in the construction of more
97'Of the nine options originally created for SALT by the U.S., 
seven were to limit ABM.
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offensive weapons. It would have adversely affected the economics of 
both nations, without increasing security at all. The political decision 
was made, therefore, to limit ABM. This has been followed by both 
powers•
A decision was also made to limit offensive arms, but qualitative 
hedges have already been developed: MIRV for the U.S.S.R. and ULMS for
the U.S.
In the final analysis, all of the above factors influenced SALT 
to a degree, but none was decisive. The most influential, however, were 
those which affected security: the strategic-technological-military 
factors.
APPENDIX A
The Language of SALT
Since theoretical jargon has influenced the thinking and deci-
98sions of the United States policy-makers, it becomes necessary to 
devote time to a discussion of the theoretical aspects of deterrence.
In essence, the language of SALT is rooted in the abstract, vague ter­
minology of deterrence. This terminology is a hybrid mix of terms, 
including those of a military-strategic, technical, and pyschological- 
political nature.
Deterrence is a theory that assumes that parleying with other 
actors in the international environment will not be fruitful if a state 
is not in the position to make its views a reality to the other party. 
Goodwill cannot be relied upon. The term suggests that the purpose of 
arming is to disuade, preclude— -"deter"— conflict. If one power can 
convince a potential adversary that conflict would be more disadvantageous 
to the latter, then the issue will not be tested. There are several 
assumptions in the concept which have to be met, namely: (l) that both 
sides are rational in the calculating sense of the word; (2) that a 
credible threat is presented, that both sides have the force structure 
necessary to impose unacceptable damage on the other side, and that they 
both have the will to do so; and (3) that a stable environment exists
98The Soviet strategic doctrine is not fully known, although it 
is suspected to be somewhat along the same lines as that of the U.S.
This appendix, of necessity, will utilize the U.S. strategic doctrine.
132
133
in which there are no "surprises” of either a political or technological 
99nature.
Deterrence as a strategic-military policy is a paradox in the
sense that its success
depends on essentially psychological criteria.
Deterrence seeks to prevent a given course by 
making it seem less attractive than all possible 
alternatives. It therefore ultimately depends 
on an intangible quality: the state of mind
of the potential aggressor. . . .Deterrence 
requires a combination of power, the will to 
use it, and the assessment of these by the 
potential aggressor.190
In essence, then, strategic stability requires that the great states
know the resources the other has. It is a fragile notion, which can be
upset by improvements in technology.
The difference between deterrence, as described above, and 
defense is central to the strategic discussions in the post-World War II 
period. Glenn H. Snyder in his comparison of the two notions essen­
tially agrees with the notion of deterrence as shown above.Defense, 
on the other hand, means reducing one’s "own prospective costs and risks 
in the event that deterrence fails," by some "defensive" means; e.g., 
a missile defense system, civil defense activities, fortification 
(hardening) of one’s own missile sites. The difference between deterrence 
and defense then, can be said to be analogous to the difference in
^^See Eoherty, Fn. 95*
"^^Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (New York: Harpers,
1960), p. 12.
^"^Snyder defines deterrence as "discouraging the enemy from taking 
military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing 
his prospective gain." Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense; Toward 
a Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1961), p. 3. ■
"reducing the probability of war and mitigating its consequences.
Snyder, p. 4.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there seem to be certain factors which are 
common to the onset of each of the three arms control conferences under 
study. However, the effects of each of them appear to differ according 
to the circumstances surrounding the specific negotiation.
Economics
The state of a nation's economy appears to have been a major 
determinant of its willingness to enter into arms control negotiations, 
especially with regard to the Washington Conference and SALT. The Hague 
Conferences also exhibit this factor as important, but to a lesser 
degree. Before the Czar's Rescript, for example, it appears that Russia 
was in financial straits for many reasons, but primarily due to the 
costs of maintaining its immense armed forces. Russia was heavily in 
debt to other nations, particularly Prance, and the outlook for future 
credit was bleak. The expected cost of refitting the armed forces with 
a new field gun was too high, thus the Czar attempted to reach some sort 
of arms control agreement with other continental powers, particularly 
Austria-Hungary and Germany.
Granted, there were other powers in the world having financial 
problems, but even though it would have been possible for most of them 
to use the proposed conference as a vehicle for reducing armaments and 
therefore arms budgets, they did not. Germany, for example, ridiculed
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the idea that arms control was necessary for economic reasons. More­
over, although England recognized that armaments were an expensive pro­
position, the financial "burdens were not large enough to bring about 
British agreement on arms control.
Furthermore, during the conference, the vast majority of nations 
did not appear to be concerned with the economic problems created by 
armaments and no concerted effort was made to eliminate any item on 
economic grounds. In the final analysis, if the cost of armaments was a 
"crushing burden" driving nations to the Hague, this was not in evidence 
in any case but that of Russia.
The economic factor appears to have played a more important role 
in the decision to opt for the Washington Conference in 1921. The 
American naval program of 1916, for example, was proving to be a very 
expensive proposition. By 1919-1920 it came to be considered economi­
cally infeasible, and ways to reduce naval spending without harming 
security were discussed. One viable option was the conference.
Japan was having similar, and possibly more severe, financial 
problems. Her buildup of naval weaponry appears to have been tied to 
the United States1 1916 naval program. Her attempt to stay at two- 
thirds the level of American naval construction, however, was placing 
her near bankruptcy. Moreover, appropriations were becoming more diffi­
cult to obtain from the Diet, and articulate opinion pushed for financial 
relief. Great Britain was also in financial straits. World War I had 
caused the British to incur massive debts, and on top of these, post-war 
domestic expenses were astronomical. Finally, financial problems 
became so severe that the decision was made to place a very large portion 
of the British fleet on reserve status. This concern over financial
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problems was to continue into the negotiations, and the main agreements 
finally reached limited the most expensive type of vessel— -the capital 
ship.
The actual effect of economics on the Russian decision to enter 
into SALT is probably unknowable, at least to Western analysts, but it 
does appear to have been a factor. The fact that the decision to nego­
tiate was made during a year when defense spending had reached its 
highest peak and the economy was in a severe downturn, however, is 
coincidence enough to suggest a probable correlation. Likewise, the fact 
that the Soviets decided to stay in the negotiations as their economy 
resurged in 1970 probably indicates that finances were not a decisive 
factor.
The decision of the United States to enter into SALT probably 
was influenced heavily by economics. The war in Vietnam, among other 
things, had caused the defense budgets to soar after 1965, a -fa-ct which 
became painfully obvious as major, vocal disagreements on spending 
priorities erupted in 1967. Arguments appeared to center around whether 
to spend money on either "guns” or "butter." As Congress began to 
become more concerned with defense spending, the executive branch turned 
to ways of economizing. One such way was an attempt to halt the prolif­
eration of strategic weaponry. This was done by placing a unilateral, 
quantitative ceiling on offensive missiles in 1967, the decision to 
deploy a "thin" ABM system, and the decision to halt ABM, or limit it to 
a severe degree (twelve sites were originally planned) through SALT.
In the final analysis, economics played a different but major 
role in each of the three conferences studied. At the Hague it was
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influential for Russia, though not for other nations* At the Washington 
Conference it played a large role, at least with respect to Japan, Great 
Britain, and the United States, the three great naval powers. Economics 
also had a major influence on SALT. Here, both nations apparently 
wished to divert funds to domestic needs, at least on a temporary basis, 
hence agreement was reached on a potentially expensive item— the ABM.
' Qualitative Innovations in Weaponry
Qualitative innovations in weaponry appears to be a common 
variable at the conferences. A factor in the onset of Hague, for 
example, was the existence of a new type of field gun. Russia, until 
then the strongest military power on the Continent, saw that possession 
of this weapon was vital to its continued well being. Because of Russia’s 
financial status, however, it was felt that this innovation could not be 
purchased, thus leaving Russia in a qualitatively inferior status. The 
invention of this weapon, its desirability and its cost, appear to have 
been major influences on the Czar's decision to issue his first call for 
an arms control conference.
The original Rescript, however, was greeted with skepticism from 
the other nations of the world. Those nations Which were not continental 
powers showed little, if any, concern over the existence of the new field 
gun, or any other qualitative advance in weaponry for that matter. There­
fore, they were under no "urgent need" to procure such a weapon for 
themselves and they remained skeptical of the Czar's motives. The contin­
ental powers likewise felt that the Czar's motives were selfish, and 
they saw that the Rescript was the result of Russia's financial problems. 
Their original skepticism was ameliorated somewhat by the issuance of a 
second circular, however, and the nations did gather at the Hague to
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discuss, among other things, arms control.
Although arms control proposals were presented at the conference 
by the Russians, it soon became quite clear that no major agreements were 
to occur. Only the peripheral agreements described in Chapter II were 
reached, and none of these were of especially great consequence. In 
essence, once the conference convened, it quickly showed that the nations 
of the world were not then ready to conscientiously seek arms control.
The rejection of arms control as part of the 1907 conference's program 
only served to emphasize this point.
Two major qualitative innovations in weaponry came into promi­
nence during or immediately after World War I, however, and both influ­
enced the decision of the major participants, Great Britain, Japan, and 
the United States, to enter into negotiations on arms control at the 
Washington Conference of 1921-1922. These innovations were the sub­
marine and the airplane.
The submarine had shown its potential as a devastating weapons 
system in World War I. Its killing power may not have been as great as 
that of a capital ship, but its stealth, quickness, and economy were 
adequate compensations. It was an excellent weapon, both offensively 
and defensively, and was being promoted as a revolutionary new concept:—  
one which made a large capital-ship navy an unnecessary extravagance.
The airplane was another weapon with immense potential as both 
an offensive and defensive weapon. It was not as advanced as the sub­
marine, and therefore had not had the same impact, but it had shown 
promise during the war, and post-war tests had shown its probable future 
effectiveness. The airplane could be constructed very inexpensively, 
particularly compared to the capital ship.
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The existence of these two weapon systems provided the oppor­
tunity for the nations to keep up both their offensive and defensive 
strength at relatively little cost. Though the submarine and airplane
were not as formidable as the capital ship, they could provide adequate,
and far less expensive, security for each nation.
In the final analysis, however, exactly how much effect these 
weapon systems had on the advent of the Washington Conference is in 
doubt. Both were discussed at the Washington Conference, with the 
largest controversy centered around the submarine. It must be noted, 
however, that the submarine was a weapon ideally suited for a defensive 
as well as offensive role, and those nations without extremely powerful 
navies, like Prance, would have no part in Its abolition. They saw 
Britain's offer to abolish the submarine, therefore, as working in her 
own favor, especially since she was assured of the second largest fleet
of warships in the world. To limit capital ships and not submarines, on
the other hand, would bring Britain closer to the lesser powers in naval 
strength. It can be said, then, that Britain's offer to abolish the 
submarine showed that she was not prepared to use it as an alternative 
to the capital ship, and that, for Britain at least, the factor of quali­
tative weapons innovations may not have been of prime importance. If, 
however, Great Britain knew the offer to abolish the submarine would be 
refused and that therefore the gesture was made only to induce Prance to 
vote for the Root resolutions, then it was effective. The sudden improve­
ments in Britain's submarine forces following the Washington Conference 
may show the latter as the case. For the most part, however, qualitative 
advances in weaponry were not a decisive factor in the decisions to enter 
into the Washington Conference.
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After World War II, weapons technology changed in rapid,
"exponential" jumps. This meant that, relative to the interwar period, 
qualitative improvements now came about in quick succession. These 
improvements, in turn, were of such magnitude, either in terms of fire­
power or delivery capability, that they altered the strategic status quo 
in some form. Thus, the reaction of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. was to 
match the innovation, thereby perpetuating an "arms race" until both 
sides finally decided to accept parity as a basis for negotiation. There­
fore, it can be said that these qualitative advances in weaponry affected 
the onset of SALT.
To digress for a moment, it appears that military technology 
creates a particular hazard for any arms control negotiation: it affects
its timing. Because of technological innovations, one nation may be a 
distance (in the R & I) spectrum) ahead of another at any specific point 
in time. For example, in January 19&7 > President Johnson proposed SALT 
to Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin. At that time, however, the United 
States was well ahead of the U.S.S.R. in both the number and quality of 
strategic arms. The U.S.S.R. was in the midst of a build-up program 
designed to attain equality with the United States. By June 1968, when 
Foreign Minister Gromyko signaled Soviet agreement to SALT, Soviet 
strategic production was rapidly catching up with the United States 
forces, then at their 19&7 ceiling.
Finally, technological improvements allowed the Soviet Union to 
achieve quantitative parity in payload, at least, with the United States 
by 1970* By that date, the Soviet Union was able to absorb a sizeable 
counterforce attack and still have enough nuclear weapons left to destroy 
the United States.
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It appears, then, that qualitative innovations destabilize an 
existing strategic balance— a status quo which is understood, and has 
led to plans and policies designed with it in mind. When an innovation, 
such as ABM or MIRV, creates instabilities in strategic thinking, fear 
and tension are the result.
The qualitative, or "technological," implication of weaponry 
in the nuclear age, then, is that each "exponential" jump dramatically 
alters the existing strategic status quo. If the Soviets are outdone, 
as in the case of MIRV, an agreement to limit it is impossible, at least 
until both nations have the innovation. However, the case of MIRV is 
complicated. Its possession can be hidden, and without on-site inspec­
tion it cannot be verified* To limit MIRV without inspection guaranteed 
is ludicrous. ABM, on the other hand, is a destabilizng weapon like 
MIRV,-but it can be inspected by satellite reconnaissance and hence 
limited. It is unstable because it limits deterrence; that is, it 
allows one side to feel that if it builds enough ABM, then it can win a 
nuclear war. Deterrence depends on a "standoff" where both sides are 
equally vulnerable. To have ABM on both sides would mean that emphasis 
would have to be in two areas, in a large, expensive ABM force to pro­
vide defense, and a large, expensive offensive force to overcome an 
opponent’s ARM system.
What this means, in the final analysis, is that arms control is 
based on security, not economics or technological innovations. Only when 
a power feels secure at its force level can negotiations take place. It 
appears that the Soviet Union felt secure only in a position of strategic 
parity, where the strategic force structure was stable. ABM was a threat 
to this, could be limited, and hence the agreement.
1U3
Security
It appears that all arms control negotiations in this study were 
undertaken to advance security. In all three cases, the development of 
new weaponry altered the then existing strategic status quo, thus 
affecting the then prevalent notions of security. In the case of the 
Hague, the field gun affected Russia’s ability to defend itself, 
especially under the old rules of warfare where nations massed their 
armies. A new gun would bring murderous concentrations of firepower to 
bear on an enemy, thus forcing military commanders to recognize that 
deciding combat power on a battlefield, all else being equal, would have 
to favor those having this weapon. The "have not”— Russia in this case—  
became quite insecure. Since it wanted the weapon but could not afford 
it, Russia opted for a conference.
At Washington, the existence of the submarine and airplane 
changed the then prevalent manner of waging war, on the sea at least, 
because it began to make capital ships anachronistic. Security was not 
that severely hurt, however, by the existence of these new weapons.
Instead, the interaction of the three great powers in the Pacific 
created security problems for all three. The problem appeared greatest 
for Japan, however. Japan knew it could not win in any war with the 
United States, and it was becoming bankrupt over arms expenditures. In 
addition, the British were making inquiries which led the Japanese to 
believe that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was soon to be abrogated. With­
out some agreement to control arms, Japan would have had to enter an 
arms race to protect its security, which would have proven to be devas­
tating. The same reasoning existed for Great Britain and the United 
States, but to a lesser degree.
lUk
Security was also a prime consideration at SALT, The entire 
doctrine of deterrence deals specifically with security. If deterrence 
fails,then security is irrevocably damaged because a nuclear war has 
already begun. Once both nations become convinced of the destabilizing 
effects of ABM on deterrence, then both nations moved to limit its use.
Through a study of these conferences, several things become 
apparent. One is that agreement in the matter of armaments is possible 
when there is mutual interest in reaching an agreement, and security 
policies are parallel. If security policies collide, as was the case of 
Russia and the United States until the mid-1960s, negotiations cannot be 
undertaken. As John Newhouse aptly states, "arms control becomes a 
serious matter only when directly linked to national security."^
Another similarity in the conferences was that in two of the 
three, a decision was made by at least one major participant to go from 
a formerly superior position in armaments to one of parity with at least 
one other nation. The decision was also made by a nation: formerly 
seeking superiority to resign itself to acceptance of parity.
Before the Washington Conference, Great Britain had enjoyed a 
superior position in terms of naval power for at least a century, possi­
bly more. Yet, after World War I, it decided to "hold the line" with 
regard to further naval expansion, thus conceding the opportunity for the 
United States, at least, to achieve a position of equal strength if so 
desired. The United States, on the other hand, had seemingly made a 
commitment to achieve naval superiority in its own right. By 1921, 
however, the United States began to abandon this goal, especially as the
^John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt,
Rinehart & Winston, 1973)> p. 69. '
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British reduced naval construction and the expenses necessary to attain 
this "superior” navy became apparent. Consequently, both nations 
resigned themselves to a position of what they perceived as parity in 
naval power. These political decisions thus paved the way for the 
negotiations to take place.
The post-World War II period saw a similar occurrence. The 
United States, after its atomic monopoly period had ended in 191*9*. 
had resolved to maintain superiority in nuclear weaponry. This it was 
able to do, in both size and quality of nuclear forces, for a long time.
In the 1960s, however, the U.S. dropped the desire for numerical advan­
tage in all aspects of the Triad, especially in ICBMs, and decided to 
opt for quantitative equality, thereby resting its security on perceptions 
of a vast qualitative advantage in weaponry. This decision allowed the 
Soviets to gain numerical equality, then superiority, in terms of 
launchers, by default. This superiority was supposedly balanced, 
however, by the somewhat fuzzy nuclear conceptions of the "balancing" 
qualitative superiority of the U.S., specifically because of the existence 
of MIRV. In any regard, it was only after this decision to hold the 
line on deployment of weaponry that the negotiations were able to take 
place.
In essence, it appears that parity defined as a nation’s percep­
tion of what constitutes strategic equality, is possibly a necessary 
precondition for negotiations to take place. The "successful" negotia­
tions (in the sense of those where the participants gathered in good 
faith with some hope of success) , appear to have this in common.
In the final analysis, at the present time it cannot be general­
ized that any single factor or combination of factors provide the impetus
for arms control negotiations. All that can be said is that four factors 
are usually present as "influencers" in the decision to enter into arms 
control negotiations. These, in sum, are economic considerations, 
qualitative innovations in weaponry, the acquiescence by the major 
participants of perceived parity, and the consideration of enhancement 
of security. In actuality the last three pertain to security considera­
tions, therefore, it is possible to state that security is the most 
important factor in bringing about arms control negotiations, and this 
must be recognized in any attempt to solve the political problems 
through arms control. Qualitative advances in weaponry are a prime 
determinant of security because they upset the status quo, thereby 
challenging decision makers either to match the improvement, or to attempt 
arms control to avert an aims race. Thus, qualitative advances in 
weaponry always have the potential to create negotiations, but their 
actual effect can be known only to the decision maker.
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